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ABSTRACT 
The prequel to Plato’s Sophist, the Theaetetus, ends with the unanswered question, 
what is the logos (discursive account, reasoning) appropriate to knowledge? How can one 
distinguish it from the logos that lacks knowledge? This dissertation argues that the Soph-
ist, through an inquiry of what the sophist is, is a response to that question. 
This response consists in three basic claims. First, logos forms the heart of inquiry, 
that is, the ascent from ignorance to knowledge. That ascent consists in logos repeatedly 
articulating what one understands at a given moment and then examining that articulation 
from different perspectives. The dialogue shows how the interlocutors’ initial understand-
ing of the sophist is constantly refuted, refined, challenged, and qualified after being ar-
ticulated. Second, the cognitive powers of perceiving, judging, and thinking all have the 
structure of logos, and are presented as stages in the ascent. That is, stage one shows the 
interlocutors’ perceptions of the sophist; stage two, their judgment of him; and stage 
three, what they think of him. Each stage gradually approaches knowledge without being 
identical to it. Finally, this absence of identity suggests that logos is necessary but per-
haps insufficient for the ascent to knowledge. 
The process of inquiry, as shown in the Sophist, gestures towards knowledge as a 
state of mind that is both internally self-consistent and holds beliefs that allow the knower 
		 vi 
to be “in touch with” the world (a relation that Plato calls “truth”). Logos is insufficient 
for knowledge for two reasons. First, while capable of achieving a self-consistent state of 
mind, it does not guarantee that its results will be true of the world. Nor, moreover, can it 
replace the personal experience that is equally necessary for knowledge. The dialogue 
suggests this latter point by concluding with a correct definition (logos) of the sophist that 
is misunderstood by one of the interlocutors (Theaetetus) due to his lack of experience. 
These limits of logos suggest that the Sophist presents Plato’s self-critique of both the 
possibility and desirability of the philosophical dream of grasping the world in its purely 
“logical” aspects. 
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INTRODUCTION 	
Plato's Theaetetus asks what knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is. It concludes with the question 
of the relation between knowledge and λόγος (logos), that is, “discourse,” “discursive 
reasoning,” or “discursive account.”1 The person who knows something seems to be 
capable of giving a logos of that thing. The mathematician can give a demonstration of 
the Pythagorean theorem. The car mechanic can name the components of the car and 
explain how they work together. But while the possession of knowledge implies the 
ability to speak and think, the converse is not true: one can discourse and think about 
something without being a knower of it. I can, for example, go on the internet and read 
articles on mathematics. It seems, however, that while I somehow learn something 
reading those articles, this usually does not make me a mathematician. What is the 
difference between me and the mathematician? Does it lie in the difference between the 
quality of my logos and his? Is it possible to specify a sense of logos appropriate to 
ἐπιστήμη, a logos that would qualify as scientific and mark the possession of 
knowledge?2 
The Theaetetus, when discussing the proposed definition “knowledge is true 
judgment with logos,” considers three candidates for what sort of logos would make the 
definition true. Its result, however, is inconclusive, and what knowledge is remains 
																																																								
1 Because of both its wide range of meanings and the meanings at work in this dialogue, for the most part 
λόγος will retain its transliterated form and noted whenever a translation is offered. 
2 Cf. Sayre (2005) [1983], 219. 
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unsolved.3 The Sophist, its dramatic sequel, can be read as a renewed attempt to tackle 
this question. The guiding idea of this dissertation is that the dialogue approaches the 
question in light of inquiry, that is, the process leading to the possession of knowledge. In 
other words, instead of looking directly at the difference in logos between (for example) 
the amateur and the mathematician, the Sophist considers whether there is a specifiable 
mode of discoursing (legein, the verb form of logos) that transforms the amateur into a 
mathematician. The strategy is motivated by the idea that, insofar as means and end 
should meet, the specification of what the inquiring mode of logos is would help us 
understand what the logos appropriate to knowledge looks like. 
The new strategy opens up new facets of the original issue. What is the nature of 
discursive reasoning? Is it merely a medium for the communication of what is already 
known, or is it also capable of making what is unknown known? If one assumes that the 
latter is the case, what assumptions about the objects of knowledge is one committed to? 
The power to reason is fallible; but what is the ground of its fallibility? And is it possible 
to devise something like a method allowing logos to partially overcome its own weakness 
from within logos? Are there procedures for discliplining the mind, in other words, to 
think and converse in ways that fruitfully deepen one's understanding of things? And 
finally, if the logos appropriate to knowledge is revealed, can one then answer what 
knowledge is? 																																																								
3 There is the often debated question whether the Theaetetus implicitly contains an answer to what logos is. 
The claim here is only that no explicit result is offered and that the Sophist approaches the same question 
with a new strategy. Some claim that Plato was truly puzzled about what the answer is when he wrote the 
Theaetetus, and only discovered one when he wrote the Sophist and hereafter, e.g. Sayre, ibid., and Ne-
hamas (1999) [1984]. Others think that Plato already had an answer in mind, for example Fine (2003) 
[1979]; Miller (1992). 
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This dissertation is a detailed interpretation of the Sophist with these questions in 
mind. It will argue that: 
 
(1) “Perception,” “true judgment” (or opinion, belief: δόξα), and “true judgment with 
logos,” the three definitions of knowledge proposed in the Theaetetus, are all images 
of knowledge. The expression “image” is meant to capture the idea that while none 
of them ultimately fulfills the requirements of knowledge, each nevertheless counts 
as an achievement of it and is to be recognized as such. 
(2) While logos only explicitly appears in “true judgment with logos,” it is in a sense 
present in all three of them. This is because the dialogue shows how logos is capable 
of transforming these three achievements into moments of inquiry so that they form 
a partial ascent towards knowledge. 
(3) The qualification “partial” means that the requirements of knowledge cannot be 
fulfilled through logos alone. The limitations of its powers form an important theme 
of the dialogue.  
 
This introduction first examines the proem of the dialogue and explains how it sets 
up the problematic of knowledge and logos. Sections 0.2 and 0.3 then elaborate on the 
above theses by way of a summary of the chapters to follow. Since the central portion of 
the Sophist raises questions concerning Plato’s conception of Forms in this dialogue, 0.4 
briefly explains how this dissertation deals with the issue of Forms. 
0.1 The Proem 
The Sophist, as its title suggests, does not explicitly raise the knowledge-logos prob-
lematic, but only does this through asking what the sophist is. In the Theaetetus, its title 
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character, a young mathematician, proposed the three famous definitions of knowledge 
just mentioned for examination. Socrates refuted or challenged each of them, but then he 
had to go to the king archon for the first hearing of his trial. Before leaving he arranged 
for another meeting the next day with Theaetetus’ teacher, Theodorus. Both sides now 
show up as promised, but Theodorus brings in an unexpected visitor. Theodorus only 
says “he is from Elea, a comrade of those around Parmenides and Zeno, and a very philo-
sophical man” (216a2-4). We never learn his name: the intellectual identity of the Eleatic 
Stranger is emphasized, and his individuality suppressed.4 Socrates jokingly suspects that 
Theodorus might have unwittingly brought a disguised god into their conversation. The 
Stranger might have come to observe whether they have been just and moderate. If they 
have not, the Stranger will refute (ἐλέγξων) them for their poverty in speeches, being a 
sort of refuting (ἐλεγκτικός) god (216b5-6).5 
“Refute” and “refuting” remind one of Socrates’ own famous way of conversing, the 
cross-examination of the interlocutor’s opinions, elenchus. Socrates’ elenchus is negative 
in appearance: he seems to only have shown how Theaetetus was mistaken about his 
three proposals of knowledge. Learning with Socrates is by and large a matter of unlearn-
ing. The Stranger, by contrast, will present positive doctrines. Socrates’ joke suggests that 
the Stranger has a logos that is superior, more positive, or both. He will refute Socrates’ 
refuting ways. Socrates’ art does nothing else than make one moderate and distinguish 
																																																								
4 Blondell (2002), 319 has a helpful discussion of the term ἑταῖρος and the Stranger’s namelessness. 
5 Translations from the Greek are my own unless otherwise noted. Citations of Stephanus page numbers 
will be from the Sophist unless otherwise noted. Line numbers are based on the edition of Burnet. 
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clearly what one knows from what one does not know.6 Does the Stranger realize some-
thing about logos that Socrates does not? Does he have a more powerful elenchus? If he 
does, and his doctrines are sound, then Socrates used elenchus unfairly, insofar as he un-
derestimated what its powers are. Socrates’ joke might therefore be defensive. His antici-
patory defense is that anyone who is able to do more than he had done with logos is au-
tomatically god and no longer human.7 As far as is humanly possible with logos, Socrates 
has been perfectly just. His joking suspicion about the Stranger’s true identity introduces 
the question, What is the power of logos, and what can it achieve? 
Theodorus does not seem to understand the joke; he takes Socrates’ remark quite lit-
erally and answers with a straight face. He responds that the Stranger “seems to me to be 
in no way a god (θεός), but rather divine (θεῖος)” (216b8). Philosophers, he implies, are 
humans, and humans at best can only be divine. Besides his lack of humor, Theodorus 
commits a grave mistake. The Stranger is neither a god nor elenchic, because he, accord-
ing to Theodorus, is more measured than those who are serious about verbal contests 
(ἔριδες). This remark implies that he does not distinguish elenchus from eristic.8 He also 
implies that a philosopher avoids elenchus/eristic. It follows from this that Theodorus 
likely does not consider Socrates a philosopher. In this way, Plato makes the reader sus-
picious of Theodorus’ judgment of the Stranger’s identity. Is he a reliable person con-
cerning this subject? He might still be correct, but only accidentally so. (It would be a 
true opinion that is not knowledge.) 																																																								
6 Socrates and the Stranger seem to agree on this. See Tht. 210c3 for Socrates’ statement of the power of his 
art, and Sph. 230d5 for a similar statement by the Stranger. 
7 Rosen (1983), 64 draws a similar conclusion through a different route. 
8 Klein (1977), 7; Gonzalez (1997), 40. 
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By making Theodorus say that the Stranger is a philosopher, Plato marks the 
Stranger’s identity with a degree of uncertainty.9 If Theodorus were wrong, what would 
the Stranger be? What are the non-philosophers that Theodorus might have confused him 
with? According to Socrates, the family (γένος) of philosophers is as difficult to discern 
as the family of gods. This is because true philosophers look from up high at the life of 
those below, and when they do visit cities, they do so in guises (φανταζόμενοι) due to the 
ignorance of the many. So the philosophers could appear to the many as sophists, states-
men, or absolutely crazy (216c2-d2). Is the Stranger actually a sophist, a statesman, or a 
madman? 
While Socrates’ remark anticipates much of what is to come, consider for the mo-
ment just the following observations. He agrees with Theodorus that the philosopher is 
divine. He also implies that Theodorus is more sophisticated than the non-philosophical 
many. The many never see a philosopher for what he is.10 The philosopher is hidden to 
them. So, even if Theodorus’ opinion of the Stranger were wrong, it would be a wrong 
opinion that ordinary people are not even capable of having. Socrates quotes Homer 
again, but now nothing about punishment is mentioned, but only the fact that philoso-
phers “visit cities” like gods. By admitting that philosophers also visit cities, Socrates tac-
itly concedes that Theodorus might be right about the identity of the Stranger. 
Socrates implies that “philosopher” names the highest human incarnation of wisdom. 
“Sophist,” “statesman,” and “madman” are names resulting from the fact that the philos-
opher is seen from uncomprehending or distorted perspectives. φανταζόμενοι, a word 																																																								
9 McCoy (2007), 140-1. 
10 Sallis (1996), 461. 
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which will take on enormous importance in the dialogue, is quite ambiguous. It could 
mean that philosophers are at the mercy of the distortions of the many; it could also mean 
that philosophers exploit the ignorance of the latter and can choose which disguise to 
wear.11 Is the Stranger somehow capable of appearing as he is? Is that why his logos is 
more powerful, and his identity discerned by Theodorus? Is Socrates someone who can-
not appear as he is? The reference to Socrates’ trial at the end of the Theaetetus becomes 
all the more significant here (210d). Socrates is likely thinking of how his fellow Atheni-
ans confused him with the professional sophists in his day and charged him with corrup-
tion and atheism (Ap. 24b8-c1). 
The pending trial perhaps motivates Socrates to propose both the topic of the conver-
sation and the manner in which it should proceed.12 He wants to hear from the Stranger 
what the Eleatics thought about the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. Are they 
just three names for one kind (γένος) of person? For two? Or for three, and each name 
corresponds to a separate, independent kind? This sounds like another joke from Socra-
tes. He pokes fun at the numerical monism that Parmenides and his followers were 
thought to hold (242d5-6, 244b6-10; Parm. 128a-d). Can the Eleatics consistently think 
that being is only one, while there are three kinds of persons? Socrates’ second joking 
question introduces the issue of the weakness of logos, after his first joke introduced the 
theme of its power. There seem to be names that are the result of ignorance: for example, 
the different names by which the many call the philosopher. Socrates’ question, which 
supposes that different names might refer to the same kind or being, implies an awareness 																																																								
11 Cf. Howland (1998), 176-7, who thinks that only the former sense is meant here. 
12 Cf. Gonzalez (1997), 43. 
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that logos and being are not of the same order. What is counted in logos is not the same 
as the number of beings, and one would be mistaken to think there are three beings just 
because there are three names. But how does one overcome this weakness? How does 
one find out, for example, that “one name, one kind” might be mistaken or is correct? 
The Stranger answers with no indication whether he got the joke or not. He answers 
with a straight face like Theodorus (is this why Theodorus is more friendly with him?), 
reporting that his comrades thought they were three. But he anticipates that Socrates will 
now want to know more, and warns in advance that the task of defining what each is 
(διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ’ ἔστιν, 217b2-3) is no easy job. He is willing to oblige both 
Theodorus and Socrates, but clearly he does this more for the sake of Socrates (217d8-
e7).13 Two of the three expected inquiries are passed down to us: the Sophist and the 
Statesman. What about the Philosopher? At any rate, regardless of whether the promised 
dialogue was meant to be written, the background of Socrates’ trial makes it clear that 
even the task of defining the sophist, presented in this dialogue, will be closely inter-
twined with the task of demarcating the sophist from the philosopher. So the question 
what the philosopher is is at least partly answered through the Sophist and the States-
man.14 
As for the manner of the conversation, Socrates more or less coaxes the Stranger into 
following the example of Parmenides, who, instead of lengthy monologues, engaged in 																																																								
13 Plato indicates this by making Theodorus say that they asked the Stranger “pretty much the same” 
(217b5) question before, but the Stranger refrained from answering in detail until Socrates arrived. Cf. 
Blondell (2002), 394. 
14 Plt. 258a5-6 suggests that the Philosopher would have been a dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus’ 
contemporary mathematician, also called Socrates. In the dramatic frame, that planned conversation is re-
placed by the Apology of Socrates. 
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the question-and-answer dialogue when he visited Athens as an old man and Socrates 
was young.15 The Stranger, who is old (216a3; 234e5), accepts the dialogue format out of 
respect for Socrates (217d8-218a3).16 Nevertheless he negotiates for a young interlocutor 
who is “painless and tractable” (217d1), and Socrates recommends Theaetetus. 
Socrates’ proposal is a challenge to the Stranger. The dialogue portrays a friendly 
contest between the two.17 Both of them are philosophers; the issue at stake, the proem 
suggests, is who has justly used logos, the heart and soul of philosophizing (260a6-7). 
The test of their justice is, to what extent can the difference between the philosopher and 
the sophist be clarified to a non-philosopher? (This is another way of asking to what ex-
tent can Socrates’ trial be avoided.) This dialogue only considers a part of this question, 
because it does not consider non-philosophers in general, but only the non-philosopher 
represented by Theodorus and his students. They are intellectual types who are more 
friendly to philosophers but nevertheless do not understand them better than the many. 
Socrates’ behavior the day before, his opening comments here, and his silence that will 
soon follow, all suggest that he has decided to simply be the way he is. If the Stranger has 
																																																								
15 This allusion to Plato’s Parmenides suggests its relevance for the present dialogue, but this dissertation 
will leave that dialogue out of consideration. 
16 Blondell, ibid., notes that, contrary to Socrates’usual insistence that the speaker engage in question-and-
answer, he is open to the possibility of listening to a monologue. This, according to her, suggests a certain 
amount of respect from Socrates towards the Stranger. 
17 Cf. Benardete (1984), II. 90. Socrates’ intention to listen implies that the contest is based on a more basic 
and profound agreement between the two on what philosophy is. The dialogue virtually begins with the 
word ὁμολογία, and the proem already portrays three possible permutations of agreements between the 
three old men present. First is the initial “agreement,” the arrangement between Socrates and Theodorus, 
and the Stranger is the intruder, the outsider who is not part of the agreement. Then the second agreement 
emerges, since Theodorus is friendlier to the Stranger, and it looks like the two of them are in agreement 
about philosophy, while Socrates is left alone and not understood. But third, since Theodorus doesn’t know 
the difference between elenchus and eristic, his friendship with the Stranger does not go as deep as the 
philosophical friendship Socrates might share with the Stranger — a friendship that does not become weak-
er even if they might disagree on certain philosophical issues. 
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come to complain, the complaint must be that it is possible to behave in such a way to 
distinguish oneself from sophists, and Socrates could and should have done more. Should 
the Stranger prove to be superior to him, his logos would accomplish at least two of the 
following three tasks. First, he would make Theaetetus grasp the difference between the 
philosopher and the sophist in a clear manner. Second, the logos by which he accom-
plishes this must not risk resembling sophistry. This means, at the very least, that his own 
definition of what the sophist is should obviously not describe what he himself is doing in 
the conversation. Third and finally, in the ideal case, the Stranger should make The-
aetetus capable of seeing why Socrates is not a sophist. In a way, Socrates’ challenge is 
almost designed to be in favor of himself insofar as he puts the Stranger in an awkward 
position. This is because the Stranger’s complaint against Socrates would be quite justi-
fied if his logos can “release” Socrates from the charges of being a sophist, as it would 
imply that such a logos is available for Socrates to practice. At this point of the conversa-
tion, however, the Stranger could be deemed successful as long as he satisfies the first 
two conditions. 
The proem, in sum, sets up the task of demarcating the sophist from the philosopher, 
and the Stranger’s logos, hinted to be stronger than Socrates’, promises to carry out the 
task in a dialogue with a non-philosopher. But it is not only the logos inquiring into what 
the sophist is that is relevant here; as it turns out, the very nature of the sophist himself 
also involves logos. They are to conduct a conversation which, when successful, would 
qualify as knowledge of the sophist. According to the Sophist, the philosopher and the 
sophist comport themselves differently towards logos. Both philosophers and sophists, 
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each in their own way, champion logos, and this means that they understand logos to be 
distinctively human. “Sophist” is not defined adequately or even fundamentally if one 
understands him to be the person who uses bad, fallacious, or invalid arguments to score 
cheap debating points.18 One gets closer to the heart of the matter by saying that the phi-
losopher and the sophist conceive of the role of logos in human life differently. The phi-
losopher and the sophist both strive towards speaking well, towards εὖ λέγειν. But they 
do not understand it in the same way: the philosopher reasons with a view to truth and 
knowledge. εὖ λέγειν ultimately means to articulate beings as adequately, clearly, and 
precisely as possible. Being aware of the arbitrary, contingent, and conventional character 
of received opinions, he is intellectually courageous and prepared to question what is 
usually accepted.19 The sophist is indifferent to knowledge and truth and highly con-
cerned with the opinion of his audience.20 εὖ λέγειν for him means to win admiration from 
others, and this can mean a variety of things. But the various manifestations of the soph-
ist’s activity are gathered under one name, one fundamental driving force in him: the 
sophist aims to appear or seem wise without being so (233b-c). 
The sophist prefers to be recognized as wise and sees no benefit in being wise; the 
philosopher prefers to be wise even if no one recognizes it. This difference, according to 
the dialogue, is difficult to establish for the following reason. If both the philosopher and 
the sophist champion logos, and one of them relates to logos in a knowledge- and truth-
seeking way, the other in an opinion-oriented way, then both these possibilities must be 
																																																								
18 Nehamas (1999a), 112-3. 
19 Cf. Rep. 490a-b. 
20 Lott (2012), 51. 
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available in logos, otherwise the philosopher and the sophist are not two kinds. In terms 
of the dialogue, both truth and falsehood must be possible in logos.21 
A preliminary clarification is necessary here. It is commonly assumed that according 
to the Stranger, the philosopher only says true things, and the sophist only false ones.22 
And it is true that for large parts of the conversation the two are distinguished in this way. 
But that is only transitional; once the Stranger gets to the conclusion, his view is better 
described as follows. The difference between the philosopher’s and the sophist’s inten-
tions only becomes relevant if their intentions can be realized within logos. In other 
words, true and false logos do not articulate the difference between the philosopher and 
the sophist, but the necessary condition for their difference. If there were only true 
speeches, then it wouldn’t matter that the sophist is indifferent to truth, he would be com-
pelled to utter truths anyway. If there were only false speeches, then the philosopher’s 
striving would turn out to be a dream, who imagines logos to have a power it does not 
have. 
The question of knowledge is therefore reflected on two levels in the dialogue. On 
the level of what the Stranger says, it becomes important to discover what knowledge is 
such that the sophist’s logos and being can be understood, articulated, and grasped as a 
deviation from or an indifference to it. The sophist’s logos could then be contrasted with 
the philosopher’s logos. The main part of the dialogue presenting its answer to this ques-
tion is the famous and lengthy digression, where the Stranger leaves the question of the 
sophist momentarily aside in the interest of inquiring into the ontological foundations of 																																																								
21 Rosen (1980), 159. 
22 E.g. Dorter (1994); Gill (2012), 167. 
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their inquiry (241c7-259b6). He gives a sketch of the ideal logos of the philosopher, and 
compares it to the logos of the sophist. But there is a second level that is no less im-
portant. On the level of action, in how the Stranger conducts the conversation, we ob-
serve inquiry at work, the process of attaining knowledge. He and Theaetetus are trying 
to acquire knowledge of the sophist through logos. His ὁδός or μέθοδος (this can only be 
translated as “method” with the appropriate qualifications) shows what it means to be 
truth-oriented in logos.23 Should what the Stranger say about the philosopher be in har-
mony with how he philosophizes in the inquiry into sophistry, it would be a good reason 
to think that he achieved something that Socrates could not, who had to use the verb “to 
know” without knowing what knowledge is, and philosophize “impurely” (Tht. 196e1-
197a1). But should his way and his message not be in harmony, that could be a sign that 
he does not fare better in his contest with Socrates. What is his way, and what does he 
say? 
0.2 The Ascent to Knowledge 
Diaeresis, or the method of division, is integral to the conversations that take place in 
the Sophist and the Statesman, and it does not play such a prominent role in other Platon-
ic dialogues. What is diaereis? At first sight, it looks like a mechanical procedure for ar-
ticulating the class-structures of the object of inquiry.24 A division in the Sophist proceeds 
in roughly the following way: of hunters, some hunt land animals, some hunt animals in 																																																								
23 Heidegger (1997), 8-9, often justly criticized for neglecting the dramatic context in his interpretation of 
Plato, does not commit this mistake in his seminar on the Sophist. Instead he emphasizes how Plato pre-
sents his view both through what the Stranger says and how he says it. See also Howland (1998), 173, 176; 
Brown (2010), 169. 
24 Here I follow the traditional opinion that diaeresis is a classificatory definition. For important alternative 
interpretations see Moravcsik (1973), (1973a), and Grams (2012). 
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water; of those that hunt animals in water, some do it in the daytime, some do it at night; 
and those who do it in the daytime, some use spears and others use rods and a hook: the 
latter are who we call anglers. 
The purpose and value of diaeresis remain controversial. Chapter One will discuss it 
in more detail; here the emphasis is that diaeresis is not the only procedure employed. 
This means that it cannot be grasped in isolation but ought to be understood as integral to 
the Stranger’s logos of inquiry as a whole. As a whole, the dialogue consists in a three-
stage ascent — 
 
Stage One, 218b-231e. Logos within the horizon of appearance (φαντασία, 
φαίνεσθαι): there are no philosophers. 
Stage Two, 232a-241c. Logos within the horizon of judgment (δόξα): there are no 
sophists. 
Stage Three, 241c-264b. Logos within the horizon of thinking (διάνοια): philoso-
phers and sophists are two. 
 
By “horizon” I mean some implicitly grasped, unquestioned standard, the satisfac-
tion of which would “put a stop” to logos. To stop means that inquiry is complete; and 
inquiry ends when the state of “knowledge” is achieved. Otherwise put, the Stranger’s 
logos would qualify as “knowledge” when it fulfills the standard implied by each hori-
zon. Appearance, judgment, and thinking are taken from the Stranger’s own discussion of 
them (263e-264b); they correspond to, I suggest, the three definitions of knowledge dis-
cussed in the Theaetetus. I call this an ascent, because Socrates’ request that the Stranger 
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engage in conversation is a request that the philosopher begin with the non-philosopher 
and from what is “down here,” and then proceed towards what is “above,” and the 
Stranger himself will use the metaphor of ascending movement several times. The transi-
tion from each stage to the next occurs through a revelation of a defect or inadequacy of 
each horizon, and the next stage emerges as a response to that defect. 
A brief explanation of each stage is in order. The horizon of appearance is the every-
day world; the totality of what is described as obvious, intuitive, familiar, or commonsen-
sical. It is where things appear as they are. Within this horizon, phenomena are trustwor-
thy. What counts as “knowledge” when the world is experienced as the totality of the 
phenomena? What is the work of logos here? Since the horizon of appearance means that 
what one sees is what one gets, logos works as the conversion of appearances into spoken 
images, to use the language of the Sophist. To know the sophist within this horizon 
means to reach agreement concerning his appearances through logos (218c4-5). 
But this is not adequate, because the Stranger and Theaetetus are in the process of 
inquiry: they do not know what the sophist is yet. Unlike whatever else is within the hori-
zon of appearance, the sophist is not familiar or obvious in his appearance. The Stranger 
attempts to make the sophist familiar by assimilation. Understanding naturally tries to 
articulate the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. It asks: what does the sophist look like? 
Or more precisely, is there anything familiar that he looks like? This is how the work of 
diaeresis in Stage One is to be understood: it is an attempt at understanding by assimila-
tion. On the reading proposed here, diaeresis is as much a heuristic as a device of articu-
lation. It follows the “logic” of each horizon and shows what is grasped or understood. 
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Within the horizon of appearance, things appear as they are; the sophist appears as a cer-
tain expert; therefore, he is that kind of expert. Diaeresis exhibits the understanding of 
things that is at work at each Stage. 
But surely not everything appears as it is. What if the sophist is one of those things? 
Wouldn’t the Stranger and Theaetetus be inquiring into the sophist on the basis of com-
pletely mistaken assumptions? Can one know if the assimilation is successful or not? It 
will be argued that a diaeretic definition should be read in the following way. By being a 
classificatory device, diaeresis imposes an implicit demand to unfold the implications of 
assimilation. And the assimilating classification could then be shown to be faulty if some-
thing crucial is missing, or if something cannot be fully integrated into that classification. 
As will become clear, each of the initial definitions are shown to be failures because there 
is always some “leftover” or excess that is either unexplained by each assimilation or 
goes against its very assumptions. Diaeresis then shows what is wrong and reveals the 
failure of the assimilation. Interestingly enough, the Stranger does not tell Theaetetus 
what the problems are; all he does is to suggest that there are problems, because he goes 
on to make five diaeretic definitions of the sophist, each taking up various models to as-
similate him to. Chapter One will explain the “logic” of diaeretic assimilation and offer 
a reading of the first four definitions of the sophist. 
The crucial problem in Stage One is that appearances are defective in their intelligi-
bility. They are structured by similarity and dissimilarity; but if one thing resembles an-
other, this in the final analysis means that while the two are not identical, there are more 
traits they share in common than traits that mark them apart. In other words, the differ-
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ence between similarity and dissimilarity is a matter of degree and not clear-cut. How 
does one decide, then, that the two resembling things truly belong to the same kind? Do 
the respects in which they have in common matter more or less? The Sophist suggests 
that the answer will always be more or less arbitrary in the horizon of appearance and 
cannot be resolved in it. It shows this through the Stranger’s fifth definition, which takes 
up the model of purification and discovers elenchus. And the practitioner of elenchus, the 
refuter, resembles the previous definitions of the sophist. But is he one of them? The-
aetetus says yes, and the Stranger says no. This disagreement is not resolved at the end of 
Stage One: the Stranger concedes without being convinced. The horizon of appearance 
ends with there being no difference between the philosopher and the sophist: both appear 
as “sophists.” 
The discovery of the refuter (a clear allusion to Socrates) both brings out the crisis in 
Stage One and offers the possible cure for it; as such it is transitional towards Stage Two. 
How does this discovery break the spell of this horizon? What happens during this defini-
tion is not simply that the Stranger and Theaetetus try to discover the sophist, but they are 
simultaneously looking into themselves, that is, reflecting on their discourse so far about 
the sophist. One sign that this is taking place is that this is one of the few places where 
the Stranger offers a lengthy comment on the “methodology” of diaeresis. To give the 
short story here, diaeresis is shown to be inadequate for solving the question whether one 
should divide things into two kinds based on how much they resemble one another. To 
ask that question is to presuppose that some features of the sophist (and the philosopher) 
are relevant and others are less so or irrelevant. But to distinguish between which features 
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are and which are not relevant, the art of elenchus is needed. In other words, the Stranger 
needs to incorporate elenchus into his logos in order to get Theaetetus to realize his mis-
take in calling elenchus sophistry. The longer version of the story will be told in Chapter 
Two. 
Stage Two, the horizon of judgment, reflects a different mode of comportment to-
wards the world and a corresponding advancement in logos. Making judgments presup-
poses a certain independence and detachment from the familiarity and obviousness of the 
world. To “look into oneself” is to effect a certain withdrawal. In this way, appearances 
become questionable. The self or the soul is therefore more “by itself” than in Stage One 
because it is at a remove from the world. The soul’s ability to question opens up for the 
first time. Stage Two represents the sophisticated everyday, pre-philosophical world. The 
logos of Stage Two can be broken down into three steps. First, a recollection of the artic-
ulated appearances in Stage One. They become the raw material, as it were, for the 
Stranger and Theaetetus to reflect upon. Then, they choose something among what is 
recollected for elenchic examination. In the dialogue, the Stranger only selects one fea-
ture to examine, the sophist’s skill to contradict. And here the sophist is revealed as one 
who aims at seeming wise without being so. In Stage Two, judgment is arrived through 
elenchus. δοκεῖν, which can both mean to seem or to judge, suggests that the sophist is 
the human incarnation of that which misleads judgments. Finally, this new revelation of 
the sophist’s being leads to a renewed attempt at discovering the class to which he be-
longs through diaeresis. Since the sophist seems wise through speeches, the Stranger at-
tempts to articulate his speech-making art in terms of another familiar art, image-making. 
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He is said to belong to the class of seemingly accurate images (the equivalent of saying 
that he makes false speeches seem true) named phantastics (φανταστική). It is contrasted 
with eikastics (εἰκαστική), the art of making accurate images (true speeches). Knowledge 
within this horizon means, in short, the successful interrogation and articulation of ap-
pearances through the joint work of elenchus and diaeresis. 
In the second half of Stage Two, the Stranger reveals a monumental difficulty. What 
happens here is the sudden realization on the Stranger’s part that Parmenides’s prohibi-
tion against thinking and speaking of “nonbeing” (τὸ μὴ ὄν), if strictly understood, means 
that images and falsehoods are impossible. The significance of this triple perplexity can 
be briefly stated. The horizon of judgment introduced something without having clarity 
about it, namely the distinction between appearing (or seeming) and being, and the 
awareness that there are both truths and falsehoods. These distinctions are the conditions 
that make questioning possible. The perplexities, in attacking those conditions, threaten 
to destroy those distinctions and bring one back to the horizon of appearances once more. 
Since “to appear” implies “to not be” and “is false” implies “is not true,” nonbeing is the 
common factor in both issues. The sophist — who emerges as an imaginary character at 
this point — therefore uses Parmenides, the Stranger’s intellectual father, to refuse being 
defined. If there are neither images nor falsehoods, then there is no art of image-making, 
and the sophist disappears into thin air. My reading of Stage Two will be detailed in 
Chapter Three. 
The sophist’s challenge at the end of Stage Two, like the definition of elenchus in 
Stage One, is also transitional and, as such, already signals what is to come in Stage 
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Three, the horizon of thinking. The Stranger and Theaetetus continue to look even more 
deeply into themselves than before. This means that they must attempt to harmonize their 
opinions and beliefs as comprehensively as possible. The δόξαι in their souls, instead of 
appearances they perceive, become the object of examination. Their judgments them-
selves become question marks demanding a decision to be made about them. What comes 
out at the other end is what survives elenchus. In Stage Three, diaeresis disappears: eve-
rything is elenchus, or is involved with elenchus. What does it mean to “know” within the 
horizon of thinking? What does the Stranger achieve? How should we evaluate his re-
sults? 
Before I summarize my answers in the next section, let me briefly remark on the 
Stranger’s logos of inquiry. Whether he is using only diaeresis, elenchus, or a combina-
tion of both, one feature of logos is appropriated throughout, and it is what I would call 
its daemonic character, in the sense described in the Symposium (202e-203a). By this I 
first mean that logos is the bridge between appearance and being, between “ignorance” 
and knowledge. I also mean that logos is simultaneously an expression and a surrender of 
agency. In the grip of ἔρως, one experiences it as the expression of what one is and yet 
also as what one is not yet, as an alien force, as what one surrenders oneself to. The expe-
rience of logos is similar. It both expresses what one understands and what one does not 
yet understand. One says more than what one understands in the attempt to say what one 
means. Something becomes uttered without being clearly understood. And that which one 
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does not yet understand indicates the next step of inquiry.25 And so in genuine conversa-
tion, logos begins as the utterance of the thoughts of a person, as having an “owner,” but 
is always transformed into having a life of its own, beyond the reach of the person who 
uttered the speech.26 The ascent is only made possible because of this. And like ἔρως, 
logos is mantic in its power: it gestures towards what is true no less than it misleads one 
away from it. Another way to put this is to say that a solution to a question is often ut-
tered even before one realizes it. More radically, it is somehow uttered in the very ques-
tioning, in the search for that truth. An early example of this is when Theaetetus says “I 
am confused (ἀπορῶ) since the sophist has appeared many times; but what must one, as 
saying and insisting on the truth, say that the sophist really is (ὄντως εἶναι)?” His very 
perplexity, in retrospect, indicates its own resolution with the introduction of being and 
appearing (231b9-c2). It is almost as if he knew the answer beforehand, otherwise he 
could not have voiced his perplexity in the way he did. The instinctive, divining power of 
logos was noted by Theaetetus when he said that he and the Stranger seemed to have 
ἀπομαντεύεσθαι, that is, to intimate or oracularly pronounce, that Being has its own na-
ture (250c1-2). 
One is not yet in a position to estimate the Stranger’s logos over Socrates’ yet. That 
estimation requires a discussion of what knowledge is. 
																																																								
25 224e5. Cf. 227c6, where diaeresis is spoken of as if it were a living being with a will or intention; and 
Tht. 172d, about the patience of the philosopher in dealing with logoi. In Rep. 394a7-9, Socrates claims that 
they should follow wherever “the wind of logos” carries them. 
26 Gadamer’s Truth and Method, Chapter 5 has a beautiful phenomenological description of how genuine 
conversation takes place in this fashion. 
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0.3 The Ideal of Knowledge 
I have labeled the three horizons “stages” to suggest that they are, on the one hand, 
parts of a larger whole, and yet, on the other hand, relatively self-contained. The Sophist, 
while it shows how appearance and judgment are inadequate to distinguish the sophist 
from the philosopher, nevertheless vindicates them as “knowledges” in a diluted sense. 
While they are not “knowledge itself” and fall short of it, they do not therefore become 
ignorance or “mere opinion” but still resemble knowledge. For example, the definition of 
the angler, which opens the dialogue and illustrates how diaeresis works, is already com-
plete in the first stage of inquiry. What the Stranger and Theaetetus are familiar with is 
sufficient to articulate the angler.27 There is no need to turn to abstract, metaphysical is-
sues to define him. Second, even the articulation of the sophist occurs in a “network” of 
what the Stranger and Theaetetus already in some sense “know,” i.e. the many familiar 
arts and their differences. And one knows better on the level of judgment than on that of 
appearance, insofar as one can weigh the relative importance of appearances and is capa-
ble of making one’s assent and denial of them consistent with each other. There is there-
fore a sort of satisfaction within this horizon as well, a satisfaction that does not demand 
further inquiry. The satisfaction of judgment can be numbing, such that the ascent beyond 
this horizon is only motivated by the Stranger’s sudden — almost awkward — introduc-
tion of the issue of Parmenides’s prohibition of nonbeing. This turn of events suggests the 
difficulty of moving one towards philosophizing partly because the world makes a lot of 
sense already. One does not, as a rule, experience the need to break away from the usual 																																																								
27 Campbell (1867), ix. 
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habits; there is much already known even before the grounds of intelligibility is ques-
tioned. 
But what about thinking? Is it no longer transitional but final, where the desire to 
know can be fully satisfied? Since by the end the Stranger finds both the philosopher and 
the sophist and distinguished them, Stage Three looks like the completion of inquiry and 
the possession of knowledge. To summarize, the digression thinks through the basic onto-
logical commitments involved in the very act of questioning. The doctrine of συμπλοκή 
τῶν εἰδῶν (“the interweaving of Forms”) is meant to be the foundation of true and false 
logos. To state the doctrine in simplistic terms, it means that certain “elements” of intelli-
gibility must be in definite and unchanging relations. They would then function as the 
conditions for the possibility of logos representing the world as it is. Without the inter-
weaving, the Forms would not be available to logos. And once they are available, truth 
and falsehood in logos can then be understood as conforming to or deviating from “For-
mal relations.” Once this foundation is secured, the rest of the dialogue completes the di-
aeretic definition of the sophist. The inquiry seems successful. 
The way the Stranger arrives at his doctrines, however, is not identical with what he 
says about the ideal of knowledge in Stage Three. His own ὁδός illustrates knowledge as 
judgments or beliefs that survive the comprehensive test of elenchic logos. (This is an 
example of “true judgment with logos.”28) However, the ideal logos represents and articu-
lates the relations as they are. Do the Stranger’s doctrines illustrate this ideal? They do 
not. The Stranger’s own logos, it will be shown, is a doctrine plausibly true of the world; 																																																								
28 Cf. Schipper (1965), 29-30. 
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he does not demonstrate for certain that it is true. It therefore falls short of the ideal logos. 
Moreover, the Stranger’s arguments in the digression undermine the possibility of achiev-
ing this ideal in interesting ways. An examination of these instances will suggest that the 
gap between his logos and the ideal logos likely cannot be bridged through logos alone. 
The Stranger himself seems to suggest this too, because he notes several times the need 
for intellectual insight, a direct awareness of beings that is irreducible to logos. The di-
gression does not portray a μεθόδος in logos that could facilitate this final step of the as-
cent. Chapter Four will discuss the Stranger’s doctrines and how his logos suggests its 
own limitations. 
The digression, as a whole, suggests the near impossibility of achieving dialectical 
insight through logos. The dialogue’s concluding definition of the sophist continues this 
theme, the weakness of logos. That definition, as many commentators have noticed, 
seems to allude to Socrates much more obviously than it does to actual sophists. On this 
reading, the Stranger fails to demarcate the sophist from the philosopher. It will be argued 
that this conclusion is right for the wrong reason. Appearances notwithstanding, the 
Stranger’s concluding definition correctly captures the sophist. His successful capture, 
however, will not prevent Theaetetus from misunderstanding what is going on. The defi-
nition is a definitional success but a pedagogical failure. It means that while the Stranger 
correctly articulated the difference between the philosopher and the sophist, Theaetetus is 
still not capable of distinguishing between actual sophists and philosophers he might en-
counter in the future. It is even quite likely that he sees Socrates in the definition, even 
though Socrates is, when the definition is correctly understood, excluded from it. The 
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Stranger’s failure, this dissertation will argue, is the failure of logos. And the failure hap-
pens because without an engagement with beings, things, or particular humans, to have a 
logos of any being is insufficient. In other words, Theaetetus needs experience and a 
more comprehensive understanding of the human soul to truly transform the concluding 
definition into knowledge for himself. This anticipates the next examination of 
knowledge presented in the Statesman. Chapter Five and the conclusion will take up 
these issues. 
Insofar as the limits of logos are limits, they also gesture towards the ideal of 
knowledge. The pursuit of a logos appropriate to knowledge is not merely a matter of ar-
riving at exact, scientific terminology. It is simultaneously the pursuit of becoming a cer-
tain sort of being. This ideal might be very roughly stated as the task of becoming one in 
and with the world through logos. The phrase “becoming one with the world” is meant to 
convey the idea that a knower and the world are in the relation of what is called “truth” in 
the dialogues. The knower is together with beings in such a way that they open up as 
themselves to the knower. In knowing them, the knower “lets them be what they are” in 
an active, participating, and vigorous way. At the same time, he also becomes himself, 
comes to be a one “in” the world. This means that the knower preserves his identity as a 
knower through time. A sign of this persistence of his identity is his intellectual resili-
ence, that power to respond and maintain a firm, unchanging stance in the face of chal-
lenges, objections, and rhetorical arguments — that also forms part of the ideal of 
knowledge. Part of the message of the Sophist is that logos plays a valuable and indispen-
sable role in making the knower a one in the world. Learning is to begin to ask questions, 
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and asking questions is to doubt; but to doubt means to become double and undergo a 
self-splitting that is the condition for dialogue. The work of logos is the work of ordering, 
relating, weighing, affirming and denying, and thinking through appearances, beliefs, and 
thoughts so that they become a whole. The Sophist shows how logos brings the soul’s 
cognitive powers together into a harmonious one. But this process, as the dialogue shows 
through the digression, does not automatically lead to insight into the truth about the 
world. Otherwise put, it does not guarantee becoming one with the world. The incomplete 
education of Theaetetus is meant to show that there is something missing in the under-
standing of who we are as beings with logos. 
The difference between the Stranger and Socrates can be now roughly stated. The 
Stranger, while being clear about the difference between the ideal and what is achievable, 
is more willing to blur this difference than Socrates is. The Stranger appears, in other 
words, more optimistic about the possibility of philosophy. This first comes up in the dia-
logue, I will show, when he proves to have a more positive estimation of elenchus. The 
Stranger sees that its seemingly negative results, when practiced in a comprehensive way, 
provide a basis for making conjectures and hypotheses about the world. Socrates is, by 
comparison, more sober about the value of elenchus. He does not deny that elenchus 
might lead to positive results. But he emphasizes more the distance of those results from 
the ideal of knowledge. The Stranger, on the other hand, tends to present them as 
achievements of genuine knowledge. He puts more trust in the mantic power of logos and 
it is because of this trust that his logos looks more powerful than Socrates’. But in the 
end, his logos still suggests that he might be a sophist no less than the logos of Socrates; 
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indeed, in making what is achievable look like the realization of the ideal, he is present-
ing an image as an original, and to that extent practices sophistry by his own lights. The 
victorious note with which he concludes the conversation is not unambiguous. 
0.4 Forms in the Sophist 
The Sophist is often considered to be a crucial dialogue, or so the narrative of Plato’s 
career goes, that marks a change in his conception of Forms, often understood to be the 
core of his philosophy. The nature and extent of this change are controversial, and this 
dissertation will not treat this topic in detail. But one aspect must be discussed, and that is 
the Stranger’s criticism of the so-called “friends of Forms,” who hold the position that the 
world consists in unchanging, eternal entities and sensible things or particulars, with the 
former being genuine objects of knowledge and truth (see 4.2). 
For all practical purposes, the “theory” of the friends is the theory familiar to readers 
of Plato; it is not misleading to see it as the classical formulation of that theory. What is 
less noticed but no less important is that, while the Stranger is obviously familiar with it, 
Theaetetus is not. In the digression, when the Stranger reviews “the friends of Forms,” 
Theaetetus was unable to respond on behalf of them to the Stranger’s questions. The 
Stranger had to intervene and conduct the dialogue himself.29 This is of some importance. 
When the Stranger begins his division of the angler and the sophist right away, he some-
times calls the objects that he divides εἶδος. But if Theaetetus is not familiar with the 																																																								
29 Benardete (1984), II. 133 and Blondell (2002), 343 notice this. But even they do not draw out the impli-
cation of this observation. Moline (1981), 81-88 notes that in other dialogues, interlocutors of Socrates 
readily accept εἶδος-talk and do not raise objections (e.g. Republic, Phaedo). He suggests that the pre-
philosophical background of εἶδος informing their acceptance is how it is used in ancient medicine termi-
nology (where it could mean something like “visible symptoms”). 
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opinions of the friends, then it is reasonable to assume that diaeresis is not understood by 
Theaetetus as dividing Forms. In other words, there is no hint that “the theory of Forms” 
must be accepted in order to understand the divisions. I emphasize this because it is often 
taken for granted that the dialogue starts right away with “Formal” or “eidetic” analysis. 
But like the ascent to knowledge, there is also an ascent in their grasp of what εἶδος is. 
Otherwise put, an untapped value of the Sophist is that it portrays how a philosophi-
cal grasp of εἶδος grows out of the everyday understanding of it. Even here, the daemonic 
character of logos is at work: the Stranger says more than what he understands, and only 
comes to grasp later what was said before. And so, the development of the dialogue can 
alternatively be described in the following terms. In Stage One, εἶδος is the visible looks 
of things indicating their classes or kinds. Since appearing and being are not distin-
guished, looks determine what things are. Trees are tree-like and they all resemble each 
other and belong together. But the two meanings of εἶδος as “visible look” and “kind” 
diverge in Stage Two. The same look is now revealed to possibly contain two kinds. The 
philosopher and the sophist have the same look but belong to two γένη. This is then 
where εἶδος as “look” can no longer mean simply the visible, visual look or shape of 
something, but must involve the element of discourse, of thinking, in order to be clarified. 
The problems that emerged in Stage Two lead to the notion of εἶδος as nature or essence 
(φύσις, οὐσία) in Stage Three. So the Stranger and Theatetus arrive at a sharper, more 
philosophical notion of εἶδος by overcoming the problems encountered in defining the 
sophist. 
		
29 
But is this philosophical grasp of εἶδος one that Plato himself would agree with? 
Here, we turn to a question much debated in the literature on the Sophist. Forms are gen-
erally agreed to remain the kinds of beings they always are, independent of what we think 
and say about them. Whatever else scholars might disagree about, there is consensus that 
Plato insists on the ontological independence of Forms throughout his career — except 
when it comes to the Sophist. The primary evidence is in his criticism of the friends of 
Forms. According to some commentators, the Stranger is arguing that Forms must change 
insofar as they are known, otherwise knowledge cannot be possible. So is the Stranger 
not committed to the view that Forms are ontologically independent? Does this mean that 
his εἶδος is only “Form” in name but not in substance? Are his “greatest Kinds” Forms or 
really just concepts invented by the human mind in order to deal with reality? 
My view is that he remains committed to the independence of Forms. The claim that 
the Stranger is inclined to think of Forms as moving or changing is a misreading (4.2 will 
explain why). Basically, he does not say that Forms must move, but that insofar as 
knowledge is a state of the soul, and the soul is essentially mobile, knowledge must be 
the seemingly impossible unity of motion and rest in the soul. The Stranger’s criticism of 
the friends, therefore, does not concern whether Forms move, but whether the soul can be 
both in motion and at rest in such a way that it is in a state of knowledge. His solution, to 
repeat the same point from a different perspective, is logos: logos is where the motions of 
the soul come into contact with and rest in the unchanging Forms. 
To see logos as that through which Forms are discerned, however, means not only to 
affirm the difference between the order of language and the order of being, but also that 
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the two can be confused. In a sense, one of the main lessons of the Sophist is a warning of 
the difficulty of distinguishing thoughts about Forms from Forms themselves, since we 
cannot but think about them through logos. For example, the main Greek term for being 
in this dialogue, τὸ ὄν, can at least refer to: the expression “is” in sentences of the form 
“p is q;” anything that exists; or the Form Being. And the relation between the usage of 
the word “is” and the Form Being is not a simple one-to-one correspondence. This 
means, in other words, that an analysis of the meanings of εἶναι, while clearly relevant to 
an understanding of Being, is not the same as giving an account of the Form Being.30 But 
there is a real danger, inherent in philosophizing, of mistaking whatever is analyzed dis-
cursively as a Form. The Stranger himself will commit a mistake of this kind in the dia-
logue (see 4.5). With respect to Forms, then, the Sophist illustrates the same theme: the 
power and limitations of logos. 
So the situation concerning Forms resembles the one concerning knowledge. The 
knowledge achievable by logos alone is made to look like the ideal of knowledge; the 
discursive account of Forms is also made to look like the complete truth about them. This 
mistake is again due to the Stranger’s optimism about logos. In other words, while for 
him the Forms remain independent of discourse about Forms, he still confuses the two. 
Nevertheless he is quite aware of the plausible character of his doctrines (for example, 
the discussion of the greatest Kinds) and the possibility that they are erroneous. Both dur-
																																																								
30 In the literature, the view that one word (more precisely, one predicate) corresponds to one Form is called 
“semantic atomism” in some circles, and is sometimes attributed to Plato. It should be obvious that Plato is 
not at all committed to semantic atomism at least in the Sophist, appearances notwithstanding. For a denial 
that Plato ever held this position, see Moravcsik (1973). 
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ing and at the conclusion of the digression, the Stranger states repeatedly that the results 
achieved are tentative and he is open to future objections to them. 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
At the end of this Introduction, it is useful to recall once more that the questions con-
cerning logos, knowledge, and the Forms are raised in the context of Socrates’ trial in this 
dialogue, as the proem makes clear. The case against Socrates presupposes that he is a 
sophist, but Socrates denies that he is in Plato’s Apology of Socrates (Ap. 19d1-e4). That 
work, however, raises two issues concerning the sophist question without answering 
them. First, in that dialogue, Socrates suspends judgment as to whether the sophists’ 
claim to wisdom is justified (19c5-7). And in not having examined their claim, Socrates’ 
own claim to the highest human wisdom and his Delphic mission becomes questiona-
ble.31 Maybe the sophists’ wisdom is actually the highest possibility of human wisdom 
after all. Second, Socrates’ own conversations with Meletus (24c4-28a1) and his sympa-
thizers (40c4-41c7) look like examples of “making the weaker argument stronger” (19b5-
c1) which in the public mind was strongly associated with the practice of sophistry. His 
obvious differences from sophists (neither charging mandatory tuition nor traveling) are 
then undercut by their similarities (having followers, being skillful with debating, and 
unsettling social norms). In short, he does not completely clear himself of the charge that 
he is a sophist. Insofar as the Socratic enterprise is to be justified, the sophist’s claim to 
																																																								
31 Socrates only examined the political figures, the poets, and the craftsmen, according to his own report 
(21c-22e). The exclusion of the sophists is due to Socrates’ decision to examine only those “reputed to be 
wise” (τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, 21b9), and the sophists’ reputation for wisdom is controversial. But 
insofar as fame is not an infallible indicator of one’s wisdom, one cannot take this exclusion as certain 
proof that the sophists are not wise. 
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wisdom must be examined and its spurious character exposed. And insofar as philoso-
phers and sophists are different and yet nevertheless appear alike, one presupposes the 
distinction between being and seeming (or appearing), and an investigation of the conse-
quences of that distinction is in order. The Sophist tries to understand and articulate more 
fully these presuppositions and consequences. Whether it establishes Socrates’ identity as 
a philosopher and his difference from a sophist more satisfactorily than the Apology, 
however, can only be answered at the end of this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE APPEARANCES OF THE SOPHIST 	
To say that Stage One of the Sophist operates within the horizon of appearance is not 
novel. For example, Rosen describes the diaereses of the sophist as a “phenomenology” 
of him.1 But the significance of this is not yet adequately appreciated. 1.1 begins by con-
trasting my view of diaeresis with alternative readings. 1.2 and 1.3 then offers an account 
of the horizon of appearance and how diaeresis works within this horizon in terms of the 
hunting metaphor. Finally, 1.4 applies this to the first four definitions of Stage One. 
1.1 What Diaeresis is not 
Like knowledge and Forms discussed in the Introduction, diaeresis also evolves over 
the course of the dialogue. The Stranger and Theaetetus gradually come to understand 
what it is that they are dividing, the goal of their activity, and how to achieve it. As a 
starter, one might begin with what it is not: 
(i) Not dialectic. The Stranger will say something about “dialectic” in Stage Three, 
where he describes it as the knowledge of dividing and discerning Forms or kinds. What 
is the relation between diaeresis and dialectic? Several answers have been proposed. 
They might be identical.2 Or diaeresis might be a part of dialectic, investigating one or 
more but not all of the topics that belongs to dialectic.3 It could also turn out that diaeresis 																																																								
1 Rosen (1983), 47 (cf. 9): “diaeresis in the Sophist cannot be understood as instances of mathematical or 
quasi-mathematical reasoning, but instead as constituting a kind of phenomenology of everyday life.” 
Campbell (1867), lii; Heidegger (1997), 200-1; Notomi (1999), Ch. 3; Ionescu (2013), 42-3 hold similar 
views. 
2 Ambuel (2007), 11-33 (esp. 17). This view often appeals to another piece of evidence, namely that diaere-
sis seems to illustrate the description of dialectic in the Phaedrus. 
3 Stenzel (1940), 99-106, for example, considers 253d8-9, a description of a one-many relation between 
Forms that the dialectician discerns, to be a description of the operation of diaeresis. 
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is preparatory for dialectic. The nature of this preparation can be understood differently. 
It could be a clarification of linguistic meaning to prevent confusion or illicit arguments, 
or a way of achieving agreement about the subject matter through classifying it.4 A final 
and rather radical view is that diaeresis has nothing to do with dialectic at all.5 
My position is somewhere between the “part” and “preparatory” view. Roughly put, 
diaeresis is an image of dialectic. Diaeresis is an inquiry into one of the topics of dialec-
tic, namely, the division of the εἴδη-structure of each kind of being. In this sense, it is a 
part of dialectic. Moreover, it is only an image of this part. This is because, as we will 
learn later, the dialectician never makes mistakes, but the diaeretician does. Diaeresis is a 
practice of discovering the truth, while “dialectic” designates the possession of truth. Ac-
cordingly diaeresis is μέθοδος or ὁδός; dialectic is ἐπιστήμη. Just as one can see the adult 
in the growing child, the journey resembles the goal. This seems to me the most plausible 
view based on the text. 
(ii) Not Multiple. Does diaeresis admit multiple definitions of the same thing? Some 
say yes. On one version of this claim, as long as the definition correctly “picks out” the 
thing investigated and only that thing, it counts as correct.6 Others say no. A straightfor-
ward version of this view would be that there should be only one branch along a diaeretic 
tree for each being; multiple definitions are tantamount to saying either one’s definitions 
are erroneous, or that one was jumbling two or more beings together while mistakenly 
thinking them to be one single kind. 																																																								
4 Trevaskis (1967) is of the former view; Henry (2012) the latter. 
5 Rosen (1983), 261 entertains this possibility; Cherniss (1944), 46 ff. has a rather subtle version of this 
position. 
6 E.g. Campbell (1867), xiii. Moravcsik (1973) is the best-known paper that argues for this view. 
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It is difficult to judge which claim is right, since there is evidence supporting both.7 
One reason for thinking that multiple definitions are allowed is due to the fact that in the 
Sophist and the Statesman, arts are differently categorized. In the former dialogue, all ex-
cept one definition classifies arts in accordance with the production-acquisition dichoto-
my; in the latter, arts are classified in terms of whether they are theoretical or practical.8 
Even in the Sophist, as will be seen in the next chapter, the definition of elenchus classi-
fies arts according to whether they separate like from like or better from worse. It is not 
asked whether elenchus is productive or acquisitive, or whether it is theoretical or practi-
cal. And apart from textual evidence, it seems obvious that the same arts can be catego-
rized differently. For example, medicine is arguably as much production of health as sep-
aration of disease from health in the body. In other words, how one divides an art in rela-
tion to other arts seems to be context- and problem-sensitive. So it seems reasonable to 
suppose that there can be multiple definitions of the same thing. But there is also strong 
evidence for thinking that the tendency of diaeresis is to find one and only one definition 
for each thing.9 At the end of Stage One, when they reach five definitions of the sophist, 
Theaetetus complains that they don’t know what the sophist is because he has appeared 
many times. He implies that diaeresis ought to unambiguously track the object of pursuit 
under one single branch of the division, and the Stranger agrees. Whenever there are two 
apparently correct definitions for the same thing, then, it is natural to ask which definition 
																																																								
7 The thoughtful discussion from Silverman (2002), 207-9, arrives at a conclusion similar to the one argued 
for here (mine is slightly stronger than his since he ultimately endorses a position closer to Cherniss’ inter-
pretation, which I discuss in the next point). 
8 Sayre (2006), 58-62; Grams (2012), 131; Gill (2012), 145. 
9 See e.g. Brown (2010), 159. 
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is better and why, i.e. one reasonably wishes to understand if one is more correct than the 
other. 
Overall, then, it is safe to say that there ought to be at most one correct definition for 
each thing for a given context of dividing.10 This view explains the drift of the dialogue 
better. But it remains an open question whether each thing allows for alternative and 
equally correct definitions under different contexts. Examining the same thing from dif-
ferent contexts might be not only fruitful but also necessary. I will leave this question 
aside in the rest of this dissertation. 
(iii) Not Only Articulation. The Stranger calls diaeresis a μέθοδος (methodos), and 
while the translation “method” is not completely misleading, it needs to be qualified. The 
methodos is not a fail-safe procedure. It does not guarantee a successful outcome, nor is it 
designed to avoid common mistakes. Actually, the methodos itself provides little guid-
ance for how and where one should divide something. It requires effort and discernment 
from its user.11 It is therefore not a method in the sense of being algorithmic or relatively 
user-independent.12 It is a heuristic, in the sense of aiding in discovery. Diaeresis makes 
use of the mantic, daemonic power of logos: to say something that goes beyond what one 
is aware of before speaking. It therefore cannot be understood simply as a method of ar-
ticulation, as if the work of discovery, understanding, inquiry, and knowing is already 
																																																								
10 At most, because there could also be none - if the context is wrongly chosen. 
11 Campbell (1867), xi; Cohen (1973), 188. Ionescu (2013), 42, gets this point quite right: “…we are to take 
the objects of division to be intelligible or sensible depending on the level of understanding at which the 
divisions are carried out” (emphasis added). 
12 Franklin (2011), 7. 
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finished before carrying out diaeresis.13 On the picture of articulation, diaeresis is a tech-
nical aid for the sake of giving a precise, verbal expression of what one already knows. 
On the picture offered here, it is instead meant to aid in discovery by encouraging a cer-
tain way of articulating what one understands. (More on this in 1.3.) 
This understanding of heuristic resembles but is not identical with Cherniss’. He also 
calls diaeresis “heuristic,” but what he means is that the actual classifications are not 
meant to have ontological import. The only thing that matters, according to him, is 
whether diaeresis produces Platonic recollection. In other words, diaeresis achieves its 
goal as long as it helps one gain insight into the atomic, essentially language-transcending 
Form of the sophist.14 He therefore seems to mean that diaeretic definitions are not to be 
judged as true or false, but only by the standard of whether someone ends up recollecting 
the object defined. This would then imply that the definitions are highly dependent on the 
pedagogical context. For example, the definitions that might make Theaetetus recollect 
the sophist might fail to awaken someone else’s recollection. The suggestion that diaere-
sis lacks ontological import, however, simply fails to explain its role in the dialogue. 
There is a question of true or false concerning the diaeretic definitions, otherwise it be-
comes difficult to explain why the Stranger calls the concluding, official one “true.” 
“True,” we will see, cannot mean only that Theaetetus would “recollect” the sophist bet-
ter with the final instead of the initial diaereses. So while diaeresis is a heuristic, this does 
																																																								
13 This is the view of e.g. Fossheim (2012). Cf. also Trevaskis (cited in n. 4). 
14 Cherniss (1945), 46 ff. Commentators who follow him include Bluck (1975), 39-40; Silverman (2002), 
215; Ambuel (2007), 26. 
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not rule out, but rather requires, that there is a question of truth and falsehood concerning 
its results. 
In sum: diaeresis imitates a part of dialectic; while it is an open question whether it 
admits of multiple correct definitions, it is advisable to think that given a context of di-
viding there is at most only one correct definition for each thing; finally, it is heuristic, 
not merely articulation. 
1.2 The Horizon of Appearance 
Appearance refers to the world encountered in its familiarity and everyday “looks.” 
There is a table in front of me; the sun rises in the east and sets in the west; humans be-
long to different groups. The world is a world of plurality and change; things move in 
space and time. Insofar as appearances encompass what is “obvious” or “ordinary,” it is 
the realm of “commonsense.” The horizon of appearance has three characteristics: 
(i) Appearances are relatively free from doubt. The obvious or familiar is, as a rule, 
unquestioned and taken for granted. φαίνεσθαι, like “apparent” in English, has a well-
known double meaning. It can mean “to appear” in contrast to εἶναι, “to be,” and thus 
what is merely apparent. But it can also mean “to be manifestly so,” a sense that does not 
imply a contrast with “to be” but rather emphasizes the presence, visibility, or evidentiary 
character of how things “show themselves forth” what they are. The horizon of appear-
ance is where this latter meaning of φαίνεσθαι, the evidentiary aspect of appearances, is 
emphasized: that which shows forth is not open to doubt. This freedom from doubt is, of 
course, a consequence of familiarity. 
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(ii) Appearances are not completely chaotic or in total disarray. They can be distin-
guished from each other and also grouped together. They are not completely “formless,” 
so to speak. There is accordingly an everyday sense of εἶδος. This everyday sense re-
volves around the following aspects. First, kind, class, or type. “Kind” often seems the 
most plausible translation for the occurrences of εἶδος or γένος in Stage One.15 To say that 
there are εἴδη within this horizon is to say that things always appear as belonging to a 
“family” or “kind.” Appearance, in other words, always involves a “two,” one appearing 
as another. Second, a kind has members. In Stage One, the difference between a kind and 
its members is not usually thematic, and so εἶδος can sometimes be used to refer to the 
latter. This is what Theaetetus sometimes has in mind in his responses. For example, 
when the Stranger divides hunting into two εἴδη, one hunting the soulless and the other 
the ensouled, Theaetetus replies yes, that is, “if indeed both are (εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω)” 
(219e8). He does not mean, I think, that this division is sound if these two Forms exist; 
but rather, he is wondering if the classes are not “empty,” i.e. whether there are arts that 
hunt soulless things.16 So, “there is an εἶδος called ‘tree,’ ” within this horizon, does not 
mean that there is a Form of Treehood. It more likely means that “there are many things 																																																								
15 There are plenty of examples in the Sophist and elsewhere where εἶδος is used interchangeably with 
γένος. Benardete’s translation of the Sophist and the Statesman consistently translates γένος as “genus,” 
and εἶδος as “species.” This is helpful for the Greek-less reader, but ultimately misleading. Heidegger 
(1997) thinks that the two terms have very different connotations, and their interchangeability in Plato is a 
sign of unclarity in his mind about them. εἶδος is stable look, while γένος brings in the element of time with 
its etymology in γίγνομαι. Sayre (2006), 227 argues that εἶδος and γένος not only have different meanings 
in the Sophist, but even εἶδος alone has different meanings in the Sophist and the Statesman: it means 
Forms in the former but “classes” (i.e. groups of Forms, and these groups themselves are not Forms) in the 
latter. This dissertation will treat the two as interchangeable for the most part. 
16 Since inquiry is also called hunting, the implication is that Theaetetus does not notice himself and the 
Stranger doing what belongs to the hunting of soulless beings (cf. Benardete (1984), II. 81). Similar pas-
sages where εἶδος seems to primarily refer to the members of the class instead of the class or character, see 
222b6, 223e4 and 225c6-7. 
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called ‘tree’ “ or more simply “there are trees.” An εἶδος relates to its members as a “one” 
to a “many.” Third and finally, since kinds can often be further divided into subkinds, it 
would seem that εἶδος can also relate to other εἴδη as a one to a many. There are there-
fore, for example, two εἴδη of acquisition, which itself is an εἶδος. This relationship be-
tween kinds seems to be the reason why sometimes εἶδος is also called “part.”17 In short, 
appearances show things as belonging to kinds, and the kinds in turn exhibit structures 
amongst themselves. The doctrine of the interweaving of Forms, in other words, is al-
ready anticipated in the everyday encounter with appearances. 
(iii) The last point implies that appearances are “diaeretic”: there is already an ar-
ticulation inherent in things. It divides them into different and plural kinds. Those dis-
tinctions appear “already there” before we divide them. It is only because appearances are 
themselves diaeretic that diaeresis is a legitimate procedure. Diaeresis reflects the human 
effort to communicate and articulate the articulation inherent in things. Now language is 
not something alien but also familiar and encountered everyday. Accordingly, there is 
also a tendency to treat logos in the same manner as one encounters appearances, that is, 
unreflectively and without doubt. That the horizon of appearance is where the Stranger 
and Theaetetus begin explains some odd steps in Stage One. For example, when the 
Stranger asks Theaetetus whether the sophist is an expert or not, he responds that some-
one with the name σοφιστής, which in Greek usage can actually mean “expert,” cannot 
																																																								
17 In Stage One, “part” language occurs in 219c7, 220a3, 220b10, 221b3, 222b3, 223d6, 225a2, 229b9 
(here, not μέρος as it is in other places, but μόριον), 229c3, 229e2 (μόριον again). 
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possibly lack an art. Commentators have noticed the weakness of this argument.18 But 
they do not notice that this is a consequence of the horizon of appearance: language ap-
pears to Theaetetus and the Stranger as trustworthy and transparent as the appearance it 
articulates and classifies. Another way to put this is that in Stage One, the Stranger and 
Theaetetus are not aware of the possibility that their conversation might fail to “cut at the 
natural joints” of reality (Phaedr. 265e-266a). Therefore at this stage, they cannot even 
yet raise the question of false logos. Instead, logos is understood more like a “translation” 
of an appearance into a speech. It converts what is seen or visible, something private, into 
discourse, something that can be shared in common (cf. 218c4-5).19 
1.3 Diaeresis as Hunting 
Diaeresis aims to disclose the “articulate joints” of appearances. How it does this can 
be explained by the Stranger’s own metaphor for inquiry, hunting (218d3, 231c6, 235b1). 
In hunting, the prey is not always visible to the hunter. When it first appears, it is not 
completely out of reach, nor close enough for capture. It is thus vague and only partially 
clear and distinct. The hunter first spots an animal among plants and rocks. Once noticing 
the animal, the hunter moves closer in the expectation that it is potentially the prey he is 
seeking. As he moves closer, his potential target becomes more and more distinct, and he 																																																								
18 Rosen (1983), 101; Benardete (1984), II. 84; Brown (2010), 164 n.28. See also the beginning of 3.2.2 (a) 
below. 
19 Heidegger (1997), 200-1 warns that the articulation should not be understood as description, even though 
he immediately adds that it is not a “mere ordering or classification.” But what happens is that the conver-
sation only later discovers that what they are doing in Stage One turns out to be a description - but at this 
moment, they are not yet aware of that, because within the horizon of appearance, description is classifica-
tion: the two are the same. Crivelli (2012), 22, by contrast, speaks of the initial definitions alternately as 
classifications and descriptions. To anticipate my view, a more accurate reading would be as follows. In 
Stage One the initial diaereses are classifications-definitions. In Stage Two they turn out to only have re-
vealed the sophist’s actions and not his essence, and therefore are demoted to the status of descriptions. See 
also 5.2 and 5.3 below. 
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begins to notice features that were unavailable to him before his approach. Ultimately, 
when he is close enough to the thing spotted, he might eventually come to realize that it is 
not the animal he is hunting and so he lets it go, or he sees that it is his prey and proceeds 
to capture. 
The hunting simile highlights five important features of diaeresis, and four of them 
are particularly relevant to Stage One. First of all, the sophist also appears initially “from 
afar” to the Stranger and Theaetetus, that is, in a state of relative obscurity. Similarly, di-
aeresis generally begins from more general features, with generic classes, and proceeds to 
more specific, concrete ones. So the sophist first appears as acquisitive and then appears 
to engage in the mastery kind of acquisitive arts.20 
Second, the hunter is concentrated on catching the prey. Likewise, diaeresis is also 
employed with an interest on a single subject matter, the sophist.21 This explains partly 
the procedure of bifurcation. Bifurcation implies that diaeresis is neither systematic nor 
exhaustive (despite appearances to the contrary). The inquiry into what the sophist’s art is 
does not depend on the Stranger’s successful classification of all arts; only the parts rele-
vant to the object pursued need to be correctly stated.22 The Stranger is solely interested 
in disclosing the sophist’s art. For this purpose, bifurcation is enough. The Stranger draws 
																																																								
20 To be sure, not all steps seem to reflect the process from the generic to the specific, leading to the claim 
that this is only an accidental feature of diaeresis, e.g. Sayre (2006), 61-2; Grams (2012), 139. But their 
view that Plato does not necessarily intend diaeresis to proceed from the generic to the specific misses the 
wood for the trees. The Stranger’s comment at 264d-265a makes it quite clear that one ought to proceed 
from the general to the specific. Whether this is actually done in every division is another question. 
21 Franklin (2011), 10. 
22 Campbell (1867), xi; Cornford (1935), 171; Brown (2010), 154. 
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attention to this in several places; for example he leaves the “many different kinds” 
(220a8: πολλοῖς εἴδεσι or 22e1e7: πολυειδές) of footed animals undivided.23 
As he approaches, the hunter could eventually come to realize that what he initially 
thought to be his prey is some other animal. The hunter would be like someone who sees 
Theaetetus from afar and think it is Socrates; only halfway upon approaching him does he 
realize that he is mistaken. So thirdly, there is a possibility that what they thought was a 
sophist might eventually not be one. They could misidentify someone else as a sophist. 
Obviously, the most important instance of misrecognition is the identification of the phi-
losopher as the sophist — which will happen in the last definition of Stage One. Diaeresis 
is therefore not infallible.24 
A related fourth point is that the hunter discovers his object as he moves closer, not 
before. Diaeresis also does something like this. The observation that diaeresis merely 
transforms appearances into a linguistic form must therefore be supplemented by the fol-
lowing consideration. It implies that there is something first seen, and then translated by 
diaeresis. This is not wrong for many appearances that one can easily divide. For exam-
ple, the division of the angler fits this description, as the angler is not something the 
Stranger and Theaetetus only come to see as they divide him. The angler is “easily recog-																																																								
23 Ackrill (1997) [1970], 103 gives a similar explanation of dichotomy. Cf. Rep. 523a-525a. Franklin 
(2011) proposes that dichotomy, the puzzling feature of diaeresis, is meant to overcome the problematic 
character of everyday discourse (his terms are “ordinary parlance” and “ordinary norms”). I do not, howev-
er, find this ultimately convincing. Instead, the issue of the confusion between the sophist and the philoso-
pher, which reflects ultimately the difficulty of distinguishing appearance and being, is the real cause of the 
choice of dichotomy. (See 5.3 below.) 
24 Fallibility can of course also occur at the specific steps in the division. The fallibility of diaeresis, when 
not fully appreciated, leads to misapplied charity. Grams (2012), 154, for example, implies that the task of 
the interpreter is to offer a model of explaining diaeresis such that all the inconsistencies in the text can be 
explained away instead of grasped as inconsistencies. Assuming the infallibility of diaeresis makes both the 
Sophist and the Statesman into something that they are not, namely disguised treatises. 
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nized (εὔγωνστον),” as the Stranger notes. It is chosen so that Theaetetus can focus on 
how the method is used. When applied to the angler, therefore, diaeresis really is a 
“merely technical” matter of articulating him correctly. But it is misleading because the 
sophist is not well known: he appears initially difficult to make out.25 For something un-
known like the sophist, diaeretic talking is part of the effort of “approaching” the prey. It 
is meant to lead to discovery — discovery of something that was previously not under-
stood clearly or even something new. 
In Stage One, diaeresis shows its heuristic potential by appropriating the appearing-
as structure. Since the distinction between appearing and being is absent, “x appears as y” 
and “x is y” are treated as identical. Diaeresis then records appearances as if they correct-
ly reflect being. Now, if someone has never met nor heard of Socrates, he cannot mistake 
Theaetetus for Socrates even if Theaetetus appears like Socrates. Similarly, since to ap-
pear as something is usually to appear as a kind, and this kind must be something familiar 
to the inquirer, diaeresis first investigates something by the assimilation of what is not 
clearly known to something familiar.26 The inquirer thus begins with assimilating the 
sophist to what is familiar and ordinary. The initial definitions therefore mean that the 
Stranger is assimilating the sophist to other jobs or expertise that we are familiar with and 
recognize: hunting, commerce, and sports. 
Assimilation is the inevitable beginning of all inquiry: it is the natural impulse to at-
tempt to fit the unknown into the context of what is known. It is also justifiable on the 																																																								
25 Heidegger (1997), 179-80; Benardete (1984), II. 78. 
26 Notomi (1999), 77; Franklin (2011), 7; Gill (2012), 140-2. This is related to the topic of παράδειγμα, 
example or model, but I will not discuss it. 
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grounds of prudent conservatism: we only resort to new ways of understanding when the 
old ways are revealed to be inadequate.27 But it is obviously problematic. How do we 
know that the sophist is not someone who requires new categories in order to be under-
stood? What if he is one of his own kind? Since diaeresis is fallible, is it possible to know 
when it records an inappropriate assimilation? Or, more relevantly, why assimilate by 
means of diaeresis? Here, diaeresis actually has great value: it imposes a kind of disci-
pline that guides one to follow a thought or idea to its very end.28 One begins with an idea 
based on appearance — for example, that the sophist appears to be a hunter — and then 
diaeresis assists in following that idea to its “logical” conclusion. Since all hunters hunt 
something by means of something else, the sophist must also have an object and a means 
to pursue that object. Now, while there is obviously no guarantee that something wrong 
would reveal itself, there is also the possibility that an incorrect assimilation would reveal 
its incorrectness in one way or another. For example, as I approach Theaetetus, I might 
eventually realize this person cannot possibly be Socrates, because I see hair on his head. 
Something contrary to what I know (namely that Socrates is bald) is revealed during the 
approach. Likewise, the assimilation of the sophist to a hunter might also reveal why it is 
wrong when there is something about the sophist that is either incompatible with being a 
hunter, or is left unexplained by being a hunter. 
Diaeresis, therefore, both makes one see something that was not previously seen (by 
way of assimilation), and at the same time has the potential to reveal problems in certain 
																																																								
27 Rosen (1980), 164: “The fact that meanings or epistemic characters are reflected from one thing to anoth-
er is an essential cause of the recognizability and (partial) intelligibility of things.” 
28 Rickless (2012) associates it with the method of hypothesis in Plato. 
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ways of seeing (by showing the defects of assimilation). To understand how each of the 
first four definitions of the sophist achieves this double function of revelation and con-
cealment is the task of the next section. 
Before that, let me mention the fifth and final feature. Hunting ends at the capture of 
the prey. There is a similar aspect in diaeresis as well. To divide the εἴδη-structure of the 
sophist is to complete the investigation of the sophist. Consider the following. In Stage 
One, the angler “inquiry” is concluded when his diaeresis is concluded. In Stage One, 
diaeresis has the peculiarity of being both the beginning and the end of inquiry. The soph-
ist is “captured” once the process is carried out. In the other two stages, however, it oc-
curs at the end. In Stage Two, the Stranger prefaces his division with the expectation that 
once the sophist is thus defined, he will soon proceed to define the statesman. This means 
that the successful diaeretic definition completes the investigation of the sophist. And the 
dialogue itself ends with diaeresis. Otherwise put, any diaeresis is always potentially an 
ending point. So, if the first definition of the sophist were as satisfactory as the angler, 
inquiry would have stopped. This does not contradict the fact that in retrospect, any diae-
retic definition might only turn out to be a temporary stage in inquiry. But that is because 
those definitions were problematic, questionable, and in need of refinement. 
In sum: the hunting simile illuminates why diaeresis is a top-down bifurcation meant 
as a heuristic, fallible aid in the pursuit of an object. It explains how definitions generated 
by it are to be read as both revealing and concealing. And it suggests that while the un-
successful diaeretic definitions will become temporary moments of inquiry, the success-
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ful ones end inquiry and offer logoi that are appropriate for the knowledge of what is in-
vestigated. It is now time to turn to the first four definitions. 
1.4 The First Four Definitions 
(i) Production and Acquisition. Besides being an illustration of diaeresis, the angler 
also brings out the important division between productive and acquisitive arts. Since all 
definitions except one begin with the production-acquisition dichotomy, a discussion of it 
is in order. 
Farming, care of mortal bodies, making of equipment, and imitative arts (painting, 
poetry, drama, and acting), are all grouped into one, because in them “someone brings 
whatever previously was not into being.” There is therefore someone who produces 
(ποιεῖν), and something that is produced (ποιεῖσθαι). Arts with this power are “produc-
tive” (ποιητική) (219a10-b10). A host of other activities are markedly different: mathe-
matics and learning as a whole, moneymaking, contest, and hunting. All these activities 
“manufacture (δημιουργεῖ) nothing, but concerning what are and have come to be, some 
subdue (or master) by speeches and actions, and others do not give in to what tries to 
subdue.” They are collectively labeled acquisitive (κτητική) arts (219c2-7). 
This division sets up the theme of knowledge and logos. Production-acquisition re-
flects the question whether knowledge is creation or discovery. Putting mathematics and 
learning under acquisition suggests that knowledge is discovery and is to be distinguished 
from invention. Their own inquiry is compared to hunting, also acquisitive. This means 
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that the sophist, the object of their hunt, is not a fictional type invented by them.29 Logos, 
however, has a productive aspect. While there is no contradiction in thinking that acquisi-
tion can involve production (for example, fishermen can make their own nets for catching 
fish), and the pursuit of knowledge can very well involve creativity in speech, the sophist 
raises the issue of which is in the service of the other. The sophist understands making 
speeches as the expression of human freedom.30 The philosopher understands logos as 
guided by something higher than itself and therefore human freedom is freedom under 
the yoke of truth (253c7). In the very opening of the Stranger’s division, the great con-
trast between the sophist and the philosopher is foreshadowed. 
In Stage One the Stranger will discover the sophist under three main branches of ac-
quisition. So the sophist initially comes to light as an acquisitor rather than a producer, 
i.e. he appears as belonging to the same class of arts as the philosopher’s. 
(ii) The Hunter-Sophist. The angler, seemingly chosen at random, becomes relevant, 
as the Stranger realizes that the sophist and him are akin (συγγενῆ) in being hunters, as 
both engage in forceful subduing of their prey. But this is an appearance only manifest to 
the Stranger (καταφαίνεσθαι μοι) (221d13). He assimilates the sophist to a hunter on the 
basis of how the sophist looks to him. As mentioned before, this assimilation restricts 
their articulation. All hunters hunt something by means of something: one asks what they 
hunt and how they hunt it.31 Hunters of land animals and fowlers might both use rifles 
(same means) but differ by their prey; the angler differs from the spearing fisherman by 																																																								
29 Rosen (1983), 133. 
30 Grg. 450c, 452d. 
31 Heidegger (1997), 196; Benardete (1960), (1984), II. 77; Cornford (1935), 172. 
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method but both hunt fish; and often any two hunters might be different because of both 
prey and method. Since how one hunts is partially determined by what one is hunting in-
sofar as the means should be suitable for the end, what the sophist hunts precedes the 
question of how he hunts, and is the first question raised by Theaetetus. The Stranger’s 
answer is wealthy, young men (221e1-222c2). The rest of his diaeresis spells out the 
sophist’s means of hunting, which could be summarized as persuasion concerning virtue 
(222c5-223a5). So the process of applying diaeresis now both lays bare the sophist’s ap-
pearances and arranges them in accordance with the model of the hunter. If one recalls 
that kinds are based on looks, the division suggests that the sophist appears to travel 
(222a9-11), associate habitually with the elite youths in private, earn money through per-
suasion, and appeal to virtue instead of pleasure.32 See Diagram 1 below. 	
         Hunting 
 
In-Water  Footed 
 
    Wild    Tame 
 
   Violent Persuasion 
 
     Public  Private 
 
      Erotic  Wage-Earning 
 
        Pleasure         Virtue 	
Diagram 1. The Hunter-Sophist 																																																									
32 Cf. the slightly different list by Notomi (1999), 47-8. 
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The hunter-sophist first and foremost draws attention to the Stranger’s own resem-
blance to the sophist. He and Theaetetus are hunting a hunter. One cannot help but notice 
that both the Stranger and the sophist travel, that both are good at persuasion, and that 
Theaetetus is also a young man (and his tractability also makes him akin to the tame). 
Although the Stranger does not seem to charge tuition, and the real “object” of his hunt is 
not young men (he even showed an initial reluctance to talk to Theaetetus), both his ac-
tivity and the sophist’s are called hunting. Given that the theme of the dialogue is meant 
to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher, it is perhaps not a surprise to see that as a 
first attempt, the sophist and the Stranger are suggested to be in the same family. At any 
rate, the pressing question is, is the assimilation adequate? 
Three observations suggest that it is not. First, the sophist, as a hunter of humans, is 
put under the class as hunters of tame animals. Theaetetus initially does not quite under-
stand this division. He wonders whether there is truly a hunt of tame animals.33 Surpris-
ingly, the Stranger leaves this up to Theaetetus to decide. He claims to be indifferent even 
if Theaetetus asserts that no animals are tame, or that there are tame animals but humans 
are wild or savage, or that humans are tame but there is no hunting of them. While The-
aetetus chooses none of these options but agrees that there is hunting of tame animals, 
had he chosen any of the other three options, the model of hunting would collapse. If 
there is no hunting of humans, then the sophist cannot possibly hunt young men — he 
would be practicing a non-existing art. If humans are wild or savage, this becomes diffi-
cult to square with the immediate ensuing revelation that the sophist hunts by means of 																																																								
33 As Benardete (1984), II. 84 notes, Theatetus must think “tame” (ἥμερον) to mean domesticated animals, 
which are already hunted, and therefore the division is puzzling to him. 
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persuasion, which works on tame, speaking animals. And if humans are tame, then per-
haps the sophist is not really hunting them. This is because hunting, as involuntary subdu-
ing, suggests force — kidnapping, pirating, or tyranny are more appropriately grasped as 
hunting than persuasion is. This is the first sign that it is questionable whether hunting is 
a suitable way to articulate the sophist’s activity, and the first signal that the sophist 
might not be as he initially appears. Theaetetus only avoids the collapse of the model by 
choosing the awkward option the Stranger induces him to take. 
The next puzzled reaction from Theaetetus reinforces this point. He seeks clarifica-
tion for gift-bearing, a branch under private-hunting and contrasted with wage-earning. 
The Stranger gives one example to illustrate its meaning: lovers bringing gifts for their 
beloved (222e1). This example leads him to give the alternative name “the εἶδος of erotic 
art” for the gift-giving class. This has made some commentators uneasy. They worry that 
the replacement of the name is to make a joke (the joke being that δῶρα in the Greek can 
mean either gift or bribe, the latter being what the lover is really offering) at the cost of 
committing a “scientific error,” namely the error of replacing the name of a genus with 
that of a species (since obviously, not all gift-giving or bribe-offering is done for the sake 
of love).34 I would instead suggest that in the context, this change of name corrects a de-
fect that “gift-bearing” has. “Gift-bearing” and “wage-earning” are not the same sort of 
names. “Wage-earning” names the goal or end result of persuasion, while “gift-giving” 
reveals the mode of persuasion itself, the manner or means. “Erotic art,” by comparison, 
																																																								
34 See the report by Robinson (1999), 140-1. 
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forms a better parallel with wage-earning than gift-giving, because both answer the same 
question, what the private-hunter of persuasion is looking for in doing his work.  
This brings us to the crucial point. The fact that the question of goal or intention 
comes to the fore during a discussion of the means of the hunter subtly reveals the defi-
ciency of the hunter model. While an angler might very well be working for pay and thus 
is a wage-earner, the question of whether he earns wages or not is not part of what he is.35 
It is not because he is an angler regardless of whether he sells the caught fish, brings it 
back home as food, or is fishing for his master. In other words, he is a hunter because the 
object and means of his art are fully adequate for capturing what he is. For the sophist, 
however, they are not adequate. There is a “leftover” or “excess” — wage-earning — that 
does not quite fit into the model. It suggests that the sophist has some objective that is 
determinative of him but not fully captured by the object of his hunting. 
So hunting does not perfectly assimilate the sophist’s appearance.36 No wonder the 
Stranger says that they must take another look (223c1), because the art of the sophist is 
not something trivial, but rather complicated (ποικίλης). He says that “in what has been 
just said (ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις),” another appearance (φάντασμα) presents itself, 
but it is not the kind (γένος) they said it was, but another kind (c2-4). In other words, 
something they said about the hunter-sophist includes some hint or clue as to the next ap-
																																																								
35 McCoy (2007), 157-8 perceptively notes that the comparison between wage-earners and lovers might 
implicate the sophist to be in a class with prostitutes, despite the fact that the Stranger is overall silent about 
questions of good and bad here. 
36 McCoy (2007), 149-152. Heidegger (1997), 205 also notes that the hunter-sophist “does not evaluate 
what the sophist has to say,” i.e. the actual content of their claim to education or ἀρετή. This is quite correct 
– the sophist’s logos only first becomes a topic in the fourth definition, and more fully treated in the defini-
tion of elenchus (noble sophistry). 
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pearance of the sophist.37 This brings us to the third point. Even if the sophist’s persua-
sion can be seen as a kind of hunting insofar as his persuasion towards virtue is analogous 
to a hunter’s bait, there is an obvious difference between his “hunting” and those of the 
latter kind. A prey resists or struggles after being caught by the hunter’s bait; young men 
end up often paying more money to the sophist after being caught.38 In short: by the end 
of the division, it has come to light as more appropriate to articulate the dealing between 
the sophist and young men as a transaction, i.e. voluntary exchange. The sophist’s wage-
earning, in other words, is in tension with the model of the hunter. Even the final cut in 
the hunter-sophist definition indicates as much, where he is said to offer virtue in associa-
tion on the one hand, and ask for currency as tuition on the other; and the summary splits 
this final step into two terms with –ικη suffixes: νομισματοπωλική and δοξοπαιδευτική. 
It therefore seems that he does not have just one, but two arts. This is, I suggest, why the 
next diaeresis takes up commerce as the model. 
(iii) Merchant-Sophists. The specialization of moneymaking raises two questions: 
where he gets his product, and what kind of product he specializes in selling. The source 
of his product contains two questions. The first is whether he made the product himself 
(this is called by the name of αὐτοπωλική, “self-selling”) or bought it from others 
(μεταβλητική, “resale”).39 The second is whether his product is brought by him from one 
city to another (whether he exports or retails). The first merchant-sophist resells and ex-																																																								
37 Heidegger (1997), 206 also saw this. Dorter (1990) proposes the highly interesting reading of the defini-
tions of the sophist in Stage One: each definition forms the progression from desire to spiritedness to rea-
son, i.e. the tripartite soul doctrine of the Republic is the secret link to understanding the sequence of the 
definitions. 
38 Rosen (1983), 109; Howland (1998), 191; cf. Campbell (1867), l. 
39 There is a change in meaning in the term μεταβλητική. When the Stranger divided the angler, this term 
referred to all voluntary exchanges (including gift-giving). 
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ports. The second merchant-sophist both resells and “self-sells,” but he stays in the same 
city. Both merchant-sophists sell the same type of products, soul-goods (i.e. knowledge, 
art, entertainment, and cultural goods in general), more specifically, they sell “logos and 
learning about virtue” (224d1). I note that many features of the sophist revealed in the 
previous diaeresis are retained but undergo a reordering or relabeling now.40 So, while 
money and privacy are not mentioned, being a merchant implies those features; traveling 
is implied in the exporter-sophist division; and finally, logos and virtue are mentioned at 
the end. The involvement with young men, however, is quietly dropped: the merchant- 
sophists’ “potential customers” are no longer limited to wealthy, young men. The mer-
chants thus defined thus more or less resemble the hunter (cf. 223e6-7). See diagram 2 
for the divisions. 
Assimilating the sophist to a merchant makes him centrally concerned with the max-
imization of profit. He is therefore less likely to be concerned with the quality of his 
teachings about virtue except insofar as they might bring him a higher profit. This implies 
that the sophist has a motivation to exaggerate the quality and worth of what he intends to 
sell, or to appeal to what is demanded by his customers (Prot. 313c-314b). The quality of 
the learnings he offers is therefore suspect. 
The assimilation of the sophist to a merchant still suffers a deficiency, however, if of 
a different kind than the model of the hunter. Selling obscures a fundamental aspect in 
which the sophist differs from a merchant. The Stranger draws attention to this aspect by 
repeating “buying and selling” for a total of six times within half a Stephanus page in the 																																																								
40 Cf. Cornford (1935), 175; Ambuel (2007), 46. 
		
55 
course of explaining what soul-goods are to Theaetetus (223e2, 224a2-3, a5, a5-6, b1-2, 
b6). This repetition is meant to actually alert the reader to consider whether buying and 
selling is a good model to assimilate the sophist’s activity to. It falls short of accounting 
for the sophist as a teacher. The sophist does not simply sell learnings about virtue, but 
he sells them by teaching them. Similarly, if he “bought” learnings about virtue from an-
other city, this does not mean that he merely paid for them but that he also learned them. 
The merchant-model, in other words, fails to differentiate the sophist from, for example, 
a book merchant specializing in works on virtue, someone who also “buys and sells soul-
goods,” but is obviously different from sophists.41 
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Diagram 2. The Merchant-Sophists42 
 																																																								
41 Heidegger (1997), 209-210 claims that the importance of the merchant is to establish the sophist as sell-
ing and buying persuasion (i.e. logos). It is more to the point to say that the suppression of logos in the 
merchant model leads to the athlete one. 
42 The bold font identifies the second, exporter-sophist; the third sophist, the retailer, is special in that he 
occupies two branches (underlined in the diagram). 
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This is one aspect of the problem. The other aspect concerns whether it is crucial that 
the sophist only practices the resale art. In other words, does he sell his own products? 
This division seems meant to convey the sense that the sophist, strictly understood, 
makes no positive contributions to knowledge, but only facilitates in its popularization. 
The sophist would then be a great disseminator of knowledge. It is unclear, however, why 
original ownership of knowledge matters. If Theodorus taught Theaetetus the proof of a 
theorem that he discovered, and Theaetetus teaches it for a fee in another city, why would 
that make Theaetetus more of a sophist, and not Theodorus?43 The Stranger had an-
nounced that he would report what the Eleatics thought about sophist, statesman, and phi-
losopher. In other words, he also claims to be sharing the thoughts of others in another 
city. If he were really reporting the Eleatic opinion verbatim — I do not think that is ac-
tually the case — would this make him resemble a sophist too?44 One might think that 
speeches and teachings of virtue do not work like mathematical proofs or diaereses of the 
Stranger. But it is difficult to explain why they differ. Does this mean that, for example, 
anyone besides Aristotle teaching Aristotle’s ethics makes that person a sophist?45 It 
could be the case that all sophists practice the resale of virtue, but not all people who 
practice the resale of virtue are sophists. Even so, this possible difference is not specified 
in any branch of this definition. 
																																																								
43 For an alternative interpretation, cf. Howland (1998), 172.  
44 Cf. Rosen (1983), 108. 
45 Cornford (1935), 175 suggests that this is because virtue is not teachable (perhaps unlike geometrical 
theorems in this respect), so anyone who claims to teach it would automatically be a fraud. This is doubtful 
since not all instances of the word ἀρετή are understood in that well-known Socratic sense. 
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The significance of the distinction between “self-selling” and “resale” ultimately 
concerns genuine and defective knowledges or learnings. The notion of products brought 
from others is meant to distinguish between “firsthand” and “secondhand” products, and 
like most secondhand products, the latter are deficient compared to the brand new ones. 
But so far, whether the education the sophist provides is δοξοπαιδευτική or genuine 
μαθήματα is not even raised as a question: the Stranger uses these terms interchangeably. 
If the difference between genuine and defective learning is not yet established, however, 
then the question of origin is irrelevant. The person who teaches what he himself produc-
es provides learning no more than the person who teaches what he learned from others. 
This is perhaps why the question of whether resale is a relevant feature of the sophist be-
comes highly indeterminate throughout the discussion.46 When the Stranger summarizes 
the results of the diaeresis of the exporter-sophist in 224c9-d2, resale is in effect not men-
tioned. This suggests that whether the sophist engages in resale or not has become irrele-
vant. The next definition, the retailer-sophist, who sells and buys in his own city, rein-
forces this point. The retailer-sophist is said to sell partly products of others and partly his 
own products. One cannot help but wonder if this does not imply that an exporter of 
one’s own products is a sophist as well, or why a retailer who only sells products made 
by others would not also be a sophist. In the summary of the retailer-sophist, the Stranger 
says that he belongs to the class that καπηλικόν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικήν, ἀμφοτέρως, “retails 
or sells his own products — both.” The text reads as if the Stranger is initially indifferent 
to whether the sophist sells his own products or not, and thus uses εἴτε (“either…or”), but 																																																								
46 Cf. Howland (1998), 175. 
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finally goes back to affirming that he really does both, not just one of them. This uncer-
tainty seems to be the source of a later miscounting, where the retailer-sophist is counted 
as two sophists, one focusing only on selling others’ products, the other only on self-
selling.47 
Other peculiar features of the retailer-sophist are best explained by the fact that the 
dialogue occurs in the background of Socrates’ trial, and so the definitions are constantly 
comparing him (and to a lesser degree, also the Stranger) with the sophist. The retailer-
sophist partly sells his own products; Socrates has his own brand of spiritual maieutics. 
Neither of them travels, and both tarry in the marketplace. Finally, the retailer-sophist 
looks poor — the phrase “making a living (τὸ ζῆν προυτάξατο)” suggests that the retailer 
just gets by in his business. This also reminds one of Socrates, the philosopher famous for 
poverty. While Socrates is not a merchant — he offers his conversations “free of charge” 
— the resemblance is nevertheless undeniable. 
In sum: the merchant-sophists reveal the sophist’s possible indifference to the quality 
of his product; but they conceal his teaching activity and, within the horizon of appear-
ance, make the issue of whether he sells his own original intellectual products uncertain. 
And the uncertainty brings a variation of the merchant — the retailer — slightly closer to 
the appearance of Socrates. 
(iv) The Athlete-Sophist. The Stranger does not say why the sophist is now assimilat-
ed to an athlete. But a similar logic is at work as before. It was said that the merchant-
sophists “buy and sell” their products in a way different from an ordinary merchant, but 																																																								
47 For an interpretation of that miscounting, see Chapter Three, note 5. 
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that way is not specified in the definitions. What is not yet specified is here revealed to be 
his logos. The merchant’s logos is mainly advertising discourse; the sophist’s logos both 
advertises and instructs. The assimilation of the sophist to the athlete, in other words, ap-
proaches the sophist with an interest in revealing how or what he teaches. He belongs to 
the class that fights with words (225b1 ἀμφισβητητικόν, “controverting”). Athletes fight 
in a certain manner about a certain thing. Boxers use punches instead of kicks to achieve 
victory by overpowering the opponent in physical prowess and technique. The athlete-
sophist speaks in private using short questions and answers, a manner of speaking termed 
ἀντιλογικόν, contradicting. The topic concerning which he tries to overpower the oppo-
nent is “just things themselves and unjust things, and the rest in general,” that is, pretty 
much everything, but mainly virtue. This artful manner of winning controversies puts the 
sophist in the class of the eristic (ἐριστικόν). If we compare this definition again with the 
previous ones, we see that four features of the sophist are present: logos, privacy, virtue, 
and money (see diagram 3). 
The athlete model is illuminating in the following way. The divisions of fighting and 
contradicting indicate that the sophist reacts, that there is constantly some other that the 
sophist is trying to overpower. Benardete (1984), II. 89-90 notes that the difference be-
tween rivalry and fighting is analogous to the difference between racing and boxing. In 
racing, one tries to be better than others by doing one’s own best; in boxing, one partly 
does that by weakening the opponent as well. The sophist is more of a boxer than a run-
ner; he is more of a contrarian, namely someone who contradicts for the sake of contra-
dicting. This means that the sophist’s orientation is not “inward” but “outward.” The in-
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wardly-oriented person thinks of improvement as becoming better than one’s present self; 
the outwardly-oriented one thinks of it as victory over others. Fighting and contradicting 
thus show the sophist as reacting and outward-looking. 	
     Involuntary Acquisition 
 
[Hunting] Contesting 
 
    Rivalry   Fighting 
 
   Violent Controverting (ἀμφισβητητικόν) 
 
     Public  Private (ἀντιλογικόν) 
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Diagram 3. The Athlete-Sophist 
 
Another way of putting this is to say that the sophist is not concerned with genuine 
or deserved honor. Any praise or honor is enough to bolster his pride. There is a problem, 
however. At the end, money is again appended to the model of the athlete. It seems that 
no matter how they divide the sophist, he never looks like practicing just one art. If he 
hunts, he also sells; if he sells, he also teaches; and if he fights, he also makes money. In 
one way, this reveals his ποικιλία. In another way, it conceals his ultimate motivations. 
The sophist might be an athlete who makes a lot of money but primarily values it as a 
sign of the honor he deserves. He could also be someone who is profit-minded and hap-
pens to be good at verbal fighting, in which case his concern for honor is secondary. The 
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difference between these two is not negligible but quite substantial for clarity about what 
the sophist is, but the present definition fails to say which of these two possibilities the 
sophist exemplifies. In short, the Stranger and Theaetetus observe the sophist’s multiple 
concerns — virtue, money, honor — without grasping clearly how they are ranked and 
practiced by the sophist. 
The athlete-sophist, of all the definitions examined so far, resembles Socrates most 
closely.48 Speaking in private and short question-and-answering can hardly be said to be 
the sophist’s exclusive specialty (indeed sophists, as they appear in other Platonic dia-
logues, often boast of being able to speak in any mode) and is more characteristic of Soc-
rates’ own preferred way of speaking. At the same time, the Stranger seems to be distanc-
ing himself from the sophist while making Socrates closer to him. The Stranger’s own 
question-and-answer so far has looked less confrontational than Socrates’ usual practice, 
and thus resembles fighting less. The result is that one can see Socrates and the sophist 
traveling along the same divisional branches until the very last one. In other words, mon-
ey is now discovered to be the single salient feature in appearance that differentiates Soc-
rates from the sophist; with respect to the art of logos, to verbal athleticism, they appear 
the same or no different. 
Why is it that Socrates and the sophist are so confused here? It is because philosophy 
cannot even appear as philosophy in the familiar, everyday world. The Stranger makes 
this point by curiously suggesting that he and Theaetetus find a nickname or epithet 
																																																								
48 As Benardete (1984), II. 90; Howland (1998), 196; Crivelli (2012), 22 n. 34 all note, each definition 
looks progressively like Socrates or the philosopher. 
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(ἐπωνυμία, 225d4) for the money-wasting and moneymaking eristic.49 Implying that one 
can waste money artfully or skillfully seems absurd. The purpose of this questionable di-
vision is likely to contrast Socrates with the athlete-sophist. This is what the Stranger 
says about the money-wasting eristic — 	
Str. I think that it,50 in becoming unconcerned with its own affairs on account of the 
pleasure of spending time about these things, when it is heard by many of those who 
do not listen to the talk with pleasure, is called by them, so far as I can tell, by noth-
ing else than “babbling.” (225d7-10) 	
While a few scholars deny that an allusion to Socrates is made here, the allusion, I 
think, is rather obvious.51 Socrates is the negligent father and husband who forgets “his 
own affairs,” speaks because he enjoys it, and irritates many of those around him. What is 
noteworthy in this description, however, is that certain others call him a babbler, 
ἀδολεσχικόν. In other words, the non-philosophical people don’t even call him a philoso-
pher. By contrast, the moneymaking eristic gets the epithet “sophist,” which one infers is 
also a name that the non-philosophers give him. The absence of “philosopher” and the 
presence of “sophist” reminds one of Socrates’ opening remark that the philosopher never 
appears as himself to the many. The Stranger’s initial diaereses thus exhibit a remarkable 
																																																								
49 ἐπωνυμία as “epithet,” see e.g. Rep. 394a3; Crat. 416b10-11. 
50 The literal translation indicates that Stranger refers to the class (which is neuter in the Greek) in an an-
thropomorphic way, and so the class of something and the practitioners belonging to that class are as con-
fused as the meaning of εἶδος as class and as members of the class. 
51 Some think this is referring to the Megarians: e.g. Cornford (1935), 176; Heidegger (1997), 212. Those 
who see Socrates in this description - Campbell (1867), 40 (but only tentatively); Rosen (1983), 114; Sallis 
(1996), 472; Dorter (1990), 54 and n. 22; Gonzalez (1997), 59 n. 63; Howland (1998), 182; Zuckert (2000), 
72-3; McCoy (2007), 158-9 (also tentatively). Cf. Tht. 195b9-10. 
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agreement with Socrates’ understanding of the philosopher’s situation.52 This passage 
suggests that the sophist, even if he ultimately eludes the horizon of appearance, is never-
theless intelligible to a much greater extent here than the philosopher is. It is understand-
able and familiar, even “categorizable,” that someone is concerned with money and/or 
victory, with honor and winning arguments in law courts or assemblies. But Socrates is in 
a sense singular and unclassifiable. To be concerned with truth and wisdom to the extent 
of enjoying speeches over deeds, of forgetting one’s own affairs and properties — that is 
strange, odd, and difficult to understand. The non-philosopher can only see Socrates’ 
oblivion of the obviously important; even Socrates’ pleasure strikes him as frivolous, to 
the point of causing displeasure to him. Socrates is therefore as much of a stranger in 
Athens as the Eleatic Stranger is. 
To conclude, the three assimilations of the sophist reveal him and simultaneously fall 
short of fully clarifying him.53 What the Stranger and Theaetetus have in private when 
each utters the name “sophist” is now made common through discourse; and they “know” 
the sophist to the extent that they discern the activities he is engaged in, his πρᾶγμα. But 
what is revealed of the sophist in terms of appearance is inadequate. In each definition 
these known features of the sophist were given different emphasis, but none of them 
showed up to be fully satisfactory. The sophist’s real identity is left in the dark. And the 
fourth definition, the athlete-sophist, resembles Socrates to such a degree that there is a 
risk of confusing the two within this horizon. The Stranger and Theaetetus are about to 
																																																								
52 Heidegger (1997), 263. 
53 Giannopoulou (2001), 103. 
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come to the paradoxical realization that the more they learn about the sophist the less 
they understand him. 
Since each model always seems to leave something unsaid or distorted, the models 
of hunting, commerce, and competition are ultimately all failed assimilations. This ulti-
mately seems related to the fact that the sophist is ποικίλον (223c2, 226a6; also cf. 
240c4). This seems to mean both that he is “chameleonic” in the sense of “changing col-
ors” every other time they look at him, so that he is constantly defined differently, and 
that he is “complex” in the sense of seemingly having many arts, so that he appears eve-
rywhere they look for him and consequently seems to be nowhere. An intelligent grasp of 
the apparent plurality of the sophist requires one to seek that one thing that holds him to-
gether; but even to raise that question requires the distinction of being and appearing, a 
single being accounting for the apparent multiplicity. How can one begin to raise a ques-
tion like that? That transitional step towards it will take place by the next and final defini-
tion in Stage One, that of elenchus. 
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CHAPTER TWO NOBLE SOPHISTRY 	
The fifth definition does not define the sophist, but a philosopher, Socrates.1 It is the 
climax of Stage One, completing the argument that philosophers and sophists cannot be 
satisfactorily distinguished in terms of their appearances. It also suggests that Theaetetus, 
like his teacher, is incapable of distinguishing eristic from elenchus, as the two are de-
fined next to each other. It is a transitional passage, however, because Theaetetus and the 
Stranger are slowly becoming disenchanted by the horizon of appearance.2 2.1 explains 
why the Stranger for the first time offers a methodological remark on diaeresis, with spe-
cial emphasis on the problematic principle of “value-neutrality.” 2.2, a close reading of 
the Stranger’s account of elenchus, suggests that the fundamental analogy at work in this 
definition — the analogy between badnesses of the body and those of the soul — is prob-
lematic. The main problem, however, comes up at the end of the discussion, where the 
Stranger and Theaetetus explicitly disagree as to whether the refuter is a sophist, dis-
cussed in 2.3. My interpretation, briefly stated, is that the only way to overcome the defi-
ciencies of the horizon of appearance is to practice elenchus. Elenchus reveals the prob-
																																																								
1 See e.g. Klein (1977) 23-4; Rosen (1983), 131; Dorter (1990), 48-9. It is disputed by scholars whether the 
definition of elenchus describes Socrates as a member of the art, and whether the Stranger (Plato) means to 
allude to him or not. It is understandable why this is disputed. The Stranger himself is a foreigner; he wish-
es to be as polite as he can even when showing Socrates’ confusing appearance. He therefore does not 
make his point as explicit as one would like it. For those who resist the identification (but do not necessari-
ly exclude the possible allusion): Kerferd (1954); Bluck (1975), 40-5 (who takes the refuter to be a spurious 
imitation of Socrates); Notomi (1999), 64-8 (the best case made in defense of this view); Giannopoulou 
(2001), 114; Solana (2013). 
2 There are plenty of signs that this is the case, and they will be noted in proper places in this chapter. Here 
I only note that the description of folly resembles the first formula of false opinion that Socrates offered in 
the Theaetetus. On the enchantment of appearances, see Heidegger (1997), 256. Cf. Klein (1965), 114. 
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lem that only it itself can cure; the Stranger therefore has no choice but to take up the dis-
tinctively Socratic art from now on. 
2.1 Separating Like from Like 
Why this definition follows the previous one is in a sense obvious. The athlete-
sophist revealed that Socrates and the eristic only differ by the element of money. The 
Stranger is now about to present a definition that will no longer mention money. Moreo-
ver, virtue (ἀρετή), privacy, and logos had emerged as constant traits of the sophist 
throughout those four definitions, but the reader was never told what ἀρετή means. The 
present discussion makes virtue and its relation to logos thematic. 
The deficiency of the definition of elenchus differs from the deficiency of previous 
definitions. While hunting, exchanging, and competing are imperfect models that both 
reveal and conceal the sophist, refutation conceals him completely: it presents an other 
(Socrates) as the same (the sophist).3 The fifth definition commits the error of misidenti-
fication. The Stranger is clearly testing Theaetetus. He presents something that he himself 
does not count as sophistry, but he suspects that Theaetetus will mistake it for one. (Inci-
dentally this is a sign that he is not reporting Eleatic doctrine as he heard it, contrary to 
the impression he gave in the beginning.)4 He began the inquiry by suspecting that he and 
Theaetetus might have different notions of what each means by “sophist” (218b8-10); his 
suspicion will be confirmed at the end of Stage One. 																																																								
3 Cf. Benardete (1993), 765: in the definition of elenchus, “…Socrates’ way is correctly characterized but 
falsely categorized.” 
4 It is therefore misleading to think, as Blondell (2002), 345, 347 does, for example, that all the agreements 
in the dialogue are “without exception the visitor’s [i.e. the Stranger’s] ideas.” Consider, in this respect, 
also the statement that “it is impossible that Motion rests” in Chapter Four. 
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It is difficult to explain, however, why the Stranger no longer divides elenchus in 
terms of production-acquisition, but of separative arts (διακριτική) instead. After Stage 
One, the Stranger returns to searching the sophist in terms of the production-acquisition 
dichotomy. This peculiarity, let me suggest, is meant to indicate that this passage is a 
logos concerning logos, and in this sense is “outside” of the discussion, as it were. Sepa-
rating or distinguishing is a basic act of the intellect; and so in a sense separating is per-
vasive throughout all arts, and human life in general (cf. 253b5-6). This new discussion 
takes place because it has already become somewhat clear that diaeresis by itself cannot 
capture the sophist. But it is not completely clear why. Accordingly, a reflection on what 
they themselves are doing is in order.5 To consider logos through logos means to engage 
in a heightened sense of self-awareness or reflexivity; it means to “perceive” inwardly, to 
talk about one’s own talking. The framework shift signals the change from looking out-
wards to looking inwards. At the same time, the Stranger slows down. He discusses each 
division more carefully partly because it is not the natural tendency of the soul to look 
into itself. Nor is it surprising that in this passage, Theaetetus confesses having trouble 
seeing and asks for clarification more often than before (226c12, e3-4, 228a3, 229b11). 
He has not yet attained the level of inward reflection necessary for this division. But to 
look into oneself is to become distanced from the things one sees. This suggests that the 
Stranger and Theaetetus are approaching the horizon of judgment. Other signs also indi-
cate that the discussion is an inward-gazing reflection on logos. The Stranger’s examples 
for separative arts are οἰκετικῶν, the activities done by servants or slaves. Etymological-																																																								
5 Benardete (1984), II. 91; Sallis (1996), 473. 
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ly, the word is related to οἶκος, house, and logos is at one point suggested to be the house 
or home of the soul (252c6). Language or discourse is understood to be deeply one’s own 
(οἰκεῖος). To evoke the household arts is to evoke the fact that logos belongs to oneself 
and one becomes open to the world through it. 
The main point of the reflection is the discovery of two modes of logos. Separative 
arts are divided into two branches. One branch separates like from like, and is left name-
less. The other branch separates the better from the worse, and all the arts that do so are 
labeled “purification.” Weeding the chaff from the grain, or distinguishing coarse from 
fine flour are examples of purification. Carding, spinning, and combing, can be said to 
belong to what separates like from like. They disentangle and straighten out fibers from 
fibers.6 Activities in mathematics likely belong to this class as well. When Theaetetus and 
his friend young Socrates discovered a general way to define square and oblong numbers 
(Tht. 147c7-148b4), this seems to be a like-from-like separation. But most importantly 
the Stranger’s own diaeresis will be said to belong here.7 So on the one hand, one can 
read the discussion of elenchus in comparison with the first four definitions, and see the 
dialogue contrasting the sophist with Socrates. On the other hand, one should also read 
the discussion itself as contrasting between these two modes of logos, which indirectly 
contrasts the Stranger with Socrates — two different looks of the philosopher. At any 
																																																								
6 Rosen (1983), 119. Is there any significance that the household arts exemplifying purification relate to 
bread making, and those illustrating arts that seprate like from like relate to clothes making? Insofar as 
bread relates to eating and clothes relate to dressing, does this therefore suggest that intellectual purification 
is the restoration of health (eating well), and intellectual diacritics is the production of beauty (being 
dressed up well)? Cf. the end of 2.2 in this chapter. 
7 There is, then, a kind of kinship between mathematics and diaeresis. See also Howland (1998), 185. 
		
69 
rate, two modes of logos are discovered. Is only one of them needed in philosophizing? 
Are both needed? If so, how should one use them together appropriately? 
The Stranger does not answer this question directly but only shows through his con-
versation what he thinks the answer is. So far, he has only employed diaeresis. The need 
for elenchus requires him to show first what can go wrong with using diaeresis alone. 
And here we come to the clearest sign that the elenchus passage is self-reflexive: it is dur-
ing this diaeresis that the Stranger first makes an extensive methodological “digressive” 
remark on the method. When the Stranger distinguishes two sorts of purification, that 
concerning body and the other concerning soul, Theaetetus wants to know which purifi-
cations concern body and what the generic name for all of them is. Instead of answering 
this question directly, the Stranger says: 	
In fact, it happens to be of no concern for this method of speeches whether the art of 
sponging or drug-drinking, as purification, benefit us little or greatly. Since, for the 
sake of acquiring understanding (νοῦς), this method, in trying to discern clearly 
(κατανοεῖν) kinship and non-kinship (τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενές) in all arts, 
honors all of them equally with respect to this goal; it does not consider any art more 
laughable than others in similarity (ὁμοιότης), nor does it deem the person who 
shows the hunting art through the art of generalship somewhat more august than him 
who does this through the louse-killing art, though it does deem the former more 
vain for the most part. 
Moreover, now, this thing you asked, namely what shall we call all the powers that 
purify either ensouled or soulless body, it makes no difference for the method 
whether this sort of thing said will seem to be the most fitting. Just let it have the 
name that binds together everything that purifies something else as separate from pu-
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rifications of the soul. For it [the method] has been trying to divide the purification 
of thinking from the rest, if, that is, we understand what it wants. (227a7-c6) 	
I note the following points. 
Similarity and dissimilarity determine the divisions between εἴδη: this view reflects 
how inquiry proceeds in Stage One. And the question of better and worse is explicitly 
said to be irrelevant to the question of the similarity-dissimilarity structures of things. 
This confirms that diaeresis belongs under the non-purifying branch of separative arts. 
The remark also confirms that diaeresis is not designed to be systematic or exhaustive. So 
they are, for the moment, not concerned with dividing the arts concerning purification of 
the body. The purification of bodies can simply be all bundled under whatever name one 
cares to give to it. 
The Stranger seems to endorse what Crivelli calls a “cavalier attitude” towards 
names (2012: 19). Insofar as this attitude reflects the intention to attain to substantive re-
sults and genuine, mutual understanding, in contrast to mere nominal or verbal agree-
ments, the unconcern with names is justified.8 But should the reader take the Stranger at 
his word? To begin with, he does not recommend an unconcern with all names in a divi-
sion. He only recommends an unconcern with the names of the classes or kinds that are 
divided off from a branch, not the classes that they are actually dividing. Moreover, when 
the unconcern with names was first mentioned, it was actually mentioned by Theaetetus 
(220d4). One cannot rule out the possibility that the “cavalier attitude” might be a part of 
the Stranger’s willingness to adjust his μέθοδος for the young man’s impatience for 																																																								
8 Notomi (1999), 76. 
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names.9 More importantly, can one really say that names are completely unimportant in 
substantive matters? Doesn’t it matter greatly whether one calls Socrates a philosopher or 
a sophist? Otherwise put, are all issues about names “merely” about names?10 In this con-
text it is useful to remember that the Stranger himself, right at the end of the athlete-
sophist, showed some interest in knowing that the money-wasting eristic was also called 
a babbler. Is that interest not part of the method but a digression? 
In short, names are not simply innocent labels that can be arbitrarily attached to 
something and detached from another. “General” is already a term of honor, and “bab-
bler” carries a pejorative meaning. This brings us to the third and major point, the “value-
neutral” stance (as will be called here) of diaeresis. According to the Stranger, diaeresis 
disregards the benefits of each art and honors all of them equally.11 It is not designed to 
tell us whether, for example, merchants benefit more than anglers. Value-neutrality is jus-
tified by the purpose of understanding. Diaeresis, in other words, is in service of a kind of 
acquisition (namely to become intelligent, τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν 227a10-b1). In dis-
regarding every other kind of benefit, diaeresis itself provides the single benefit of 
knowledge.12 For this reason, the Stranger recommends not asking questions about bene-																																																								
9 Theaetetus’ unconcern with words is praised and gently criticized by Socrates in one breath in Tht. 184b-
185a. Young Socrates, Theaetetus’s friend and later the Stranger’s interlocutor in the Statesman, exhibits a 
similar attitude (Plt. 261e4). To my knowledge, Blondell (2002), 330 is alone in attributing this indiffer-
ence towards “terminology” to the young men instead of the Stranger himself. 
10 Towards the end of the dialogue, right after the Stranger recommends that they be lazy about naming the 
class of imitation that uses other tools (267a10-b2), he immediately accuses ancient men of being lazy 
about naming because they didn’t concern themselves with division of kinds (d4-e2). The status of the cav-
alier attitude towards names therefore remains ambiguous in the text. See also Dixsaut (1992), 69. 
11 Giannopoulou (2001), 107 and n. 28 attempts an alternative interpretation of the text, arguing that diaere-
sis cares about utility but not honor, and thus it is not absolutely value-neutral. But this severs what the 
Stranger associates closely together: honor and utility are treated almost interchangeably in this passage. 
12 Rosen (1983), 121 makes the same point, but in such a way that is more critical of the Stranger’s “meth-
odology.” 
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fit or honor of the arts. Not because arts don’t have their deserved benefit or honor, but 
because they are irrelevant for the purpose of knowing. In other words, the method of di-
aeresis seems to be grounded in the view that what is true (the similar and the dissimilar) 
has nothing to do with what is good (benefits, deserved honors, and so on).13 
To some extent, the neutral stance is defensible. Benefit can be a matter too contin-
gent to serve as a basis for classification; a conscious distancing from issues of benefit 
reflects caution.14 If one is guided by benefits or honors, one might miss the resemblance 
between the louse-killer and the general and become resistant to classifying them both as 
hunters. On the other hand, value-neutrality is obviously problematic. To begin with, it 
does not look like an attitude that can justify itself. Value-neutrality, as Rosen puts it, is 
based on the preference, and thus non-neutral stance, for knowledge.15 Insofar as value-
neutrality is backed up by a non-neutral stance, it means that the diaeretician cannot help 
but think the general’s self-evaluation quite vain or ridiculous compared to the humble 
louse-killer. One wonders if the Stranger has not incorrectly supposed that value-
neutrality is easily attained by the simple avoidance of value-laden issues. Maybe the 
value-neutral stance is instead the result of an enormous effort of confronting one’s own 
value-laden perspectives, i.e. it is not attainable except by thinking through questions of 
better and worse. 																																																								
13 I note in passing that in this sense, the value-neutral perspective reminds one of Socrates’ imaginary de-
fense of Protagoras in Tht. 166e-167b, who proposes that the wise person is he who persuades the city to do 
what is good, regardless of whether it is true. Is diaeresis an art more reflective of the great sophist’s view 
instead of the philosopher’s? Cf. Howland (1998), 168, 183-8, 314 n. 22. 
14 In Grg. 511c-512b, Socrates notes that the benefit of arts is too contingent upon circumstances. Arts that 
are usually not beneficial can become immensely valuable in rare times and/or certain places. 
15 Rosen (1983), 121: “It is fair to observe that the decision to disregard purification in favor of the distinc-
tion between like and like is itself an application of the distinction between better and worse.” 
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Second, it is not clear why one would want to know the class-structure of each art. 
This sort of knowledge seems quite useless to a statesman, who is probably much more 
interested in the benefits of each art than in knowing that both the general and the louse-
killer are hunters. (And the true statesman, according to some Platonic dialogues, is iden-
tical to the philosopher.) 
Finally, even if there are plenty of things whose class structure can be revealed or 
perhaps can only be revealed by adopting the value-neutral stance, arts are unlikely to be 
one of those things. Arts came to be because humans had needs. They exist to provide 
benefits or ease humans from hardships.16 In other words, what each art is seems insepa-
rable from at least the kind of benefit they provide, and thus from the question what each 
is good for. The articulation of an art that disregards its benefits therefore cannot possibly 
adequately grasp what that art is. To honor all arts equally seems to be a willful obtuse-
ness concerning the nature of arts. It is no accident that the value-neutrality recommenda-
tion occurs exactly during the definition of purification, an explicitly value-laden art. It 
compels the reader to ask how value-neutrality is applied here and whether it is adequate 
at all for articulating something value-laden. Is it not the case that even dividing body 
from soul is not dividing like from like, but it already presupposes what are better and 
worse? And, to connect this with the cavalier attitude towards names: if names in their 
everyday usage are already value-laden as we noticed, can we simply take them over and 
use them neutrally? What if the name σοφιστής is not neutral? In being neutral about his 
																																																								
16 Note that an example of production was care of mortal bodies. Art is associated with the need to over-
come the unavoidable pains and sufferings of mortality. Cf. Rep. 369c-370a. 
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name, will one succeed in being scientific about the sophist and miss nothing important 
about him? 
The value-neutral diaeresis of the value-laden elenchus will lead to the first crisis in 
the conversation. Insofar as diaeresis assumes the separation of the good from the true, its 
crisis means that the relation between the two must be reconsidered. I now turn to that 
other mode of logos, elenchus. 
2.2 Separating Better from Worse 
Unlike the previous definitions, purification does not present a failure of assimila-
tion: the refuter is a purifier. Nevertheless there is still a questionable assimilation, name-
ly the analogy between the badnesses of the soul and the badnesses of the body. The 
problems involved in this analogy will come to light at the end of this section. Like ac-
quisition, there are also questions about the what and the how in purification. What does 
the refuter remove (and what does he leave)? How does he do this? The object removed 
by the refuter is called ἀμαθία, folly or stupidity. The refuter removes by means of elen-
chus. The last three divisions of this diaeretic definition are diagrammed below (Diagram 
4). 	
       Badness (κακία) 
 
       Vice (Disease)       Ignorance (Ugliness) (ἄγνοια) 
 
   (Nameless)         Folly (ἀμαθία) 	
            Admonition  Elenchus 
 
Diagram 4. The Purifier-Sophist 
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Since only ensouled beings think and reason, intellectual purification is sought under 
the branch of psychic purification. There are two kinds of badness in the soul, vice and 
ignorance. The Stranger appeals to the body to grasp what they are. Vice is like (οἷον) 
disease in the body, and ignorance its ugliness (228a1-2). Again, the Stranger applies the 
principle effective in Stage One: what appears like something is something. So “vice is 
like disease” later becomes “vice is a disease (of the soul)” (d7-8: “it is called ‘vice’ by 
the many, even though it is (ὄν) most clearly disease”) and similarly, ignorance is (psy-
chic) ugliness. But what is disease? It is faction, στάσις, defined as “a διαφορά resulting 
from some corruption (διαφθορά) of those which are by nature akin (συγγενής)” (a7-8).17 
A political phenomenon, playfully mixed with technical language from medicine (the pun 
between διαφορά and διαφθορά), is used to capture something common to city, body, and 
soul. Faction is a city losing unity; its parties, supposed to cooperate and work together, 
are somehow corrupted and thus fail to recognize their kinship with each other. The result 
of this διαφθορά echoes the linguistic corruption of this word into losing the theta and 
becoming διαφορά, which can mean either “difference” (in the sense of dissent and con-
flict) or “vehement motion” (cf. 246c2; Tht. 159d4, 182a5). There is διαφορά because 
factions are characterized by the fact that no side clearly dominates the other; one party 
momentarily gains the upper hand only to make the momentum swing again to another 
party soon afterwards. It is a back-and-forth (δια-) sweeping motion (φορά).18 One might 
then render διαφορά as “conflicting motion.” Faction is full of paradox. It is on the one 																																																								
17 The text is corrupt: see Robinson (1999), 144 for a discussion of why Galen’s variant is to be preferred. 
He and most scholars adopt Galen’s variant, and I follow their emendation. 
18 For this meaning, see LSJ διά D. II. “in different directions” and also διαφορά A.1. 
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hand the separation of what are supposed to be together; and on the other hand a motion 
resulting in a στάσις, which literally means “rest.” It is called thus because it is the kind 
of motion that prevents growth and progress. It causes the affairs of the city to be unat-
tended, come to a halt, to a standstill. It is bad motion resulting in bad rest (cf. Tht. 153a-
c). A city under στάσις shares the same structure as a body under νόσος: disease is noth-
ing else but bodily parts fighting each other and not working together. Disease and fac-
tion are thus “the same.” The Stranger’s “proof” that this exists in the soul is simply to 
appeal to common experience: isn’t it the case that in all cases where we call a soul vi-
cious can be understood to be this conflict between the parts of the soul? For example, 
opinions at odds with desires, temper (θυμός) with pleasures, or reasoning (λόγος) with 
pains (228b2-4)? Theaetetus immediately agrees; later he suggests three vices — coward-
ice, immoderation, and injustice, in short, the so-called “moral” vices (228e2-3; 229a3). 
Therefore, city: faction = body: disease = soul: vice. 
What about ignorance, or psychic ugliness? The Stranger first defines ugliness as 
“the class of disproportion (ἀμετρία) that is everywhere deformed (δυσειδές)” (228a10-
11). The initial notion of proportionality is visual and related to shape, such as the ugli-
ness of a face or body. One goes to the gym because one is “out of shape,” which is close 
to the meaning of δυσειδής. The problem is that the soul does not have a shape like the 
body, so it seems difficult, if not impossible, to capture the soul in visual terms. The 
Stranger therefore stretches his analogy a little: 	
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Str. Whatever partakes in motion (κίνησις) and sets some mark (σκοπόν), trying to 
hit it, but with each impulse goes astray and is off the mark, will we assert that it is 
affected by a due proportion in relation to each other (συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς 
ἄλληλα), or by the opposite, by disproportion? 
Tht. Clearly by disproportion. (228c1-6) 	
The initial definition of ugliness is static, but now the notion of proportionality is ex-
tended to moving things. The Stranger thereby defines a kinetic sort of ugliness and beau-
ty. His description invokes archery, or sports in general. A diving catch in baseball is a 
beautiful play; a miss is ugly. The link that connects motion with proportionality is inten-
tion, a sense of direction in the motion, “the setting of a mark.” A ball falling down is in 
itself neither beautiful nor ugly, because the ball is not setting a mark to fall down to-
wards. But when the outfielder is moving swiftly in order to catch the ball, he exhibits an 
intention that gathers the muscles and limbs of his body together in striving towards a 
goal. Given an intention, the question of better or worse — beautiful or ugly — arises. 
When he does catch the ball, there is beauty — the proportionality between his attention, 
judgment, and that coordination between his limbs, all work together in service of a goal. 
It would be εὐειδής. The opposite happens when he makes an error, and there is dispro-
portionality. συμμετρία and ἀμετρία are therefore always in relation to some goal, a 
mark.19 
If there is ugliness in the soul, then, the soul must also have a certain “directionali-
ty,” and the Stranger affirms this: “we know that every soul is totally unwilling to be ig-
																																																								
19 Heidegger (1997), 253-4. Cf. Rosen (1983), 123-4. 
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norant” (228c7-8). This “we know,” ἴσμεν, sounds so strong that one wonders if the 
Stranger is not trying to bypass a difficulty by exaggeration. For one thing, the sophist 
will soon turn out to be someone who does not seem to care about being ignorant. In any 
case, if the soul always has knowledge or truth as its mark, then missing the mark would 
be its ugliness. And missing the mark is possible: there are ignorant people, and more 
importantly, people are often misled in their natural impulse towards truth. Psychic ugli-
ness, or ignorance, is therefore the soul clumsily trying to hit the mark of truth and fail-
ing. 
This account of vice and ignorance of the soul is easy in one respect — it sketches 
“moral” and “intellectual” vices by analogy with the body — and difficult in others. The 
crucial notion of psychic health is internal harmony between the parts of the soul; the 
crucial notion in psychic beauty is a sense of appropriateness or fitness between its parts 
with respect to truth. A first difficulty is that diaeresis only divides but does not relate. 
One would like to know how beauty and health interact or even if matters of bodily beau-
ty and health affect the soul, or how different states of the soul affect the states of the 
body . Consider, for example, beauty and health in the body. Its health and kinetic beauty 
are related in the following way. While being healthy does not guarantee that one will 
become an excellent athlete, being ill often leads to inability to train oneself and improve. 
Health is thus perhaps necessary but insufficient for beauty. There is the complication, on 
the other hand, that the pursuit of athletic excellence can occasionally impair the body, 
which suggests that excessive striving for beauty can be unhealthy. Can one analogously 
say that being purified of injustice, immoderation, and cowardice is necessary but not 
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sufficient for the task of knowledge? And furthermore, that an excessive striving for truth 
and knowledge –– a μανία perhaps philosophers are prone to (in this respect, consider 
how the babbler appears to others as mentioned in the previous chapter) –– might eventu-
ally cause a disharmony or imbalance of psychic parts and thus vice? The Stranger is qui-
et about these issues. 
A second difficulty is whether the analogy reflects the soul as accurately as one 
would like it. Is it right to say that, if there are two kinds of badness in the body, there are 
also only two in the soul as well? A negative answer will soon be suggested, as the anal-
ogy will be shown to be imprecise or misleading in some ways. And once this is revealed, 
the first difficulty will be partly confronted (but not at all adequately answered). So let 
me continue with the discussion of the means of purging one of psychic badnesses. 
The Stranger proceeds with the unexplained assumption that there is only one art of 
purification for each kind of badness (229b9-10). There would then be no single art, for 
example, that cures one of both disease and ugliness. The removal of bodily disease is 
medicine and that of bodily ugliness is gymnastics; so the first question is, what is psy-
chic medicine? The answer is κολαστική, punitive arts. Theaetetus replies that this is cor-
rect “according to human opinion” (229a6-7). His ability to distinguish what others opine 
from what is actually the case is perhaps part of the effect of inward reflection that the 
Stranger has been encouraging in this section. At any rate, κολαστική suggests that puri-
fication of vices involves violence or physical threat. The purification of ignorance might 
then be expected to involve persuasion or more generally speech. 
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The name for psychic gymnastics is teaching (διδασκαλική). While the Stranger 
notes that there are many kinds of ignorance, there is one so extensive it is “equal in size” 
with all the other kinds taken together. “Big” here is not a judgment that distinguishes 
like from like, as if the Stranger is just comparing the sizes of the varieties of ignorance. 
It is in fact a distinction between better and worse: “big” means “really, really bad.” The 
diaeresis of purification must proceed on the perception of better and worse. This really 
big ignorance is “to suppose that one knows something when one does not know it,” 
namely folly (ἀμαθία, 229c5). Folly is, according to the Stranger, the reason why we trip 
up in thinking. As ignorance of one’s own ignorance, folly is doubly ugly. The Stranger 
now asks Theaetetus whether he knows what part of teaching removes folly, and The-
aetetus, well, supposes that he knows. He says that it is “called by us here at least by the 
name of education (παιδεία)” (229d2-3). 
The Stranger, however, makes things complicated. He first violates the “one badness, 
one art” assumption and makes a division that suggests there are two arts that remove fol-
ly. The relatively rougher one is the “time-honored and paternal way (ὁδός)” of admoni-
tion (νουθετητική), something fathers apply to sons and many still do so now. Its “rough-
ness” consists in its being a mixture of harshness and gentleness.20 One might call this a 
mixture of force and persuasion; even νουθετητική reminds one of νομοθετική (the legis-
lative art), and therefore of the violence of punishment. The warnings parents make, like 
																																																								
20 Rosen (1983), 128. 
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“you’ll be sorry if you do that young man!” or “you should’ve known better!” lie some-
where between the art of punishment and the smoother way of elenchus.21 
The description of elenchus takes up three exchanges. In the first exchange (230a5-
10), the Stranger implies, by the contrast with admonition, that elenchus is newly discov-
ered; it is a “modern” art. This makes it akin to diaeresis, whose newness is implied by its 
namelessness. The Stranger says that the refuters discovered their art “after having given 
themselves a logos (λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες)” (a5).22 This participial clause is noteworthy; 
it means that the refuters thought both independently and introspectively, by looking into 
their own souls. In addition, they reasoned about what they observed — they tried to give 
an account, a logos, of it. The refuters, in other words, offer “their own products.” They 
are akin to the self-sellers, who were differentiated from the exporter-sophist. This came 
about by observing their own reactions (together with perhaps the reactions of other 
young men) to the admonition of the elders. Their reflection led them to realize that first, 
folly is involuntary, and that second, “no one, who thinks himself to be wise, would ever 
be willing to learn the things in which he thinks himself clever” (a7-8). Admonishment, 
from the refuter’s point of view, is not an art: it is practiced due to a failure to understand 
the psychology in the conceit of one’s wisdom. The severity in admonition presupposes 
that children do foolish things voluntarily and thus deserve reproach; and its gentleness 
underestimates the inner resistance and stubbornness this conceit is able to muster. In 
short, the refuters realize that folly is admonishment-proof. The son who obeys the father 
normally only does so reluctantly; he does not truly submit to the father’s wisdom “deep 																																																								
21 Benardete (1984): II. 97 gives some examples of admonishment. 
22 Heidegger (1997), 259. 
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within.” νουθετητική, literally “the skill of putting mind into someone,” suggests that one 
is imposing something “from without,” and thus in the refuter’s view quite defective. It 
follows that if a refuter were asked to divide his own art, he would not have made a bi-
furcation between admonition and elenchus, because admonition, to repeat, is not an art 
from his point of view. It is the sign of the helplessness of fathers, who replace their lack 
of art with paternal authority. This is a first indication that the Stranger’s own diaeresis 
disagrees with the refuter’s implied diaeresis. This implicit disagreement between the 
Stranger and the refuter anticipates a greater disagreement coming up. 
The second exchange explains the art of refutation itself based on the previous diag-
nosis. Instead of pointing to the foolish person’s errors paternalistically, the refuter 
“works from within” the foolish person’s mind. It does this through interrogative conver-
sation. The foolish one, supposing himself to be wise, is willing to exhibit what he thinks 
he knows. The conversation presupposes that the wise person does not contradict himself 
and that the interlocutor can feel shame (αἰσχύνη), that is, a concern with his own beauty 
and ugliness (αἶσχος). This concern is grounded in the fact that the soul does not wish to 
merely think that it has hit the mark of truth, but it wishes to actually hit it.23 The refuter 
induces the foolish person to display his opinions, and then puts them “side by side” in 
speeches. Once these opinions are shown to the foolish person as “opposites at the same 
time about the same things with respect to the same things in the same ways” (230b6-8), 
that is, once they are shown to contradict each other, the foolish person will realize his 
ugliness. Once put to shame, he will rid himself of the high opinions he had of himself, 																																																								
23 Cf. Rep. 505d, Tht. 177d2-6. 
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an event that is “the most pleasing to hear about and the most secure for the person un-
dergoing it” (230c1-2). This describes the familiar Socratic art of conversation or some-
thing extremely similar to it. 
At this point, however, the Stranger gets himself into trouble. He reports the refuters’ 
view on the health and beauty of the soul, which turns out to be at odds with the view he 
has presented so far.24 In the rest of this exchange, he speaks of what “the purifiers be-
lieve in (νομίζοντες…οἱ καθαίροντες)” (230c3-4). The refuters think like doctors: unlike 
the Stranger, they do not think of themselves as gymnastic trainers. Why? According to 
the refuters, doctors do not prescribe rashly the diet that a person needs, because the per-
son might be in such a sick state that he cannot even be benefited by good food. He is so 
sick, for example, that water might be harmful to him. The patient therefore needs a two-
step treatment. First is the purification, a purging of “the impediments” within the body. 
Then, and only then, is a diet prescribed. By analogy: the refuters also refrain from pre-
scribing learnings, that is, soul-food proper. They remain within step one, purifying one 
of folly. This must mean that according to the refuters, intellectual purification involves 
first a removal of disease (folly); and only then is there a removal of ugliness (learning 
and teaching). The distinctness the Stranger wishes to keep between moral and intellectu-
al virtues becomes therefore blurry; the achievement of the refuters, namely making their 
interlocutors distinguish what they know and what they don’t know, is called by The-
aetetus to be “the best and most moderate of all conditions;” and moderation, one recalls, 
was a kind of health for the soul. 																																																								
24 Cf. Rosen (1983), 130. 
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Before discussing the meaning of this, let me summarize the third and last exchange 
on elenchus. The Stranger heaps high praise on it now. It is “the greatest and most author-
itative of purifications,” and the person “who is not refuted, even if he is the king of Per-
sia, must be considered, since not being purified in the greatest things, to have become 
uneducated and ugly about the things concerning which the person who will truly be hap-
py is most properly purified and most beautiful” (230e1-3). One might call this the 
Stranger’s version that the unexamined life is not worth living.25 He shows himself again 
in agreement with Socrates. The claim that everyone needs to undergo elenchus suggests 
that folly is universal: no one is free of it in the beginning. Everyone has had high opin-
ions of one’s intelligence some time in his life. I note once more that the Stranger reverts 
to the language of ugliness and beauty here when he speaks in his own voice. Despite the 
high evaluation both he and refuters have of elenchus, there is a difference between their 
views after all. 
What is the difference? The refuters complicate the body-soul analogy, and perhaps 
in a reasonable way. They distinguish between the removal of folly and the removal of 
ignorance (or generation of knowledge).26 The two are not the same. Folly is akin to dis-
ease, because it is characterized by contradiction or conflict between the opinions one 
has. And conflict, we have seen, is the mark of disease or faction. Moreover, ugliness re-
quires the soul to have an intention, a striving towards truth; but the foolish person does 
not aim at truth. He already thinks he hit it. The refuter moves one from the state of sup-
																																																								
25 Cornford (1935), 180. Giannopoulou (2001), 111 n.45 draws attention to the number of times superla-
tives are used in the evaluation of elenchus. 
26 Cf. Giannopoulou (2001), 112-3. 
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posing oneself to be beautiful (a sick state) to the state of being aware of one’s own ugli-
ness (the healthy state of shame). The refuters therefore not only produce moderation in 
their interlocutors, but also are moderate themselves: they do no more than restore health. 
Socrates’ spiritual maieutics also does not claim to teach in the sense of imparting what 
one knows to the other person. This more refined picture of the soul also brings out a 
connection between “moral” and “intellectual” excellence: one does not strive for 
knowledge without becoming moderate first, and one only becomes moderate if one is 
aware of one’s own ignorance. If knowledge is what makes the soul truly beautiful, and 
happiness and beauty go hand in hand, elenchus is then necessary but not sufficient for 
happiness. The refuter’s view of the soul is depicted in diagram 5. 	
            Badness (κακία) 
 
       Moral Vices  Intellectual Vices 
 
         Folly (ἀμαθία)         Ignorance 		
    (Disease)       (Disease)      (Ugliness) 
 
Diagram 5. The Implied View of the Soul, According to the Refuter 	
By contrast, the diaeresis of elenchus given by the Stranger is less modest. The 
Stranger either committed an error, due to his intention to draw a strict parallel between 
body and soul, or he deliberately did this to suggest his disagreement with Socrates. He 
presents elenchus as both health-restoring and beauty-generating. The restoration of 
health is the achievement of harmony between one’s beliefs through the work of elen-
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chus: it is, as suggested in the Introduction, the soul becoming a unity, a one in the world. 
It does not necessarily lead to beauty, hitting the mark of truth, namely becoming one 
with the world. Seen in this way, the Stranger’s own division implies that elenchus, con-
trary to the view of the refuters, can achieve both these goals, or that the soul can some-
how become beautiful through the pursuit of health. It should be recalled that Socrates 
suspected the Stranger to be an elenchic god. This means, I suggest, that the Stranger has 
come to complain that Socrates has sold elenchus short. The Stranger wishes to show 
how elenchus is not just the preparatory stage for the pursuit of knowledge, but is very 
much the whole process when one appreciates its power. While it seems to me that the 
refuters are right, the Stranger might have a point. Consider: a typical interpretation of an 
aporetic Platonic dialogue often attempts to extract some positive belief held by Plato 
from the apparent negativity. If positivity and negativity are actually two sides of the 
same coin, maybe intellectual health and beauty are not as separate as the refuters assume 
after all. 
2.3 The Crisis of the Horizon of Appearance 
Once the praise of the refuters is made, the following exchange happens: 	
Str. What then? What will we call them who use this art? Actually, I am afraid to 
call them sophists. 
Tht. Why? 
Str. Lest we attach a greater honor (γέρας) to them. 
Tht. But what is now said resembles something of that sort. 
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Str. And a wolf resembles a dog too, one the most savage, the other the most tame. 
But the careful person will always be the most on guard concerning similarities. For 
this class is the most slippery. Nevertheless let it be. For I suppose this debate will 
not be about small boundaries (ὅρων) when they are sufficiently on guard (230e5-
231b1). 	
It is Theaetetus, not the Stranger, who calls refuters sophists.27 This passage should 
surprise the careful reader, precisely because the Stranger violates the value-neutral 
stance he himself advocated while the young man follows it by the letter.28 Theaetetus 
disregards the question of benefits. He agreed that elenchus provides the greatest benefits, 
but was not concerned with that when observing the resemblance between the refuter and 
the sophist. He makes the right call on “methodological” grounds. Perhaps due to that, 
the Stranger temporarily concedes the point. By way of compromise, he calls the refuter’s 
practice “sophistry noble in descent,” which by implication means that the previous defi-
nitions captured ignoble sophists. But before that concession, he acts against his own 
rules. He does not wish to call refuters sophists on the grounds of honor, even though one 
should honor all arts equally.29 He said that diaeresis is not concerned with names, but 
																																																								
27 Cf. Gill (2012), 139. 
28 The dramatic irony of Theaetetus following the Stranger’s orders and the Stranger disobeying them has 
largely gone unnoticed in the literature. Zuckert (2000), 74 even claims that Theaetetus does not quite un-
derstand the principle of value-neutrality, basing this remark on Theaetetus’ impatience at 227c7-9. But 
Theaetetus was following the Stranger’s orders to be impatient; and if one considers the scene discussed 
here, it seems clear that Theaetetus has no trouble following the principle of value-neutrality. Given that his 
expertise is mathematics, it is more likely that his trouble is with distinguishing better from worse. 
29 Gonzalez (1997), 43 sees this as well, but for him, it is a sign that the Stranger should be criticized. He 
fails to entertain the hypothesis that the Stranger is ironic or has become aware that there was something 
wrong in his endorsement of value-neutrality. 
 In the methodology passage discussed in 2.1, the Stranger used the word τιμή for honor; here he 
uses γέρας. According to Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, Book 4, Chapter 5, γέρας is 
basically an archaic and poetic term for τιμή. But there is a slight difference in meaning. γέρας usually 
means “deserving of superiority” and thus connotes privilege; but τιμή is a more neutral word, which could 
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now he attaches some importance to them: “sophist” is a name that should not carry too 
much honor. I think the Stranger is being ironic: he states a principle that he knows is 
problematic and thus does not follow it. But even if he is not ironic, his failure to follow 
the principle shows that there is a problem. But what is it? 
Let us take a step back and observe the overall movement in Stage One. The five 
definitions of the sophist not only are rearrangements of the sophist’s apparent traits ac-
cording to different models, but there is also a gradual abstraction in each step. This be-
comes clear when one lists the traits that are implied or divided in each definition: 	
Hunter-Sophist: young men, travel, privacy, logos, virtue, money 
Exporter-Sophist: travel, privacy, logos, virtue, money 
Retailer-Sophist: privacy, logos, virtue, money 
Athlete-Sophist: privacy, logos, virtue, money 
Refuter: privacy, logos, virtue 	
This pattern gives us an idea of the sequence of the definitions. The hunter model 
presented us with the most detailed “image” of the sophist’s appearances; but then the 
following ones undergo a process of “cutting away.” In other words, part of the question 
concerning the exporter-sophist is whether association with young men matters, whether 
the sophist who does not seek them out is still a sophist. The next step then similarly con-
firms that a sophist does not need to travel to be a sophist, and the athlete model reaffirms 																																																																																																																																																																					
either mean honor or “deserving of punishment” according to context (thus sometimes translated as “penal-
ty”). If Benveniste’s observation applies still in Plato’s time, then the change of words might indicate that 
the Stranger deliberately shifts from a value-neutral word (which means either honor, dishonor, or lack of 
honor) to a value-laden one. It thereby reinforces the fact that there is something wrong with the value-
neutral principle of diaeresis. 
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this. The refuter, then, raises the question whether a sophist can be called a sophist if the 
element of money is cut away. Theaetetus says yes; the Stranger says no. 
(Since money is present in all first four definitions and missing in the fifth, why not 
mark that as the difference between the sophist and the philosopher?30 As some have not-
ed, however, money is too ambiguous. One might charge a fee not out of a love of money 
but out of a concern for students. Philostratus, for one, defended Protagoras’s practice of 
charging tuition on the grounds that people tend to be careless and not pay attention when 
they get something for free. If they had to get something by paying out of their own 
pocket, they would be more motivated to learn.31 Conversely, as Rosen notes, it is not at 
all obvious why Socrates, who does not charge mandatory tuition but also does not refuse 
financial support from friends, is nobler or more honorable than his contemporary, pro-
fessional sophists.32 These reasons might be why money does not become a topic in this 
dialogue.) 
Back to the pattern of abstraction. In Phaedrus 261e-262a, Socrates noticed that de-
ception could not proceed in big steps if one wants the other person to accept the opposite 
of what he believes in. If one proceeds by going immediately from X to the opposite of 
X, that is easily noticeable and deception cannot work. The better way is to proceed in 
small steps and work by similarities. The sequence of these five definitions looks like an 
																																																								
30 This is partly how Socrates distinguishes himself from sophists in Ap. 19d8-e1. It is noteworthy that in 
the context of the Apology, the majority of Socrates’ audience is non-philosophers. 
31 Philostratus, Lives of Sophists I. 10, 1: Protagoras should not be reproached for charging tuition “for we 
are more enthusiastic about pursuits which costs us money than about those which cost us nothing.” (Quot-
ed from Sprague (1972), The Older Sophists, Hackett, p. 7. This corresponds to Diels-Kranz, Fragmente 68 
A9.) 
32 Rosen (1983), 116, 135. Cf. Howland (1998), 175. 
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example of deception. The refuter, it can be said, is actually the opposite of the sophist. 
The sophist presents folly as wisdom, or the conceit of opinion: the refuter removes it. 
The refuter looks into himself and makes his interlocutor look into himself: the sophist’s 
gaze is directed outwards. They are opposites that appear alike: one is a verbal athlete, 
the other a gymnastic trainer of the soul through logos.33 Is the Stranger behaving like a 
sophist in making Theaetetus mistake refuters for sophists? He is. But he is also making a 
point about how the horizon of appearance is vulnerable to deceptions of this sort. The 
present passage shows that within the horizon of appearance, not only is it impossible to 
distinguish inquiry from deception, but also, Theaetetus’ “yes” and the Stranger’s “no” 
are both acceptable.34 
In other words, the Stranger’s point about the slipperiness of the sophist’s class can 
be generalized into the slipperiness of appearances as such. To proceed on the basis of 
appearances is to distinguish and group by similar looks. But the sophist has shown that 
similarities and dissimilarities by themselves allow for different ways of dividing or clas-
sifying appearances. We can either divide things so that there are both good and bad 
sophists (Theaetetus), or that sophists strictly speaking only apply to ignoble people (the 
Stranger). Within the horizon of appearance, both are appropriate divisions, depending on 
whether one wishes to emphasize or disregard the issue of nobility. In other words, if one 
wishes to inquire which way of dividing is to be preferred, one has to ask questions about 
better and worse. This means that the cause of the confusion between Socrates and soph-																																																								
33 Solana (2013), 71-2. 
34 Cherubin (1993), 231-3 argues that not only does the Stranger’s sophistic appearance undermine (or at 
least destablize) the future results of the dialogue, but also Plato means to show why the view concerning 
the sophist must be communicated by both speech and deed, i.e. why it must be indirectly communicated. 
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ists is more the horizon of appearance, and less the supposed defectiveness of diaeresis. 
Reliance on appearances is what caused the confusion. Diaeresis by itself did not cause it. 
Actually, in showing the confusion in speech, it actually manages to problematize ap-
pearances and make the problem visible. But there is a flaw with it nevertheless: diaeresis 
presents the disease without being able to provide the cure.35 It cannot do so because it is 
value-neutral by design, and curing requires using elenchus. The diaeresis of elenchus 
therefore presents simultaneously the disease and the cure. 
There is a curious development at this point in the conversation. The Stranger had 
begun by constantly comparing the sophist and Socrates and making them look increas-
ingly alike, and at the same time he gradually distances himself from the sophist’s looks. 
The moment he catches Socrates (or more precisely, the moment he makes Theaetetus 
catch Socrates) as a sophist, however, he comes to be in need of Socrates’ “sophistry.” In 
other words, by the end of Stage One, the Stranger is faced with a larger battle. In the In-
troduction, I had said that ideally, the Stranger needs to make Theaetetus see the differ-
ence between Socrates and sophists, but it was not required for his victory over Socrates. 
Now, however, if he himself needs the Socratic art for conversing with Theaetetus, then 
he must succeed in distinguishing Socrates and sophists, otherwise he will implicate him-
self.36 The issue of demarcation, therefore, as the Stranger says, is not a small one (231a9-
b1). This is because on the one hand, taking Socrates as a sophist has led to the affairs of 
his trial, but also, on the other hand, taking any sophist as potentially a refuter would be a 																																																								
35 Cf. Rosen (1983), 115; 120; Giannopoulou (2001), 114, 122. 
36 Benardete (1984), II. 97-9 understands the situation as exactly the opposite, namely that the Stranger is 
accusing Socrates of his failure to purify Theaetetus the day before. It is difficult to understand why this 
passage proves what he claims. 
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bad thing for young men like Theaetetus. The Stranger’s remark, I suggest, means to an-
nounce the task for the rest of the dialogue: to correctly distinguish Socrates (and him-
self!) from sophists.37 
The Stranger’s expression “sophistry noble in descent,” γένει γενναία, alliteratively 
and etymologically reinforces the view that division of kinds is a value-laden affair. The 
wolf and dog example suggests that the question of savageness and tameness is the defin-
ing feature for γένος distinctions, trumping all other similarities that they share. It is a 
“better” feature or trait because it is relevant. The search for the relevant traits requires 
examination. The question of better and worse will therefore lead the way in the division 
of like from like.38 The Stranger had prefaced his discussion of elenchus by mysteriously 
saying that they obviously cannot catch the sophist with just one hand, and Theaetetus 
responds that they therefore must use both (226a6-8). That turns out to anticipate the cli-
max of Stage One. The Stranger meant that using diaeresis alone is inadequate; he needs 
both “hands,” that is, both branches of their division of separative arts, the like-from-like 
and the better-from-worse separation, to catch the sophist.39 Will he succeed? 
																																																								
37 This is also how Notomi (1999) and Giannopoulou (2001), 112 n. 49 read the development of the argu-
ments in the dialogue. Sayre (2006) sees the same issue, but offers an interpretation that fits the text poorly. 
38 Zuckert (2000) 76-77. Dorter (1990), 56 ff. claims that the Sophist abstracts from value - a mistake, ac-
cording to him, that is only restored in the Statesman. If the present interpretation is correct, however, the 
situation is more complicated than he presents it. As it will become clear in 5.3, the final definition of the 
sophist cannot be interpreted correctly without seeing that considerations of better and worse are determin-
ing the divisions. The Stranger’s remarks are therefore at odds with his practice in the rest of the dialogue. 
See also Gonzalez (1997), 37-39. 
39 As Alieva (2010) also notes, the discussion of elenchus is not merely backward-looking to Socrates, but 
also forward-looking to what the Stranger does in the rest of the dialogue. 
The branches of division are regularly referred to as “hands.” Not accidentally, τῇ ἑτέρᾳ idiomati-
cally refers to the left hand, namely the branch that is excluded in a diaeresis (which keeps to the right-hand 
side). This matches well with the fact that before defining elenchus, the Stranger says they have only used 
τῇ ἑτέρᾳ so far, in other words, they have only used what is on the left-hand branch of what he is about to 
divide, i.e. diaeresis. Cf. Howland (1987), 81. 
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CHAPTER THREE  IMAGES 	
3.1 The Horizon of Judgment 
Stage Two operates within the horizon of δόξα. This means that Theaetetus and the 
Stranger become aware of the possibility of error.1 Judgment can be true or false; to judge 
falsely is to be misled by unreliable appearances. So, while the distinction between being 
and appearing was not operative before, the horizon of judgment presupposes it. 
There is no longer simple trust in appearances. The passive, unreflecting “yes” is re-
placed by saying either “yes” or “no.” To assent or deny is to respond to a question. So, 
within the horizon of judgment, the Stranger and Theaetetus interrogate appearances.2 
Otherwise put, the process of judgment concerns arriving at a decision between the two 
senses of φαίνεσθαι: does something manifest itself as what it is, or merely appear so? 
The possibility of “mere appearing” emerges. As the soul looks into itself, it both gains in 
depth and achieves a distance from the world as it is immediately encountered. The im-
mediate and visible looks of things that were the basis of divisions are accordingly to be 
questioned. The new way of dividing requires one to turn from seeing to speaking, and to 
attend to the distinctions made in logos. Therefore diaeresis is preceded by the reflection 
that is elenchus. The Stranger and Theaetetus will examine contradictions in the appear-
ance of things, and “cast out” what they unreflectingly accepted on that basis. 
																																																								
1 Cf. Howland (1998), 207: “The new beginning made by the Stranger and Theaetetus,” that is, the begin-
ning of what is labeled Stage Two here, “springs from a Socratic recognition of ignorance.” 
2 Stenzel (1940), 118 notes likewise that δόξα is “…a form of question and answer,” and as such, it includes 
or is preceded by the stance of questioning. 
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Elenchus and diaeresis were contrasted as “distinguishing better from worse” and 
“distinguishing like from like.” Stage Two makes “better and worse” precede and there-
fore determine how one is to distinguish “like from like.” This is because there are better 
and worse within what are alike. The Stranger discovers the difference between accurate 
and apparently accurate images, which are alike in appearance but unlike in terms of bet-
ter and worse. The Stranger’s logos can therefore no longer be described as simply value-
neutral. While diaeresis remains the art of dividing like from like, it does so on the basis 
of better and worse, or in other words, on the basis that “good and bad are two” (cf. 
227d4), and so if the worse and the better look alike, the likeness must be misleading. 
Better and worse thus are prior to like and unlike. The plurality and variety of definitions 
in Stage One will now be replaced by a single definition that results from reflecting on 
better and worse. 
Doubting appearances, and the need to discern the real worth between similar ap-
pearances, brings about a change in the meaning of εἶδος. Before, εἶδος indistinguishably 
meant look, the things that exhibit the looks, and the kind that includes the resembling 
things as its members. But if looks or appearances mislead — however occasionally — 
then εἶδος must be accordingly rethought. A step towards the purified notion of εἶδος will 
be illustrated by the Stranger’s one and only division in this stage, that between eikastics 
and phantastics. 
Appearance is not given up, but it no longer forms the beginning and end of inquiry. 
The Stranger continues to attempt understand the sophist in terms of something familiar, 
but he now does it more carefully. The assimilation chosen will be painting. He first ex-
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plains the analogy between images and speeches, and only after that does he turn to di-
viding the sophist, intending to capture him for good. He fails. Instead, the triple per-
plexities (ἀπορίαι) of nonbeing, image, and falsehood appear, and the apparent impossi-
bility of the latter two implies that there are no sophists. The perplexities, on my reading, 
attack the presuppositions of the horizon of judgment. These perplexities emerge because 
the Stranger and Theaetetus ascended to that horizon without a full, clear grasp of the im-
plications involved in it. Being and appearing, truth and falsehood form the very condi-
tions for their questioning appearances. In questioning nonbeing, image, and falsehood, 
therefore, the Stranger indirectly communicates how little he and Theaetetus understand 
being, εἶδος, and truth.3 In other words, the perplexities at the end of Stage Two, like the 
discussion of noble sophistry, is also transitional between Stages Two and Three, because 
even to be able to just look at and question one’s horizon is already in a sense to distance 
oneself from it. In this sense the transition to Stage Three resembles the transition to 
Stage Two: looking into oneself. The Stranger does this himself in front of Theaetetus. 
He examines his own tradition, the prohibition against nonbeing made by Parmenides. He 
is, in other words, testing his judgment about the sophist against other beliefs (δόξαι) he 
held in associating with Parmenides. And so we witness the seeds of Stage Three, the 
horizon of thinking. 
Section 3.2 deals with the positive phase of Stage Two. The Stranger conducts an 
elenchus and discovers the sophist’s seeming wisdom. He then puts forward the analogy 
																																																								
3 Cf. Sallis (1996), 461-2. 
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between image and speech in order to explain how he seems wise through logos. 3.3 
turns to the negative phase and offers an interpretation of the triple perplexities. 
3.2 Reorientation 
3.2.1 Seeming Wise 
Theaetetus is perplexed (ἀπορῶ) because the sophist has appeared multiple times 
(διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεπάνθαι), without showing what he truly is (ὄντως εἶναι) (231b9-c2). He 
contrasts φαίνεσθαι with εἶναι without being aware that this is a way out of his perplexity. 
The proper formulation of a difficulty somehow contains resources for answering it; al-
ternatively, even in order to express one’s perplexity one must already somehow “see” or 
intimate the answer to it. If the proper formulation of a perplexity, an ἀπορία, is capable 
of pointing to its own solution, then once more, the Stranger might not be completely 
mistaken in his estimation of elenchus. 
It is important to realize that what the reader sees and what Theaetetus sees at this 
point are different.4 The reader is aware why the Stranger wants to continue: he needs to 
distinguish the sophist from the philosopher correctly. Theaetetus, however, is not aware 
of this. He does not say “O Stranger, the refuter is not a sophist, what did we do wrong?” 
Instead he wants to continue only because the sophist has appeared multiple times. As 
mentioned before, his question implies that the sophist ought to appear under one path of 
the divisional branches of arts. Moreover, Theaetetus expresses the desire to go beyond 
appearances on his own initiative. By contrast, the need to transcend the horizon of 
																																																								
4 Few commentators notice this crucial fact. An exception is Klein (1977), 26. 
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judgment will not come to sight as a need for him, as will be clear below. Instead, the 
Stranger will have to do a lot more work to make this happen. 
The Stranger suggests that they take a break and review the appearances of the soph-
ist uncovered so far.5 After that, the Stranger articulates the perplexity in his own words: 	
																																																								
5 In effect, we get a second summary (the first summaries are those that immediately follow each defini-
tion) of diaereses. A consideration of what the Stranger omits or emphasizes would not be uninteresting. 
However, I will only remark on the miscounting incident: 
 
Str. And the second [sophist], an importer of learnings of the soul. 
Tht. Certainly. 
Str. And so didn’t the third come to light as a retailer of these things themselves? 
Tht. Yes, and the fourth for us was the self-seller about learnings. 
Str. You remembered correctly. … (231d5-11) 
 
We recall that earlier, the retailer who both sells his own and others’ products, is now split into two, 
one who just sells others’ products, and the other who just sells his own products. The Stranger’s “you re-
membered correctly” is either a mistake or irony on his part, because Theaetetus himself previously count-
ed the athlete-sophist as the fourth. So why does Theaetetus miscount? 
There might be two reasons for this happening. First, Plato might be suggesting that even counting is 
unstable if there is no distinction between being and appearance. For convenience, let me label the sophist 
defined as both self-selling and retailing SR, the sophist who only retails R, and the sophist who only sells 
his own products S. The question suggested by the miscounting is this: is SR a third kind of sophist besides 
S and R? In this case, we actually have seven sophists instead of six or five. Or, no one is actually SR, but 
there are only two kinds of sophists, S and R? (Most scholars count in this way but are not aware of the 
implications.) Or, actually only SR is a sophist, but S and R are merely two activities done by him per-
ceived at different times, and thus mistaken for two sophists? This anticipates the perplexity of being later, 
where Theaetetus could not answer whether being is a “third” besides hot and cold when the dualists say 
“only hot and cold are.” 
This also shows that one cannot say for certain, at this moment in the argument, whether the initial def-
initions of the sophist are different species of the genus sophist (this is the view put forward by e.g. Sayre 
(2006)), or that they are different perspectives from which one and the same sophist is viewed (e.g. Notomi 
(1999), Gill (2012)). Bluck (1975), 52-3 saw the ambiguity clearly. One cannot yet say for certain, because 
it is not even clear what it is that we are counting. (It will only emerge, near the end of the dialogue, that 
Notomi, Gill, and others, I think, are correct.) 
Second, the reason for the miscounting is likely a consequence of Theaetetus’ misidentifying the refut-
er as a sophist. The refuter practices an art that he himself came up with, i.e. he sells his own products. This 
suggests to Theaetetus that someone who sells ones own products can be a sophist in his own right. In other 
words, there is now no need to sell both others’ and one’s own products to count as a sophist. This is why 
the third sophist is therefore split into two. But since the refuter is not a sophist, the miscounting must be an 
error. That mistake of making a refuter a sophist was so grave that even a mathematician lost count. 
If the above interpretation is correct, it means that neither the self-selling sophist counted as extra nor 
the refuter is a sophist: both are mistakes made by Theaetetus. 
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Str. So, do you notice that, whenever someone appears to be knowledgeable about 
many things, but is addressed by the name of a single art (μιᾶς τέχνης), this appear-
ance (φάντασμα) is not healthy, but it is clear that the person undergoing it is unable 
to see clearly, with respect to any art, the part of that art towards which all these 
learnings look, and because of this, this person addresses him who has them (αὐτά, 
namely these learnings) with many names instead of one? 
Tht. It is perhaps most naturally in this way somewhat. (232a1-7, emphasis added) 	
The unhealthy appearance is not the plurality of the sophist’s appearances; but the 
conjunction of the oneness of his name (“sophist,” “sophistry”) and the plurality of his 
jobs (hunter, merchant, athlete, purifier). This one-many conjunction is a sort of “con-
flict” that needs to be straightened out. There is, in other words, a faction between one’s 
opinions, thus “not healthy.” In the language of the refuters, the solution to this perplexity 
will restore health in Theaetetus’ soul. 
According to the Stranger, what is missing is “that part of” his art “towards which all 
these learnings look.” He seems to mean something like this.6 Both the doctor and the 
gymnastic trainer know things concerning diets. However, dietary knowledge is em-
ployed in different ways by them — the doctor prescribes diet for promoting health; the 
trainer aims to make the body suitable for certain competitions. They are not called “ex-
perts in diet” because diet is not what they look to. Thus dietary knowledge is not the cri-
terion for understanding them; rather, it is that feature — health for the doctor, a certain 
athletic body for the trainer — that makes each a different expert. Rosen calls this the fo-
cal feature of an art. 																																																								
6 Cf. the treatment by Rosen (1983), 157-9. 
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Three remarks. The above example suggests that at this point in the argument, “ap-
pearing to be knowledgeable” should be taken in a neutral way. That is, whether someone 
merely appears knowledgeable but is not, or both appears and is knowledgeable, is not 
yet decided. In the example of the doctor and the gymnastic trainer, they both appear to 
and really do have dietary knowledge. Likewise, the Stranger and Theaetetus are not yet 
making any judgment as to whether the sophist knows anything about hunting, selling, 
competing, and purifying, and so on. 
Second, there seem to be several notions involved in a focal feature. One is purpose. 
The doctor and the gymnastic trainer might learn a number of the same subjects. But we 
do not call them by the same name because they “look towards” different things, that is, 
have different purposes. In other words, we do not know what the sophist really is, be-
cause his purpose is not yet disclosed by the previous definitions. It remained somewhat 
invisible and “hidden behind” his appearances. Purpose, the Stranger implies, should be 
what determines the sophist’s class or kind. Another notion is that a focal feature is ex-
planatory of the sophist’s actions. It would “make sense” of those actions and show why 
he does the things he does. His polymath appearance would then be understood because 
they can then be related to the focal feature as parts to a whole. Focal feature, being the 
purpose that explains, would then lend a unity to the plurality of his learnings. It would 
see how the parts are arranged in their proper places and contribute to the purpose.7 Focal 
feature, in revealing the εἶναι of the sophist and therefore his γένος, gestures towards the 
notion of the nature (φύσις) or essence (οὐσία). 																																																								
7 Cf. Silverman (2002), 209; Crivelli (2012), 18-19. 
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Finally, it is not yet quite clear how the focal feature relates to diaeresis. Is the fea-
ture the object of one’s division, the atomic εἶδος that is supposed to be isolated? Or is it 
not the object, but relates to the divided εἴδη in some yet to be specified way? Let me put 
this on hold until Chapter Five. One thing however can be said for now. The focal feature 
is not discovered by diaeresis alone. Diaeresis in Stage One revealed appearances of the 
sophist; but the reflection on those appearances requires elenchus. In other words, elen-
chus together with diaeresis disclose focal feature. 
The Stranger examines only one feature disclosed in Stage One: the sophist’s skill in 
contradicting. Contradicting was initially defined as “using chopped up questions and an-
swers in private,” and only mentioned in the athlete-sophist division. It makes one think 
of Socrates.8 Why does the Stranger choose this? Because he needs to both find the focal 
feature and distinguish better (refuter) from worse (sophists). Choosing ἀντιλογικόν is 
sound on both grounds. On the one hand, the sophist claims to be capable of teaching this 
skill to others, and we want to begin with what is more likely true of him. On the other 
hand, it is one of the salient features shared by both the eristic and the refuter. He needs 
to begin with the feature that made Theaetetus confused, and try to explain to him how 
there could be a difference between the sophist’s (genuine) ἀντιλέγειν and the refuter’s 
(seeming) ἀντιλέγειν.9 
																																																								
8 Notomi (1999), 96-100 has a detailed and more historically-oriented treatment of ἀντιλέγειν. 
9 Rosen (1983), 160; Sallis (1996), 478-9. Sayre (2006), 44, 46 claims that ἀντιλέγειν is only the common 
factor between the first four definitions but not the fifth one (elenchus). But the fact that the refuter works 
by making his interlocutors see contradictions using questions and answers indicates the exact opposite of 
what Sayre wishes to say. 
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The Stranger proposes to review more carefully about what (232b11) sophists make 
others capable of contradicting and lists five topics. First, “divine things that are invisible 
to the many” (232c1). Theaetetus reports that this is indeed what he heard others say 
(λέγεται γοῦν δή, c3) about sophists. Second, “all visible things of earth, heaven, and 
whatever concern these sort of things” (c4-5). Third, “in private gatherings, whenever 
something is said of everything concerning becoming and being (οὐσία), don’t we wit-
ness that they are clever at contradicting and make everyone else capable of what they 
themselves are capable?” (c7-10) Theaetetus answers this question with some confidence, 
perhaps because he and Socrates discussed it the day before (Tht. 153d-154a, 157a-c, 
185d f.). Fourth, they “promise to make others capable of debating in matters of laws and 
all the political things” (232d1-2). To this, Theaetetus parrots what Theodorus said the 
day before: no one would speak to them if they did not promise that (d3-4; Tht. 178e7-8). 
This suggests that, even if the sophist speaks mostly in private, this cannot be taken to 
imply that he is unable to speak in public. Finally, sophists publish books that tell us what 
to say against each craftsman. Conclusion: they are capable of contradicting pretty much 
everything (232e3). Theaetetus’ replies overall do not show him familiar with sophists. 
This foreshadows his inexperience that will be mentioned soon. 
The sophist can contradict concerning any topic; but it is impossible that any single 
human knows everything (233a3-4). Therefore, the sophist must be sometimes contra-
dicting another like a non-knower contradicts a knower (a5-6). Concerning these topics, 
he would be behaving like a patient who finds excuses to not follow the doctor’s orders. 
But young men pay them money in order to become their students, and they would not do 
		
102 
so if they did not think him wise (b1-7). There is, then, a contradiction between the im-
possibility of knowing everything and young men’s judgment of the sophist. Since it is 
evident that a human cannot possibly know everything, it must be the case that the soph-
ist merely seems or appears to young men to know everything, i.e. to be wise. Seeming 
wisdom, then, is revealed as the focal feature of the sophist, and all his learnings “look to 
it.” 
Some comments. The elenchus is subtly conducted. The Stranger, in keeping with 
his overall tendency to avoid making things too personal for Theaetetus, generalizes his 
argument. He first plays the old man with poor eyesight, thereby encouraging Theaetetus 
to make assertions. Then he immediately mocks “young men,” tacitly retracting that they 
see the sophist with keener vision. His irony makes one think of fathers who admonish 
their sons. His old age affords him admonition that is suitably blended into his elenchus. 
Second, the argument is exaggerated.10 The argument tacitly identifies wisdom as 
knowledge of everything. But if wisdom is impossible for an individual human, what 
does that mean for philosopher, who is interested in “everything” too (242c4-250d4)? I 
will discuss this in 4.3.2. Here, note that one effect of making the sophist talk about “eve-
rything” is certainly to make him resemble the philosopher more, not less.  
Third, in the earlier definitions, the sophist is said to sell learnings or speeches con-
cerning ἀρετή, and back then, ἀρετή seemed to mean virtues like justice and moderation. 
The discussion of elenchus, however, brought to light that the ἀρετή in question is actual-
ly intellectual. Both the sophist and the philosopher are concerned with the cultivation of 																																																								
10 Rosen (1983), 163. 
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intellectual powers. By picking out ἀντιλογικόν, the Stranger means that the sophist of-
fers that part of intellectual excellence that seems more teachable than other parts. There-
fore the sophist is not focused on ethics and politics anymore, but speaks also about met-
aphysical themes and natural science. This complicates the diagnosis of the young men. 
Do they go to the sophist for the sake of political success? Or is it because they admire 
wisdom and wish to be wise? The sophist perhaps attracts both kinds. If this is so, The-
aetetus is only half right when he repeated his teacher’s opinion about the sophists. 
Fourth, the result of this elenchus presents what might be called the ordinary view of 
sophists, namely that they investigate things above the heavens and below the earth, and 
make weaker arguments stronger (Ap. 18b7-c1). The Stranger’s version for the first part 
is that the sophists talk about everything. His version of “making weaker arguments 
stronger” is that they seem wise through unhealthy contradicting. The Stranger, in other 
words, partly agrees with the opinion of non-philosophers concerning sophists. The prob-
lem is that the non-philosophers apply this charge to philosophers as well — which is 
why Socrates’ trial is soon to take place. The Stranger needs to show that there are soph-
ist-resembling people who ought not to be charged with the same accusations. 
Finally, the conclusion is value-laden. To seem (δοκεῖν) wise without being so is to 
resemble the foolish person who thinks himself (δοκεῖν) wise, and folly was the worst 
kind of ignorance. (In this respect, there is a difference in his and the ordinary view of the 
sophists. The ordinary view condemns the sophist for teaching or encouraging disbelief 
in gods and thus for destroying the social fabric. The Stranger is quiet about this. Instead 
he condemns the sophist for misleading young people from truth. In other words, the 
		
104 
sophist is bad even if he does not corrupt the political community. Cf. 228d10-11.) The 
Stranger, without saying as much, implies that genuine neutrality is not reached by the 
avoidance of issues concerning value, but by being true and faithful to the worth of 
things. 
3.2.2 Image-Making 
(i) Painting and Speech. Within the horizon of appearance, the sophist shifts his ap-
pearance to look like his opposite. Within the horizon of judgment, he is the ultimate 
source of false judgment. The sophist impersonates the cause of mistakes in inquiry. Note 
that Theaetetus initially classified the sophist as having an art because his name (“wise 
expert”) suggested that he was a knower. The weakness of the argument was noted be-
fore.11 The conversation now suggests that Theaetetus was right, but not for the reason he 
thought it was. The sophist gets his name “sophist,” not because he is an expert, but be-
cause he is an expert at fooling people into thinking him an expert. His name is not a sign 
that he knows, but a sign that he knows how to pretend to know. 
The Stranger assimilates the sophist’s art to painting. He does not explain his choice. 
One might suggest the following. The sophist passes himself off as wise in front of his 
audience by speaking to those who are knowledgeable as if he is knowledgeable as well. 
But since he is revealed to be ignorant, he must be saying something wrong while still 
refuting the expert, who says something right. Otherwise put, he “says false things like 
true ones.” He would be wise if he were saying true things. If he didn’t make them sound 
true, then he would not seem wise to others. The sophist’s art thus resembles the cunning 																																																								
11 See Chapter One, n. 18 and text. 
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of Odysseus or the craft of the Muse-inspired poet. But poetry is the production of all 
productions because while other productions have a limited range of products, poetry 
produces everything. More precisely, it produces images of everything. This is why the 
Stranger chooses painting, which will in turn locate the sophist under productive arts: the 
assimilation of sophistry to painting makes it akin to poetics or poetry. 
The importance of this assimilation is emphasized by the Stranger’s telling The-
aetetus to pay close attention (233d6-7). He begins as follows: 	
Str. If some one claimed to know, not how to speak or contradict, but how to make 
and do, by means of one single art, all things (συνάπαντα…πράγματα) — 
Tht. What do you mean, “all” (πάντα)? 
Str. You’re being ignorant right away from the get-go of what is said. For you do not 
understand, you seem (ἔοικας), this “all (σύμπαντα).” 
Tht. No I don’t. (233d9-e4) 	
The Stranger continues to mix admonishment into his speeches. Theaetetus asks 
what “all” (or “everything”) means, but his question is not really about that, but how pro-
duction of everything is possible. He had no problem in accepting that someone talks 
about everything.12 The Stranger says that everything includes individuals like himself 
and Theaetetus, all animals and trees, the sea and earth and heavens and gods. Theaetetus 
comes to the realization that the master producer is a painter. But the list of “everything” 
that can be painted and the list of “all” the topics that the sophist talks about are not iden-
tical. The painter can paint beings but not “being itself” or “becoming itself.” He and the 																																																								
12 As e.g. Rosen (1983), 164 observes as well. 
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sophist do not even cover the same ground when they deal with the same topic. While the 
sophist discusses the invisible matters concerning the divine, the painter paints gods, i.e. 
he presents their visible aspects. The “everything” that can be revealed in speech is more 
extensive than the totality of what can be made visible. 
The painter belongs to the mimetic class insofar as charm, skillfulness, and variety 
are concerned. Since the sophist also exhibited variety, and his art is like the painter’s, he 
must also be an image-maker. The Stranger continues the analogy in 234b6-c7: 	
With the art of painting, the painter manufactures (ἀπεργαζόμενος) imitations 
(μιμήματα) of beings (τῶν ὄντων) that share the same name as them (ὁμώνυμα), 
and, exhibiting (ἐπιδεικνύς) them from afar to mindless young children, he will be 
able to pass by them unnoticed and do anything he wishes. 
With a different (ἄλλην) art, the sophist is capable of enchanting young men (who 
are still far from the truth of things) through their ears with speeches — speeches 
that show (δεικνύντας) spoken images about everything, so that he produces the be-
lief that truths are spoken and that the speaker is wiser than everyone in everything. 	
There are four elements in each case: a producer, a product, some “original” which 
the product resembles, and the viewers. So, in the case of image: the painter produces im-
ages of beings to children. There is an element of deception: children cannot distinguish 
the beings from their imitations. Analogously, the sophist produces speeches that show 
spoken images of the truth of things to young men. The young men, similarly, cannot dis-
tinguish the spoken images from the truth of things. Three comments: 
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First, in the case of image, as Benardete notes, the imitations or images are far away, 
while the beings are implied to be close at hand.13 Imitations have their charm because 
children are familiar with the beings imitated by the paintings. In the case of logos, how-
ever, it is logos itself that is “close” to the young men, while truth is “far” from them. The 
painter’s enchantment of children is based on their familiarity with beings; but the soph-
ist’s enchantment of young men is based on their unfamiliarity with truth. The mature 
person is therefore not the person who has experience with only images or only originals, 
but with both. He is capable of distinguishing between them. 
Second, children see a painting of, say, a dog from afar; it looks like dogs they are 
familiar with, and so they confuse the two. They are confused because of the similarity in 
their visible shapes. The image-original relationship in speech, however, seems to work 
in a more complicated way, since words, whether spoken or written, do not usually re-
semble the things they refer to. But we have seen spoken image in action already: it is 
assimilation. “Athlete” refers to athletes we are familiar with, the beings close to us. The 
statement that “the sophist is an athlete,” however, presents the athlete as an image of the 
sophist, who is unfamiliar to Theaetetus and “far away.” Logos “paints” something and 
makes it resemble something else. If the sophist’s charming way can be illustrated by the 
assimilation that has taken place in their inquiry, this suggests again that the Stranger’s 
and the sophist’s logos are not all that different. 
Third, the painter’s imitations are said to be homonymous with the beings imitated. 
In other words, a painting of a dog and the dog share the name “dog.” This draws atten-																																																								
13 Benardete (1984), II. 106, together with fig. 2. 
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tion to the fact that names are often used in such a way that “original” and “image” are 
not distinguished. Logos, as everyday discourse, already contains the confusion between 
images of dogs and dogs. The fact that images of things and things are homonymous 
means that distinctions implied in everyday discourse are already oriented by the divi-
sions in visible looks. This raises a question. The philosopher-sophist problematic indi-
cated that looks are not always reliable. If language tends to reflect the appearances of 
things, but appearances can mislead, then language would contain errors that appearances 
induced. We are compelled to use logos, which is contaminated by “bad” appearances, to 
overcome its own contamination. One wonders if a perfect scientific discourse, a rigorous 
and precise logos appropriate to ἐπιστήμη, is ever possible given this state of affairs. 
Moreover, given the tendency of logos to reflect what can be visualized, one wonders if 
its non-imagistic components — “being” and “becoming,” for example — are not there-
fore prone to misunderstanding. Consider the word “being.” Even though, on one level, 
one understands that being itself cannot be pictured but only beings can, on another level, 
there is still an inclination to “picture” being, in other words, to make it a being among 
other beings.14 If there is no image for being, but one cannot help but picture it in uttering 
it, one is “falsifying” it already. Can this be avoided? 
The analogy between image and speech is therefore a pivotal point; from here on, the 
meaning of εἶδος will undergo a change. 
																																																								
14 In a similar vein, Franklin (2011), 6, commenting on diaeresis, notes the need for inventive terminology, 
because “the presence or absence of terms in our ordinary lexicon” is not a reliable guide to correct divi-
sions of things. This partly explains the unusual number of hapax words in the Sophist and the Statesman. 
See also Notomi (1999), 75. 
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(ii) Likeness and Phantasm. Before dividing, the Stranger digresses a bit. Experience 
and time will change one’s opinions, and the sophist’s appearances in speech will be de-
stroyed by facts (234d2-e2). Theaetetus modestly replies that for someone his age, he 
cannot judge whether it is as the Stranger describes. The Stranger gently says that all the 
elders are here for his sake: they are meant to lead him as close as possible to truth with-
out experiences (234e5-6). 
The image-speech analogy makes the Stranger confident. “The tools of their logos” 
(235b2) have now “cast a net” over the sophist and there is nowhere for him to escape. 
He also implies that catching the sophist is tantamount to demonstrating that diaeresis is 
universally applicable (c4-6). He must mean that if they can catch the source of deception 
in logos through logos, then logos can detect and correct any potential mistake. It would 
be reflexively infallible and all-powerful. In the expectation of triumph, the Stranger sug-
gests dividing image-making as fast as possible in order to “deliver the sophist over to the 
kingly speech” (235b10-c1). This implies that he expects to define the statesman very 
soon. He does not proceed step by step from the largest class of production, imitating the 
excitement that comes along with a difficult discovery. Starting in media res, he makes 
one single division between image-making arts: those that make likenesses (or icon, 
εἰκών) and those that make phantasms or appearances (φάντασμα). 
“Likeness” is derived from εἰκός, likelihood or plausibility. A likeness is an accurate 
image that reproduces the relative proportions of the original in height, width, and depth, 
and adds the appropriate colors (d6-e2). The requirement of three-dimensionality is strict: 
paintings, by definition, can never be likenesses (236b9-c1). A likeness of Socrates must 
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at least be a statue of him. Theaetetus is confused — don’t all image-makers make like-
nesses? Are there really two kinds of images? The Stranger reminds him of large statues. 
If the sculptor made a large statue in accordance with proportions, the viewer, who views 
from the ground up, would in fact see the head as too small relative to the rest of the 
body. It would actually look disproportionate and not be “beautiful.” Accordingly, per-
spectival adjustments must be made, i.e. the head needs to be made relatively bigger. And 
this, he explains, is a phantasm: an inaccurate image that appears accurate due to per-
spectival adjustments. The term φάντασμα is based on φαίνεται, to appear. The art that 
makes likenesses is eikastics (εἰκαστική), and that which makes phantasms is phantastics. 
Likeness and phantasm correspond to true logos (and judgment) and deceptive logos 
(judgment) (what is false but seems or appears true).15 “Accurate” is therefore the ana-
logue for “true” and “inaccurate” for “false.” The Stranger seems to be appealing to The-
aetetus’ mathematical learning. Three comments — 
1. A change in the meaning of εἶδος has occurred. Visible looks are no longer the 
sole basis for defining εἶδος because looks vary with perspective: phantasms are designed 
to look like likenesses from a certain perspective, and likenesses can look inaccurate if 
one is standing at the wrong place. 
The character that now forms the basis for each εἶδος is a “look” that requires the as-
sistance of logos. There is also an implicit requirement that this “look” be stable, or that it 
is independent of the perspectives from which the look manifests itself to others. This 
look or shape would then indicate the being of the εἶδος, in contrast to how its members 																																																								
15 Bondeson (1972), 3-4; Rosen (1983), 147-155; Dixsaut (1992), 62-3, 66. 
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appear. Therefore, what determines the division is the “being” of each: likeness and 
phantasm are two, because one is accurate, and the other is inaccurate. εἶδος now has the 
sense of perspective-independent character. In the present instance, this perspective-
independent character is measured ratios. The proportions of something remain the same 
regardless of how they appear to different people.16 It does not follow from this that all 
εἴδη are solely determined by mathematical or quasi-mathematical characteristics. What it 
does mean is that the look that exhibits correctly the being of something is not always 
immediately or readily accessible. The access to those looks requires reasoning about vis-
ible appearances and the perspectives from which one is looking at them. One must con-
tinue to look around and change perspectives in order to become aware what can change 
and ask what does not along with perspectival shifts. 
2. Neither εἰκών nor φάντασμα is free of ambiguity. εἰκών, some argue, means exact 
copy.17 Twins are εἰκόνες of one another; a replica of a trophy is an εἰκών of it. This 
comes close to meaning that εἰκών is another “original,” or a duplicate copy. If so, then I 
don’t need to have access to the original to learn anything about it; as long as its εἰκών is 
available, it is a perfect stand-in for it. This would be εἰκών in the meaning of exactness. 
A speech that counts as εἰκών in this sense, an iconic speech, is reliable in the sense that 
one can grasp the world as it is as long as one understands the speech. But in the second 
sense, as an inevitable distortion of a medium, εἰκών is only plausible. This sense of 																																																								
16 Rep. 602d. 
17 Cornford (1935), 198. There is the related issue already of whether eikastics really exists at all, that is, 
whether it is not the case that all arts are phantastics. The Stranger himself comes close to suggesting this at 
236b9-c1. Philips (1961), 459, following Cornford, goes so far to say that eikastics seems to be an empty 
class without any members. See similar treatments going in a different direction by Rosen (1983), 192 and 
Howland (1998), 210. 
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εἰκών seems to imply that the transparency of things through logos can only be partial. To 
continue with the mathematical analogy, even if I know the relative proportions, the rati-
os of the original, if I do not know its original size, I cannot infer the absolute height, 
width, and depth of the original. (Given the Stranger’s examples, nor would I be able to 
know the “colors” of the original, if the colors of the original are something I wish to 
know.) There is always something missing or not truly represented in εἰκόνες.18 And what 
is missing might be important. There have been debates concerning exactly which of the-
se two meanings the Stranger intends for εἰκών; I think it is deliberately ambiguous. The 
ambiguity is perhaps a consequence of the blurring between intellectual health and beauty 
in the definition of elenchus; it anticipates Stage Three, when the Stranger’s own plausi-
ble logos will look exact. 
φάντασμα has a double meaning as well. For example, if someone knows the origi-
nal and presents an image of it to his audience in a way that they can understand it, he is 
presenting a φάντασμα. A contemporary scientist writing popular science books for lay-
men is an example of phantastics. The example suggests that phantastics is not in and of 
itself objectionable. The sophist cannot be practicing phantastics in these terms, however, 
because he is assumed to be unwise: he does not know the original. The sophist must be 
practicing phantastics in a similar way to the sculptor with large statues. The Stranger 
chose that example because, as some noticed, large statues in ancient Greece were usual-
ly statues of gods — that is, beings that nobody has seen. But the sculptor can still make 
																																																								
18 According to Crat. 432b1-d4, images must by nature be lacking or missing in something compared to the 
original. For discussions of that passage in relation to the present Sophist passage, see Patterson (1985), 38-
9; Notomi (1999), 140-1. 
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these statues, because he knows his audience’s opinion about gods. He makes images 
based on what he knows of their beliefs. This is why the sophist’s knowledge is called 
δοξαστική, opinionative — his familiarity with what people tend to believe or opine 
usurps the place of truth. If this is the case, one needs to further differentiate him from 
those who employ phantastics knowingly (whether for noble or ignoble purposes). This 
differentiation will only take place near the end of the dialogue. 
3. Let me take a step back to articulate the overall picture so far. In the first four def-
initions, the sophist was compared with Socrates. The definition of the refuter compared 
the Stranger (diaeresis) with Socrates (elenchus). The present division compares the 
Stranger (diaeresis) with the sophist. Sophistry is phantastics, and diaeresis is eikastics. 
At the very least, the diaeretician aspires to provide an iconic logos of the sophist.19 The 
diaeretician wants to articulate things as they are, regardless of the perspective of others. 
But the conversation continued for the sake of distinguishing elenchus from sophistry. 
Where is elenchus now? 
I suggest that elenchus is the bridge between phantasms and likenesses. The Stranger 
says that he does not know to which class the sophist belongs, but he does not say why.20 
There are two possibilities. The first possibility is represented by Theaetetus, who sees 
nothing but likenesses. If there are only likenesses, then maybe the sophist is a knower, 
and he and the Stranger were mistaken in saying that he is not wise. This is where the 
perplexities of nonbeing, image, and falsehood will lead. The other possibility is repre-																																																								
19 Cf. Peck (1952), 38. 
20 Howland (1998), 209 suggests that what counts as beautiful proportions differ with individuals, and that 
is why the Stranger is puzzled. But this “subjectivizes” the issue of beauty in the wrong direction. 
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sented by the Stranger. Unlike Theaetetus, he is at a different perspective, and sees both 
accurate and inaccurate images. He makes a division and judges that the inaccurate imag-
es were adjusted for the perspective of those like Theaetetus. But he is not sure whether 
those inaccurate images really are inaccurate. From where is he himself looking at these 
images? If he is standing at god’s perspective, the perspective-free perspective, or what 
the Stranger calls “the vantage point of beauty” (236b4-5: recall that psychic beauty 
means the possession of knowledge and truth), he would correctly identify the sophist, 
because that is the perspective from which likenesses will appear accurate and phantasms 
inaccurate. But if he is looking at things from any other perspective, say, if he is at nei-
ther where Theaetetus is nor the vantage point of beauty, there is the possibility that what 
appears to him as accurate are actually phantasms designed to be viewed from his per-
spective, and what appears inaccurate to him are likenesses that he is unable to under-
stand correctly. He would be at a place where the sophist looks like a philosopher and the 
philosopher a sophist.21 This explains why he does not know to which class the sophist 
belongs. 
The Stranger and Theaetetus therefore see the matter differently, but the result is the 
same: they must distinguish correctly likenesses from phantasms. They will do it in the 
only way the Stranger knows how: elenchus. In other words, they will test all the “appar-
ently accurate spoken images” and see if they are truly accurate or not. Elenchus will en-
gineer the ascent from phantasms to likenesses, or the path to “the vantage point of beau-
																																																								
21 Rosen (1980), 168 makes a similar point. 
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ty,” that is, the perspective from which both false and true speeches will show their true 
colors (236b4-5). 
3.3 Nonbeing, Image, Falsehood 
3.3.1 The Perplexity of Nonbeing 
The moment Theaetetus agrees with the Stranger that they do not know to which 
class the sophist belongs, the Stranger admonishes him for agreeing too quickly and ha-
bitually to their conversation. In order to wake him up from his intellectual drowsiness 
the Stranger resorts to radical questioning. He abruptly introduces a new problem: 	
For this, to appear and to seem, but not be, and to say things not true, all these are 
always full of perplexity both in the past and now as well. For in order that one must 
say it is truly possible to say or judge false things, it is altogether difficult, The-
aeteteus, for the person uttering this not to get stuck in contradictory speeches 
(ἐναντιολογία).22 (236e1-237a1) 	
Mere appearance and falsehood are presupposed to be possible within the horizon of 
judgment, but they are now questioned. Since “mere appearing” implies “to not be so” 
and falsehood also implies “is not true,” nonbeing, whatever exactly this term means, is 
common to both. But Parmenides, the Stranger’s spiritual father, prohibited the thinking 
of nonbeing. The Stranger needs to review that prohibition, and at the same time show 
Theaetetus how to question one’s own beliefs.23 The overall strategy is to show that Par-
menides’s prohibition leads to the denial of images and falsehoods, and if there were no 																																																								
22 For an interesting comment on the meaning of ἐναντιολογία, see Rosen (1983), 178-9. 
23 At the end of the perplexity of nonbeing, the Stranger emphasizes that it is he himself who is in trouble 
and implies that Theaetetus is unharmed by the assault of nonbeing (239b7-c7). 
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falsehoods or images to make, there would be no sophists. One can infer from this that 
Socrates’ initial joke — whether a monist can truly believe that sophist, statesman, and 
philosopher are three — is understood by the Stranger as really a joke. From the 
Stranger’s point of view, the Eleatics are inconsistent, but the inconsistency is not be-
tween the oneness of being and the threeness of these persons. Rather, it is the prohibi-
tion against nonbeing that makes the twoness of the sophist and the philosopher impossi-
ble. The Stranger makes this clear by postponing his refutation of the monism thesis.24 As 
one can see in the argument below, he treats the prohibition as compatible with the exist-
ence of plural beings. 
The test (βασανισθείς, 237b2) of the true meaning of Parmenides’s prohibition is in 
place. The elenchus (238d5-6, 239b3) takes three ascending steps.  
Step One: “Nonbeing” or “That which is not” lacks reference. The Stranger first 
asks whether they dare to utter “that which in no way is” or “absolute nonbeing” (τὸ 
μηδαμῶς ὄν), something Theaetetus had no problem agreeing to. Of course we can utter 
it. But uttering is not the same as understanding: 	
If, not for the sake of contest (ἔρις) or play (παιδιά), but if one must answer in ear-
nest, in reply to one of the listeners paying attention, to where one must apply this 
name, “nonbeing (τὸ μὴ ὄν),” for what and to what sort of thing (εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ 
ποῖον), do we think, he could employ the name and show [this] to the person who’s 
asking? (237b10-c4) 																																																									
24 That occurs later in Stage Three, but it will not be discussed in detail as it is outside the scope of this dis-
sertation. 
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The Stranger defensively denies that what he is about to say is eristic or mere play, in 
anticipation that the following discussion might look like sophistry.25 The Stranger asks 
for the reference of nonbeing. The question reflects a desire for substantive content in 
one’s utterance.26 While one can point to dogs for the name “dog,” or sophists for the 
name “sophist,” it seems that there is nothing to point to for “nonbeing.” Theaetetus con-
fesses that he is at a complete loss to say what this is (ἄπορον, c5-6). The Stranger sug-
gests that they begin with the following thought — whatever “nonbeing” refers to, at 
least it is clear that it must not refer to any of the beings (τῶν ὄντων ἐπί <τι> τὸ μὴ ὂν 
οὐκ οἰστέον, c7-8).27 The implied strategy is that they might discover the substantive con-
tent of “nonbeing” by a process of subtraction, by taking away what it cannot possibly 
refer to. 
If one follows the principle just formulated, the Stranger continues, then one cannot 
refer “nonbeing” to something (τι). This is because τι always implies ὄν. In other words, 
because “something” is always some being, one cannot possibly utter “τι” and only mean 
it “alone by itself, as if naked and deprived of all beings” (d2-3).28 “Being” and “nonbe-
ing” are now completely separated from one another. We have beings on one side, and all 
the names that refer to them; and nonbeing on the other. Nonbeing should never intrude 
upon beings and “beings,” that is, it should never refer to them, nor used in conjunction 
with all the names that belong to them. To apply the same principle again, “τι” also 
means one, because something is always some one thing. Just like τινε also means a pair, 																																																								
25 Indeed it has occasionally been taken to be sophistry by commentators, notably Peck (1952). 
26 Peck (1952), 32; Silverman (2002), 151. 
27 Accepting the emendation. 
28 Cf. Phaedo 103e-104c. 
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and τινες refers to a plurality, to say “something” is to mean both a being and a being. τι, 
τινε, τινες, ἕν, δύο, and πολλά all belong to ὄν and refer to beings and nothing but beings. 
But, if “nonbeing” cannot refer to anything, any τι, then the person who utters “nonbe-
ing” is not saying “τι”: he is μὴ τὶ λέγειν. But since “τι” implies ἕν, μὴ τὶ λέγειν is μηδ-
ἕν λέγειν. So, to utter nonbeing is to say nothing: it is to fail the act of speaking at all.29 
Step Two: Nonbeing is unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and without speech or 
irrational (ἄλογον). The argument now shifts from rules of speaking to relations among 
beings themselves. The Stranger asserts that any being can come to be present 
(προσγένοιτο) in a being, and it cannot come to be present in nonbeing (238a5-9). Birds 
of a feather flock together, so only beings and beings go together, and no being can ever 
“touch” or make contact with a nonbeing. But every number is a being (a10); therefore it 
cannot possibly come to be present in anything that is not (i.e. nonbeing); therefore one 
must never apply number of any sort to nonbeing. But like “τι,” whenever one utters or 
thinks “nonbeing” or “nonbeings,” one is already thinking of some one or a plural. So 
even to utter or to think it is to violate the rule of not attaching number to it. As the 
Stranger puts it, to think or to utter nonbeing itself by itself (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό), in other 
words, with no reference to any being, is simply impossible. 
Step Three: Nonbeing cannot even be prohibited from being said or thought. The 
height of the difficulty is that “nonbeing puts the refuter into perplexity in such a way 
that, whenever someone tries to refute it, he is compelled to speak in a way that contra-																																																								
29 Alieva (2010), 77 perceptively notes that this step, taken unconditionally, destroys the basis for noble 
sophistry: “…the noble sophists refute those who think they are saying something whereas they are saying 
nothing (230b5: λέγων μηδέν). If ‘saying nothing’ is impossible, there can be no elenchus at all.” 
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dicts himself about it.” (238d5-7) In other words, Parmenides — someone who tried to 
“refute” nonbeing — ends up himself being refuted by it. Since the prohibition against it 
was based on its unthinkability, the prohibition itself violates what it denies. “Nonbeing 
is unthinkable” is itself unthinkable (239a3-11). There is therefore no correct account 
(ὀρθολογία) about nonbeing. To sum up: step one shows that to utter “nonbeing” is to fail 
to speak or think at all; step two shows that if this is the case, then one must follow Par-
menides’s prohibition; step three shows that on the same grounds, one cannot even think 
that prohibition. 
“Nonbeing,” in short, seems to be an “empty” word for which there is no original 
and which is therefore not even an image. It is the sign of an utter unthinkability. The 
perplexity is based on a tension between two ideas. The first idea is that λέγειν, meaning-
ful speaking and thinking, minimally requires one to λέγειν τι, say something. To say 
nonbeing, however, is to say nothing, and that means to fail the act of λέγειν. On the oth-
er hand, when the Stranger and Theaetetus utter “nonbeing,” they also entertain in their 
thoughts something as completely devoid of content, that is, they are thinking what might 
be called nothingness — and so they cannot say they have failed to λέγειν, otherwise the 
perplexity itself could not even begin to make sense.30 The paradoxical character of non-
being seems to be a perplexity about thinking. How can nonbeing, the unthinkable, be 
thought by thinking? This remains a perplexity throughout the Sophist. 
In light of the Stranger’s later “solution,” two things should be noted. First, until his 
account is offered, the Stranger will speak as if the elenchus of nonbeing applies to τὸ μὴ 																																																								
30 Cf. Wiggins (1971), 273. 
		
120 
ὄν, τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν indiscriminately. In Stage Three, he will distinguish 
the first two from the last. The first two are relative, qualified nonbeings which still have 
being, while the last lacks being altogether and the perplexity remains unsolved when ap-
plied to it.31 Second, the Stranger will suggest that the principle according to which only 
beings can be in contact with beings is defective. Actually, being and nonbeing must be 
“in contact” in some way, and they cannot be thought of as completely apart from each 
other.32 Otherwise the conditions for the horizon of judgment, and therefore the condi-
tions for questioning, would be destroyed. In order to make Theaetetus see the necessity 
of the togetherness of being and nonbeing for defining the sophist, the Stranger now turns 
to explaining the perplexities of image and falsehood that result from the perplexity of 
nonbeing. 
3.3.2 Image 
The Stranger for the first time suggests that the sophist practices phantastics. Also 
for the first time, the sophist (as the Stranger imagines him) shows up and talks to them. 
We witness ἀντιλογικόν in action. The sophist no longer runs away but argues in the 
open. Hunting thus gives way to fighting as the metaphor for inquiry.33 I note in passing 
that the Stranger’s playing the sophist implies that he is capable of behaving like one. The 
sophist’s first challenge: what is an image? Theaetetus replies with examples, and the 																																																								
31 Cf. Crivelli (2012), 32. Owen (1971), 241-3, arguing that it is step one of the aporia that is not answered 
and applicable to τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν, and that the Stranger’s later solution applies only to steps two and three, 
gives a contrived reading of the passage. 
32 Owen (1971), 258. 
33 The metaphor for inquiry as hunting is mentioned at least four times before this point, and only once af-
terwards (in 261a5). The metaphor of fighting begins its appearance at 241d8 on and words with μαχ- root 
occurs seven times after that. See also Rep. 534b-c. For a comparable treatment concerning hunting and 
fighting in the Sophist, see Notomi (1999), 163-5. 
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Stranger bluntly says that the young man has clearly never seen a sophist. He does not 
mean that Theaetetus has never met sophists before, but only that he failed to recognize 
them as such. 
Theaetetus has never seen a sophist, because he doesn’t realize that the sophist will 
pretend to be blind and claim to have never seen reflections in mirrors and water. The-
aetetus’ own “blindness,” his inability to see the sophist, is somehow imitated by the 
sophist. (The sophist is even called a young man here.) By making his fake blindness ef-
fectively real, the sophist is making what is false appear true, i.e. he practices phantastics 
even when denying the charge of practicing phantastics. He demands a logos for images 
and rejects examples. Given that, as mentioned before, dogs and pictures of dogs can 
share the same name, one wonders if logos alone can reveal the difference between imag-
es and originals. Surely one can tell the blind sophist that “dog” sometimes applies to 
dogs and sometimes only resemblances of them. But will the blind person really under-
stand what this means? Does not the very nature of image make any transparent elucida-
tion through logos alone improbable if not impossible? 
Theaetetus rises to the sophist’s challenge: an image is τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν 
ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον (240a8), “some other sort of thing made alike to what is 
genuine.” It is a good definition, and the force of the perplexity requires that the defini-
tion be so. An image is always a ἕτερον, which, to anticipate the great theme of Stage 
Three, Otherness (θάτερον), is always ἕτερον in relation to something else. This some-
thing else is the original or “the genuine.” The nature of the image is so far expressed as a 
double condition. Image is other than the original, and yet resembles it at the same time. 
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The Stranger first demands clarification for τοιοῦτον: does Theaetetus mean some 
other ἀληθινόν or not? Theaetetus says that an image is in no way ἀληθινόν, but only 
ἐοικός. This exchange, I think, makes a third condition explicit, namely that the original 
must be the standard with which an image is compared. Pictures of Socrates are accurate 
or inaccurate by being measured against Socrates himself. But it does not make sense to 
say “Socrates is accurate,” since he is the standard, and accuracy and inaccuracy are fea-
tures of what are measured against the standard, not of the standard itself. Theaetetus’ 
answer therefore suggests that the “truth” (accuracy) of images depends upon and is de-
rived from the original, which is the standard since it is genuine (τἀληθινόν). 
The Stranger notes, however, that this third condition compels them to say that an 
image both is and is not. If genuine means to really be (ὄντως ὄν), and not true means the 
opposite (ἐναντίον) of what is true, then ἐοικός, parsed as οὐκ ἀληθινόν, would by re-
placement: εἴδωλον = ἐοικός = οὐκ ἀληθινόν = οὐκ ὄντως ὄν = ἐναντίον ὄντως ὄν. The 
image would then seem to have no being at all. Theaetetus, however, insists that an image 
still somehow (πως) has being, because it’s really (ὄντως) an image. But this makes im-
age something that really is a real nonbeing (240b12-3). Theaetetus now is led to see the 
paradoxical character of images: “perhaps (κινδυνεύει) such an interweaving between 
nonbeing and being has been woven, and it’s quite strange (ἄτοπον)” (c1-2). ἄτοπον, lit-
erally “without place,” suggests the lack of “discursive space” for images when Parmeni-
dean logic is at work. In short, if images depend upon and are derived from the original, 
and originals are real or have being in an eminent way that makes them standards, then 
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images necessarily have being in a lesser way.34 They are mixed or interwoven with non-
being. 
The perplexity of image brings to light the puzzling character of appearance. Ap-
pearance and being relate to each other as image to original. Appearances are both other 
than being and yet made alike it. They manifest being imperfectly, and being is the meas-
ure or standard of the “truth” (and “falsehood”) of appearances. The perplexity concern-
ing image suggests that one must not think appearance — even when it is mere appear-
ance — as devoid of being altogether, as “nothingness.” Instead, all appearances some-
how, πως, have being. 
The sophist’s “proof” that images are impossible amounts to saying that everything 
is its own standard and there is no question of whether it is accurate or inaccurate, since 
accuracy and inaccuracy can only be features of something with respect to a standard that 
is not identical to it. If there were no images, then everything would be its own kind and 
be exactly what it is. The collapse of the contrast between being and appearing means 
that Theaetetus and the Stranger are falling back into the horizon of appearance once 
more. This might explain why the Stranger identifies the imaginary opponent as a soph-
ist, even though the sophist behaves like Socrates in asking for a logos, refusing exam-
ples, and leading the definition to an impasse.35 It is not because the sophist offers per-																																																								
34 Cf. Bondeson (1972), 3. Peck (1952), 39 and Robinson (2001), among others, argue that no “degrees of 
being” view is imported here at all, and thereby repeats an earlier debate from the last century. The view is 
convincing only if one accepts that εἶναι here means existence, and since something either exists or it does 
not (there are no “degrees” of existence), the present aporia cannot possibly be about it. It is important to 
remember here Kahn’s insight that “to be” in Greek often had the primary sense of veridicality, veracity: 
image “is” in a lesser way, in a mere πως, precisely because it is less real or is not fully intelligible. 
35 Gonzalez (1997), 59 n. 66. Notomi (1999), 202-4 suggests that Protagoreanism is still the implicit target 
in the background of this dialogue, which was the explicit target and treated extensively in the Theaetetus. 
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plexities (ἀπορίαι) without solving them: this is Frede’s view.36 The philosopher, by con-
trast, makes use of perplexities in a constructive way. But if this view were correct, then 
the Stranger must think that Socrates is a sophist, who also offers perplexities without 
solving them. This is inconsistent however with the Stranger’s refusal to call the refuters 
sophists. Offering perplexities without solving them is thus not in and of itself the defin-
ing feature of the sophist. Instead, the sophist argues for the impossibility of image, not 
because he believes that there are no images, but because he intends to escape from being 
defined by the Stranger and Theaetetus. Being caught would mean that he has his appear-
ance of wisdom removed and his folly come to light.37 His objection, then, is meant to 
hide his own being from being revealed, and he does so by destroying the conditions of 
questioning. (I do not mean to say that this adequately clarifies the confusion between the 
sophist and Socrates. But I do mean that the Stranger is once more suggesting, through 
his action of playing the sophist, why questions of better and worse are necessary for de-
fining the sophist.) 
Besides the occurrence of ἕτερον, the explicit identification of not (οὐ) with opposite 
(ἐναντίον) and the term συμπλοκή both occur for the first time. They anticipate the 
Stranger’s doctrines that will be presented in Stage Three. 																																																																																																																																																																					
Since the consequence of the sophist’s objections is a return to the horizon of appearance, there is much to 
be said for this reading. 
36 Frede (1996), 143-4. Crivelli (2012), 48 thinks that the attribution of the perplexities here to the sophist 
“is probably an indication that they contain illicit or at least dubious moves.” This is misleading. The 
Stranger also makes dubious moves in arguments that he offers in his own voice. Besides, he takes the 
sophist’s objections seriously; he does not understand them as “sophisms” that concern “merely verbal” 
difficulties, but genuine perplexities about the availability of intelligible accounts of image and falsehood. 
37 Cf. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, (translated Hong & Hong, Princeton University Press), p. 82. 
He saw that defining and refuting the sophist are one and the same task. This is because for the sophist, 
“…coming into being…is the worst thing that can happen to him, for despite his sophistry, which like the 
armor of Mars enables him to become invisible, he must come forth into the light.” 
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3.3.3 Falsehood 
Not only is the class of images impossible, but also the subclasses of likeness and 
phantasm collapse as well. The Stranger does not ask Theaetetus to give a definition of 
falsehood, but offers two versions of it himself. He first defines false judgment as judging 
“what are opposite to being or the things that are (τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι),” which is then 
rephrased as nonbeings or “the things that are not (τὰ μὴ ὄντα).” For the second time, he 
uses not and opposite interchangeably. Interestingly enough, he does not stop here, but 
gives an alternative formulation. Generally speaking, false logos is to speak “that those 
which are, are not (τὰ ὄντα μὴ εἶναι)” or “that those which are not, are (τὰ μὴ ὄντα 
εἶναι).” The focus is on false logos, because only in their case does “attaching being to 
nonbeing” happen, and Parmenides’ prohibition violated. It is therefore impossible to 
think of falsehoods without thinking or speaking of “is not” or nonbeing either. 
The switch from the shorter formulation of falsehood to the longer one is notewor-
thy. The shorter formulation “to judge or speak τὰ μὴ ὄντα” is enough for the sophist; he 
can simply say that that formula of falsehood already violates the Parmenidean prohibi-
tion, since it implies that to speak falsehoods is equivalent to saying nothing. The 
Stranger, however, does not stop there. This indicates that his preferred formula for false-
hood, the longer one, is not one suggested by the sophist, but proposed on his own initia-
tive. The longer formulation prepares for the sophisticated account of λέγειν τι that will 
be offered later. It is already halfway towards a possible solution. 
The formulation of falsehood as “to judge or say that which is not as being, or that 
which is as not being,” reflects, as the shorter formulation did not, that “distance” be-
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tween soul and the world necessary for questioning. In the longer formulation, the parti-
cipial substantives, τὰ ὄντα and τὰ μὴ ὄντα, denote that which is or is not the case inde-
pendent of perspective shifts. The infinitive verbs, μὴ εἶναι and εἶναι, however, denote the 
soul’s denial or affirming responses to them.38 The affirming or denying εἶναι then make 
“images” of the perspective-independent “originals.” The longer formula of falsehood, 
then, suggests that falsehood is something the soul does or commits, or something that 
happens in the soul — which is, it will be suggested, the position eventually proposed. 
The Stranger drew a parallel between images and speeches. His second formula for 
falsehood reinforces that parallel, since now both image and falsehood have the structure 
of an “interweaving” of being and nonbeing. And the implications are similar in each 
case. The disappearance of images implies that everything is “original” and whatever ap-
pears is; the disappearance of falsehoods imply that all speeches are true, or in other 
words, even if they are spoken images, all of them reflect their “originals” so perfectly 
that there is no need to resort to originals to compare them with anymore. Stage Two 
ends with a challenge. If the Stranger and Theaetetus cannot defend the grounds of what 
makes questioning possible, then there are no sophists, and there aren’t even philoso-
phers, since everyone is wise. Parmenides’s prohibition makes the defense more difficult, 
but it also gives it a focus, since the double problem of image and falsehood is now re-
duced to one task — a rethinking of that prohibition. If being and nonbeing can inter-
weave, it must mean that they are not as radically opposed as the arguments so far as-
sumed. The two must not be so opposed that it is always a contradiction to utter “nonbe-																																																								
38 Kahn (2007), 44 sees the point as well: εἶναι is either applicable to “facts” (as he calls them) or “judg-
ments,” and this prepares for what he calls the “disquotational” (correspondence) view of truth. 
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ing is” or “being is not.” Parmenides cannot be right without qualification: in the 
Stranger’s own words, they must prove that nonbeing in some respect is (τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι 
κατά τι), and being somewhat is not (τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι πῃ) (241d6-7). 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE IDEAL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE 	
4.1 The Horizon of Thinking 
Stage Three presents the horizon of thinking. Thinking was already at work in Stage 
Two, since assent and denial were results of thinking through the reliability of appearanc-
es. Stages Two and Three do not initially appear all that different. 
But there are differences nevertheless. First, a difference of orientation. Stage Two 
emphasized getting to the end, to answer yes or no, to reach a decision. There was a sense 
of urgency, a focus on the issue at hand, and therefore also a wish to divide “as fast as 
possible” (235b8). The hunting metaphor was then still active. But here the pace becomes 
leisurely, hunting disappears, and fighting is appropriated internally, as an elenchic exam-
ination of oneself.1 Urgency is replaced by patience. The discussions of being, the five 
greatest Kinds, parts of Otherness, therefore have the character of a digression, a break 
from the task at hand, despite its relevance to the task (cf. 241c7-9 with d9-e5).2 Thinking 
occurs like a break from life, despite its relevance to life. Thanks to the sophist, who 
compelled the Stranger and Theaetetus to question the conditions of questioning, they are 
now to reopen spaces for thinking precisely through thinking.3 Furthermore, there is a 
																																																								
1 Cf. Blondell (2002), 348-9. 
2 For a more general treatment of the literary device of digressions and its philosophical significance in 
Plato, see Notomi (1999), 29-42. 
3 Cherubin (1993), 223 interestingly suggests that this circularity is perhaps distinctively Eleatic and might 
be one of the reasons that Plato made the Stranger the leading speaker. The reflexivity noted here will be 
noted at several places below; cf. Silverman (2002), 139-140 (also 159): “Since metaphysical inquiry is 
itself part of thought and language…such inquiry must be self-accomodating. Ideally the very principles, 
categories, and commitments of the inquiry must be assimilated into the theory itself.” Howland (1998), 
215 notes that the Stranger is “developing the ontological implications of the soul’s intellectual activity,” 
and in this sense is building “…upon Socrates’ previous work with Theaetetus.” 
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willingness to seek truth as far as one can. The Stranger’s will apply elenchus on a broad-
er scale, namely to whatever he and Theaetetus thought they knew about being. Accord-
ingly, he resembles Socrates to an even greater degree than before.4 
Second, a difference in the object of pursuit. Stage Two examined appearances. 
Stage Three takes up beliefs themselves as the object of examination. The application of 
elenchus generates more judgments (δόξα) that are refinements of the initial judgments, 
or new ones implied by what they understand at a given moment. The new movement 
thinks from and through δόξα. 
And so third, a difference in method. While both Stages Two and Three employ 
elenchus, the horizon of thinking is conducted almost with eyes closed, as it were. For 
long stretches, there is no appeal to visible appearances.5 Part of this has to do with the 
fact that the question of being does not arise out of appearances, which raises questions 
about beings, but not ones about being. The turn towards the question of being is effected 
by turning away from beings. The sophist had pretended that he could not see the exam-
ples of images that Theaetetus mentioned, and demanded clarity from logos alone. Stage 
Three proceeds similarly. As appearance retreats and gives way to δόξα, listening replac-
es sight. One might say that they deliberately close their eyes in order to “see” intelligent-																																																								
4 The Socratic character in the Stranger’s digression is noted by Howland (1998), 207-216; Notomi (1999), 
214 ff.; McCoy (2007) 161ff.; Mouroutsou (2010), 75; Crivelli (2012), 71. Denyer reports that the expres-
sion καλεῖν …τι; (“do you say that … is something?”) is used by no one else besides Plato’s Socrates - ex-
cept the Stranger, who uses it once in the digression here (at 244b12) (Plato’s Protagoras, Cambridge, 
2008, p. 130). 
5 While φαίνεσθαι still occurs in the digression, it refers to the appearance of beliefs, opinions, or thoughts 
as they are manifest in and by logos. It does not refer to perceptual appearances. In the stretch of the text 
called the communion of Kinds (254d3-257a12), the Stranger never uses φαίνεσθαι nor any sight related 
word to describe their results (Theaetetus uses ἔοικεν only once at 256e7). The dominant words in that sec-
tion are λέγειν, φημί, προσαγορεύω, εἴρω, and διανοεῖσθαι, i.e. discourse and thinking words. Cf. the 
treatment of φαίνεσθαι in the digression by Notomi (1999), 213 n. 13. 
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ly. So, when the Stranger says that the need to refute “father Parmenides” is something 
evident even to the blind (241d5-9), he does not simply mean that it is obvious to any 
random person. He also means that the issue can be explained to someone without point-
ing to anything or observing any visible objects, and that listening and responding are 
adequate for the refutation. 
What does the state of knowing, what is the meaning of “to know” within the hori-
zon of thinking? In the previous two stages the answer can be extracted from what the 
Stranger does. But here there is a disparity between what he says and what he does. His 
speeches at one point present the ideal of the dialectician, whose logos is “scientific,” ap-
propriate to ἐπιστήμη. On the level of action, however, the Stranger offers a doctrine that 
is as comprehensively tested by refutations as he can at the moment, and to know seems 
to mean the state in which one’s judgments and the implications of those judgments are 
as coherent with one another as possible.6 This chapter will argue that first, the Stranger 
does not even pass the test of consistency. Second, correcting his doctrine from the in-
consistency will not make his logos dialectical.7 His elechus-tested knowledge remains 
second best. But — and this is the interesting point — third and finally, his very argu-
ments seem to undercut the very possibility of arriving at the logos of the dialectician. 
Dialectic seems to be paradoxically both a reasonable (since thinking itself naturally sug-
gests it) and impossible ideal. 
The ontological commitments of the philosopher form the running thread of the di-
gression. What does one presuppose about being if the conditions of questioning are to be 																																																								
6 Cf. Notomi (1999), 229. 
7 Ackrill (1971), 208-9 takes the communion of kinds passage as an obvious practice of dialectic. 
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preserved, and questioning is not possible without logos? 4.2 discusses the prayer of the 
philosopher and the perplexity of being; these two topics set up the question of 
knowledge and logos. 4.3 turns to what I call the intelligibility principle and the ideal of 
dialectical logos implied by it. 4.4 discusses the doctrine of “the greatest Kinds.” A main 
goal of my reading is to show how at each step of the way, the Stranger’s arguments un-
dercut the possibility of possessing the dialectician’s logos. Finally, 4.5 argues that the 
discussion of parts of Otherness, where the Stranger claims to have discovered the εἶδος 
of nonbeing, is inconsistent with what the Stranger otherwise says about what it is to be 
an εἶδος. 
4.2 The Philosopher’s Prayer 
4.2.1 The Battle between Giants and Gods 
The review of the Presocratics, which is not discussed in detail here, is a critique of 
counting (242c4-246a2). Counting how many beings there are, or “precise speechmak-
ing” (245e6), cannot be basic, because there must be a prior thought or account that de-
termines what constitutes a countable “unit” of being.8 And that prior account cannot be 
arithmetic. The non-arithmetic or “imprecise” account concerning being (οὐσία) is the 
topic of the endless battle between gods and giants (γιγαντομαχία, 246a4-5). Those who 
hold that “being is body (σῶμα)” are assigned the position of giants, who in the myth 
were hubristic and wished to take over the rule of gods. According to the giants, only 
what one can touch, attack, and squeeze with one’s hands counts as real. They are, we 
would say, materialists (a8-b1). By calling them giants, the Stranger suggests that materi-																																																								
8 Campbell (1867), 116-7; Cornford (1935), 231; Seligman (1974), 30. 
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alism is connected with insolence. The “friends of Forms” oppose the giants with an ex-
plicit dualism between bodies (which are forever moving and called “becoming” 
(γένεσις)) and bodiless Forms — which are intelligible (νοητά) and genuine being (τὴν 
ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν) (b6-c3). For the first time, εἴδη are said to be immaterial, proper objects 
of knowing and understanding, and identified with being. The friends defend their posi-
tion “from up high” (b6), which is where the gods are. Insofar as gods are wise and the 
philosophers are said to look down from on high, the friends are implied to be the closest 
to being correct about being, even though the Stranger will still criticize them.9 
The mythical cast indicates that the giants and the friends fight each other with some 
seriousness. 10  This is because their views on being are connected with their self-
understanding, their own being or their comportment towards other beings.11 The giants 																																																								
9 Cf. Blondell (2002), 323. Crivelli (2012), 86 draws a different conclusion: the friends are genuine philos-
ophers. But the Stranger does not necessarily understand “genuine” as “closer to the truth.” 
 The historical identity of each party is unclear. While questions like these are rarely philosophically 
helpful, in this particular context, one would like to know the identity of the friends. (1) Do they represent 
an early Plato who now changes his position through the Stranger? Cornford (1935), 242-3; Seligman 
(1974), 31; Sayre (2005) [1983], 224 hold this view. (While Notomi (1999), 219-220 prefers this as well, 
he refrains from concluding that the Sophist confirms the developmental or unitarian reading of Plato.) (2) 
Or they have nothing to do with Plato but some non-Platonic school of thought? Heidegger (1997), 331-2, 
relying on 19th century German philology, thought the friends were Megarians. (3) Could the friends repre-
sent a view of Forms wrongly held by many of Plato’s students that he sought to correct through the 
Stranger? Cherniss (1944), 439 n. 376; Klein (1977), 45. (4) Or a fourth view ? Crivelli (2012), 88, for ex-
ample, tentatively suggests one difference from the Platonic position known in the Phaedo and the Repub-
lic - he argues that the friends reject that Forms have modal power or quasi-causal power, while the classi-
cal view accepts this. However, he does not identify this view with any historical school. 
 While I refrain from taking a stance concerning the historical identity of the friends, I will assume, 
however, that the εἴδη the friends talk about either closely resemble or are related to the classical under-
standing of Platonic Forms. This means that if Plato really intended a historical allusion by “friends of 
Forms,” (2) is excluded as a possible view for a proper understanding of this passage. 
10 Notomi (1999), 217 offers an interesting (and not incompatible with the view proposed here) suggestion: 
maybe there is no common basis between them even for genuine dialogue to happen, and that is why talk is 
replaced by battle. 
11 Heidegger (1997), 397. On p. 141 Heidegger describes the Sophist as “a remarkable innovation” with 
respect to the way of philosophizing, because a human way of life (he calls it “a mode of existence of 
Dasein”) “…is offered as ground for a discussion of Being and beings.” The Stranger would agree. When 
the Stranger reviews the Presocratics, he remarked that they were conversing to others “in an easygoing 
		
133 
touch or grab; the friends see and let beings be. The giants are thus “materialists” in an 
ethical sense as well. They pursue mastery over other bodies. Their hubris consists in not 
recognizing anything higher than themselves. The friends of Forms, by contrast, see 
themselves as conditioned by beings that are not human products.12 So the battle between 
giants and friends to some extent replays the question of the relation between acquisition 
and production in knowledge. The giants emphasize being as being produced and honor 
the human power to control and master beings, while the friends emphasize that even 
human productivity and creativity is guided by knowledge, and thus by a kind of acquisi-
tion. If the giants transgress, the friends are “pious” insofar as they “look up towards” 
Forms. This might be why the Stranger does not call them gods, whose mythical position 
is now occupied by Forms.13 
Due to the personal character of the dispute, questions of better and worse character 
become explicit. The giants are savage, the friends tame (246b4, c9, d1). The savage ones 
unsurprisingly despise logos (d1). Conversation must be idle and empty from the view 
that being is body.14 How can one even begin to converse with them? They never listen 
(b2-3) and are shameless (247c4). The Stranger says that since their goal is truth and not 
persuasion, consensus from the better is more authoritative than consensus from the 
worse (246d4-e1). In other words, a prior recognition of better and worse character 
																																																																																																																																																																					
way (εὐκόλως, 242c4).” The adverb has been differently understood, but it likely indicates that the 
Presocratics merely disagree with each other but do not fight. They exhibit an aloof or indifferent attitude 
towards discussion, an attitude replaced by seriousness in the gigantomachia. See also Rosen (1983), 213. 
12 Cf. 265e3-5 and the remarks in 5.3. 
13 One can alternatively say that the friends are gods, but that even gods are not the highest beings, since 
they do not have power over the unchanging Forms. 
14 Heidegger (1997), 324. 
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guides any search for truth.15 And so he performs in imagination a non-elenchic purifica-
tion (since he removes the worse and keeps the better giants). The better ones are more 
lawful and willing to talk. 
So personal involvement seems to motivate the Stranger to examine both with the 
question whether they really comprehended themselves in their views of being.16 He thus 
shows himself to grasp the significance of their views. Both are superior to the counting, 
precise Presocratics in two respects. One, they provide a more basic, non-arithmetic ac-
count of being that makes counting beings possible. Two, they talk about being in a way 
that includes their own being in the picture. The Stranger’s refutations therefore have an 
ironic aspect, since they imply that neither the giants nor the friends actually succeed in 
offering an account that properly includes themselves. 
The refutation of the better giants goes as follows. If they admit there is a difference 
between living and non-living bodies, then there must be a principle of life causing the 
difference, something like “soul.” Moreover, “whatever is capable of coming to be pre-
sent in and absent from something else is a being” (247a8-9). (This sounds like a varia-
tion of the principle that only being can be present in or with another being — a principle 
stated in the perplexity of nonbeing.) Now humans become thoughtful or foolish, just or 
unjust. So this means that thoughtfulness or foolishness, justice or injustice — generally, 
virtues and vices — become present in or absent from human souls. According to the 
principle just stated, then, virtues and vices are beings too. The better giants agree to all 																																																								
15 Moreover, this assumes a connection between natural nobility and the power to be in touch with truth. I 
cannot discuss this question here, but see Campbell (1867), 120, who cites Laws 663c for a similar senti-
ment. Cf. Rep. 367e6-368b4. 
16 Benardete (1984), II. 130; Silverman (2003), 154; Mouroutsou (2010), 76 n. 81. 
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of this; they even agree that soul, virtues, and vices are invisible and intangible. The cru-
cial question, however, is whether they will also say that these beings cannot exist with-
out having some sort of material existence. Theaetetus responds that the giants will insist 
that souls have bodily existence, but they will be ashamed to insist the same concerning 
virtues and vices. His answer shows his familiarity with materialistic theories of the soul 
(cf. 246b4-5). 
The Stranger now proposes a boundary mark or defining feature of being that cap-
tures the common nature (συμφυές, 247d) between bodily existence and virtues and vices. 
He calls it power (δύναμις) (247d8-e4). To be is to have the power to actively affect 
(ποιεῖν) something (another being) or passively be affected (παθεῖν) by something. The 
effect of justice might be an active power, while those who become just and are not im-
pervious to it have a power to receive it.17 This definition seems to partly respond to the 
perplexity of image, since it allows images or appearances to be insofar as one can argue 
that they have some sort of power that marks it as beings, no less than their originals 
are.18 
Being as power is also intended to reconcile the giants with the friends. It looks suf-
ficiently general for capturing what bodies and Forms have in common. In other words, it 
seems conceivable that Forms are also “powers” of some sort. This ὅρος of being, how-
ever, let me carefully suggest, is not developed.19 It is not developed because the friends 
																																																								
17 Cf. Cornford (1935), 238. 
18 See Brown (1986), 63. 
19 There are scholars who try to read the Stranger’s doctrines as a development of the idea that being is 
power, for example Heidegger (1997), 327-8; Sayre (2005) 226-7; Dorter (1994), 149-150; Lentz (1997); 
Mouroutsou (2010); Leigh (2010). Ambuel (2007), 113ff. also sees echoes of power throughout the rest of 
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reject it. If being is articulated in terms of power, then the friends’ dichotomy of being 
and becoming must undergo a revision.20 Becoming, like appearance, would be an inter-
weaving of being with nonbeing. It is “not really being” and yet still is something, insofar 
as becoming or bodies have the power to affect and be affected by other beings. So, if the 
friends accept being as power, they would have to concede that bodies also have being, if 
not of the genuine (ἀληθινόν) sort. But they would also have to accept that Forms are 
powers; and this, the Stranger argues, is an implication they will resist. 
The friends’ claim examined is this: “we partake in (κοινωνεῖν) becoming in the 
body through perception, and communicate with (κοινωνεῖν πρός) genuine being in the 
soul through reasoning, and true being, you claim, remains (ἔχειν) always the same in the 
same ways, but becoming [is] otherwise every other time” (248a10-13). This claim con-
trasts body with Form, in terms of becoming and being, or radical motion and radical rest. 
Bodies exist in becoming, the realm of constant change; Forms, the realm of true being, 
has stable, unchanging, eternal character: they remain the same in the same ways always. 
This echoes the earlier implicit notion that εἶδος is the perspective-independent character. 
Forms exhibit what it means to be in an eminent way, more so than bodies, which evi-
dently undergo change, growth, and decay. Like before, this unchanging character is 
made available to us through reasoning. 																																																																																																																																																																					
the dialogue, but the conclusion he draws from this is that the Stranger’s doctrines lead to relativism instead 
of an improved version of the theory of Forms. 
 I am inclined to side with scholars who think being as power is dropped after the review of the 
friends: Campbell (1867), 124; Cornford (1935), 239; Seligman (1974), 33 n.1 (but cf. 32); Klein (1977) 
44-47; Bostock (1984), 106; Crivelli (2012) 89-90 n. 54. Rosen (1983), 217-9 is ambivalent. He might be 
the closest to being right, because while the Stranger never heavily relies on δύναμις to explain the combi-
nation of Forms, neither does he reject it outright and seems to allude to it occasionally. 
20 248a7-8. Benardete (1984), II. 174 n. 66 explains that the μέν unbalanced by a δέ in these lines indicates 
that the friends “have made an improper division between becoming and being.” 
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The two instances of κοινωνεῖν are translated differently because they take different 
constructions in the Greek. The different constructions suggest that the friends do not 
think of the κοινωνεῖν in both cases as the same — a suspicion confirmed by the 
Stranger’s failed first attempt at refuting them.21 He asks the friends what they mean by 
κοινωνεῖν: doesn’t it mean power? For example, when one hears a sound (an act of per-
ception), is one not affected by the sound? Can we not say, then, that sounds exert active 
power on us while our ears have the passive power to be affected by them? Likewise, be-
ing or Forms have a sort of power (active or passive) in relation to our reasoning, while 
our reasoning is also a sort of power that is capable of reaching or having access to 
Forms. The friends concede that κοινωνεῖν interpreted as power is applicable to bodies, 
but not to Forms (248c1-10); in other words, they do think that κοινωνεῖν is as radically 
different as the objects and participants in each realm. Theaetetus does not understand 
why this is the case, however. The Stranger has to first explain this to him.22 The friends 
assume that power, as its name δύναμις implies, is dynamic, and to that extent it cannot 
be conceived apart from motion. So, if one thinks of knowing as a making or an active 
power, and being known an affection or passive power, then true being would be moved 
insofar as it is known. This goes against their insistence that true being is at rest and can 
																																																								
21 Dana Miller (2004), 353 n.15 alone gives a discussion of the possible difference of meaning in each con-
struction. As he puts it, “κοινωνεῖν πρός [+ acc.] suggests that there are two entities that have some connec-
tion, but it does not suggest, as κοινωνεῖν + the dative might, that the two entities as wholes interact.” 
22 Theaetetus’ unfamiliarity with them can be seen in the implied hesitation to answer on his part in 248b6-
9. This indicates that Forms, like elenchus and diaeresis, are also portrayed as “modern” or new events in 
thought in the Sophist, unheard of until now. See also Rosen (1983), 221; Benardete (1984), II. 133; also 
2.2 and 5.3 in this dissertation. 
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be known because it is at rest (248d5-e5). In other words, the Stranger’s attempted recon-
ciliation fails; like the worse giants, the tame friends do not listen.23 
The friends’ reasoning is not very convincing. To begin with, their reliance on lan-
guage is quite weak. There is no reason why the gramatically active form γιγνώσκειν 
guarantees the assumption that knowing is an active power, or why it should affect the 
object known. Nor is it clear that anything that enters into a power-relation must undergo 
change of a kind that makes knowledge impossible. As Vlastos saw, it is conceivable that 
active powers can modify passive powers, where the beings that are affected certainly are 
modified and undergo change, but the affecting beings themselves do not change but re-
main what they are.24 If one puts these two points together, then one can conceive of 
																																																								
23 There is a debate concerning the interpretation of 248d5-e5. The question is basically whether that pas-
sage shows the Stranger criticizing the friends for insisting that Forms are absolutely at rest, or, whether he 
is not actually voicing their reasons for refusing to conceive of Forms as moving. If one reads it in the for-
mer way, then the Stranger seems committed to Forms moving or changing. 
 I read the passage as a counterargument by the friends. There at least three reasons to think this. First, 
in e2, κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον is most naturally taken to mean “according to their [the friends’] argument,” 
as Vlastos saw clearly. And second, those who think that the Stranger is committed to Forms changing are 
compelled to neglect or downplay the importance of 249b12-c5, where the Stranger actually agrees with 
the friends that without things that remain in the same way in the same respects there could not be anything 
for mind or intellect to get a hold on. And thirdly, even those who argue that the Stranger is committed to 
Forms moving admit that Forms only undergo what is called “Cambridge change,” that is, Forms gain the 
attribute of “being known” when they are known, but this does not change the rest of their attributes. But 
this solution seems to trivialize what is meant seriously in the context. It makes the Stranger’s “refutation” 
of the friends look like a sophism. 
 A noncontroversial reading of this passage remains unavailable. Those who think that Forms are said 
to move in the Sophist: Campbell (1867), 127-8; Kamlah (1963), 37; Owen (1966), 337-9; Bluck (1975), 
97-100; Klein (1977), 46; McCabe (1994), 204; Sayre (2005), 225; Dorter (1994), 143-145; Ambuel 
(2007), 120; Gill (2012), 237; Buckles (2015), 319, 323-4. Those who think Forms remain stable and un-
changing – Cornford (1935), 241-2, 245-6; Cherniss (1944), 437-9, (1957), 239, (1971); Vlastos (1981), 
309-317; Seligman (1974), 34; Rosen (1983); Bostock (1984), 107; Heidegger (1997), 332-3; Silverman 
(2002), 154; Crivelli (2012), 88-90 and n. 53; Kahn (2007), 48 and (2013), 105-6. Keyt (1969) is especially 
worth singling out. He holds the intriguing view that this passage does not really abandon the classical view 
that Forms do not undergo change, but nevertheless, a Platonist should have abandoned it. 
24 Vlastos (1981), 311. Turnbull (1964), 32 argues that this is the view the Stranger ultimately implies, but 
that view is not as clear as he seems to think. 
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knowledge as a passive power (a πάσχειν instead of ποιεῖν) –– despite its active voice.25 
And Forms or true being exercise active power, affecting us (that is, having the power to 
generate knowledge in us) without itself changing. 
This weakness leaves room open for thinking along the lines of a δύμανις-based on-
tology, but the Stranger does not go there. Instead he begins a second argument that is 
more successful. He begins with an epiphany concerning τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, “that which is 
in every way,” which both in form and meaning sounds like the extreme opposite of τὸ 
μηδαμῶς ὄν.26 Judging from what he says later, the phrase seems to refer to the universe 
as a whole, which would make it the same as τὸ πᾶν that he uses later in 249d4.27 What 
the Stranger realizes is that while knowledge is not possible if nothing is at rest (in this 
respect the friends are right), it is just as impossible if there is no motion (and in this re-
spect the friends are wrong).28 Knowledge at least involves the existence of knowers. But 
to be a knower is to have mind (νοῦς), and only souls have minds. To have a soul is to 
have life; and whatever is ensouled, that is, the living body, is always in motion (249a4-
b1).29 The possibility of knowledge thus minimally requires the reality of both motion 
and rest. Otherwise put, one must have an account of being that is compatible with there 
																																																								
25 Is this why the Stranger chose the word γιγνώσκειν here? Had he chosen ἐπίσταμαι he wouldn’t have 
been able to make his argument at all since it is a deponent verb. (It would even imply that it might be a 
mistake to analyze knowledge and its object in terms of affecting-affection relations.) 
26 Cf. Rep. 477a. 
27 Traditionally, τὸ παντελῶς ὄν is often understood as a claim about the Platonic god, but this does not fit 
with the rest of the Stranger’s argument. Mohr (1982) reviews this tradition and offers some arguments 
against this reading. The reading presented here is in outline similar to the one proposed by Dana Miller 
(2004), 357-8 (also n. 26). 
28 Ambuel (2007), 121, “the soul is invoked here as means to asserting that all reality is in motion.” (my 
italics) This is a misreading, because the Stranger immediately says that there would be no knowledge if 
there were no beings that rest (249c3-4). 
29 Keyt (1969), 4-6. 
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being both moving and resting beings.30 Contrary to the well-known alternative reading, 
the argument does not at all mean that the Stranger proposes that objects of knowledge 
can undergo change.31 What he claims the friends fail to address is that knowledge re-
quires both stable objects and mobile subjects.32 He concludes that 
 
Str. And whoever wipes away (ἀφανίζων) knowledge, thoughtfulness, or mind in in-
sisting on anything in any way, one must fight him with every argument. 
Tht. Absolutely. 
Str. So to the philosopher who most of all honors them, it seems, there is all the ne-
cessity on account of these things neither to accept from those who say there is one 
Form or many that the all is at rest, nor to listen at all to those who in turn move be-
ing everywhere, but, like (κατά) the prayer of children, to say that as much as there 
are motionless and moving things, being and the all is both together. (249c6-d4)33 
 
The Stranger, in other words, criticizes the friends on behalf of them. He and they 
are really friends because both fight for the cause of knowledge. Philosophy is mentioned 
for the first time since the proem. The philosopher comes to light as himself within the 
horizon of thinking. To honor knowledge is to defend its possibility; since it is not possi-
ble without motion and rest, the philosopher will defend both most steadfastly. The men-																																																								
30 Cornford (1935), 245; Heidegger (1997), 334, 337. 
31 Crivelli (2012), 93-4. 
32 Seligman (1974), 36; Silverman (2002), 154-5. 
33 For an alternative reading, see Dorter (1994), 147-9, who wants to read the prayer as saying that τὸ ὄν is 
at rest while τὸ πᾶν is in motion. It is much more natural, however, to follow most commentators and read 
τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν as a hendiadys. Klein (1977), 47 thinks that the prayer proves that being as power is 
now replaced by a new definition of “motion and rest” (Bostock (1984), 106 holds a similar opinion). As 
Rosen (1983), 224 n. 6 correctly suggests, however, it is difficult to say whether the prayer offers a ὅρος of 
being: it could be making a claim about what any definition of being needs to comprehend (namely motion 
and rest) in order to even be considered as a good candidate. 
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tion of “honor” indicates the philosopher’s self-awareness that his pursuit of truth and 
knowledge is value-laden in preferring knowledge over ignorance.34 The giants refused to 
listen because they were savage and shameless; the philosopher and the friends also re-
fuse to listen out of an adherence to truth. The savage and the tame resemble each other 
like the wolf and the dog. The philosopher is therefore open to conversation and changing 
his views, but only up to a certain point, because there are matters of principle that he in-
sists upon. I note in passing that this is in a way also a limit of logos: complete open-
mindedness in rational discussion is not seen as in and of itself to be worthy of the high-
est honor. 
“It seems” (ἔοικεν) and the comparison with children’s prayer signal tentativeness. 
The philosopher defends both motion and rest because it is the only plausible (ἔοικεν) 
view that makes knowledge possible. He does not actually know whether it is possible. 
The hypothetical and tentative character of the rest of his discussion remains in the back-
ground. 
The Stranger, in the rest of the digression, will deal with whether or how one can 
consistently think of “motion and rest are.”35 Most of his effort is devoted to unfolding 
the implications of this claim and discovering that account of nonbeing necessary for de-
fining the sophist. This might be described as the ontological aspect of the prayer: what 
must beings be like such that they can be known? But there is another aspect, which 
																																																								
34 Rosen (1983), 225. 
35 Seligman (1974), 37; Nehamas (1982); Brown (1986), 63-4; and Dorter (1994), 149. To one extent or 
another, they all note that εἶναι is no longer exclusively attributed to Forms alone. But Dorter’s claim, 
namely that the change in the sense of being is “merely terminological,” must be taken with some reserva-
tion. 
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might be described as epistemological: namely, what must the soul be like so that it can 
come to know? The prayer is asking whether the motions of the soul are compatible with 
a kind of rest that qualifies as knowledge. Since it is conceivable that one and the same 
particular can move in some respects and rest in others, there is no reason why the soul 
cannot be so as well.36 In addition, the possibility that motion and rest can be together in 
the soul was already given before: faction (στάσις) was the soul in the state of bad rest as 
a result of bad motion. So the question is whether there is a good kind of motion that 
leads to a good kind of rest in the soul. The intermediate element that links both the onto-
logical and the epistemological aspects of the prayer together, as Heidegger saw, is log-
os.37 Forms must be accessible to logos; and the soul’s motion must be grasped as exem-
plifying the structure of logos. 
4.2.2 The Perplexity of Being 
The philosopher’s prayer, affirming the being of all that moves and all that rests, 
turns out to be only the occasion for presenting the perplexity, namely the one about be-
ing: 
 
(1) Motion and Rest are most opposed (ἐναντιώτατα). (250a8-9) 
(2) Both Motion and Rest are, and each is. (a11-2) 
(3) The verb “to be” in (2) does not mean “to move,” since that would make Rest 
move, which contradicts (1). By similar reasoning, nor does it mean “to rest.” (b2-6) 																																																								
36 Heinaman (1981), 56-7; Clarke (1994), 56. Examples of opposites being in one and the same thing are 
offered in other dialogues: the spinning top, where the center is not moving while its other parts are (Rep. 
436d-e); and in Parm. 129a-b, one explicit motivation for the hypothesis of Forms is that they explain how 
perceptibles can admit opposites. 
37 Heidegger (1997), 400-1; see the discussion in 5.1. 
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(4) So, “having posited (τιθείς) Being as a third in the soul, as if Motion and Rest are 
surrounded by it, taking the latter two together, looking away from them and towards 
their partaking (κοινωνία) in being instead, you speak in this way that both are” (b7-
10). 
(5) So, according to its own nature (φύσις) Being neither rests nor moves. (c6-7). 
(6) But whatever does not move rests, and whatever does not rest moves. (c12-d2) 
(7) Therefore it seems to be “most impossible” that being is a third. (d2-4) 
 
First, the argument is commonly treated as taking Motion, Rest, and Being to be 
Forms already, even though the Stranger has not yet identified them as such yet. He does 
use the word φύσις, however, which suggests Forms in the Sophist. “Nature” will play an 
important role soon.38 The Stranger seems to accept the position of friends that Forms are 
made accessible to our souls through reasoning. (4) therefore speaks of how they are pos-
iting Being in the soul. 
Second, “most opposed,” whatever it may mean, carries at least two implications for 
the argument. One is that Rest and Motion are posited or thought of as two distinct 
“things” in the soul. A pair of opposites must “each be one and both be two.”39 So since 
Rest and Motion are opposites, they are also two, that is, two different natures, and this is 
why Being is a third. The superlative in addition means that Rest and Motion are not only 
mutually exclusive but also jointly exhaustive. In other words, whatever rests in no way 
																																																								
38 Rosen (1983), 237. 
39 Crivelli (2012), 117 also notices this. 
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must move, and whatever does not move must rest.40 This interpretation is needed so that 
(6) can lead to (7). 
Third, while the argument clearly exploits a linguistic confusion with general names 
such as “motion” (it could refer to the attribute “moving” or things that share the attrib-
ute), the perplexity does not go away once the ambiguities are cleared up, but only be-
comes clearer. Why is it that we cannot help but think of three natures even in order to 
just articulate that the totality of beings consists in two kinds? On the level of beings, 
anything is either resting or moving: there is no third class called beings that neither 
move nor rest and only are. But even to understand this is already to assume three and 
not two in the soul: it is to assume Motion, Rest, and Being, each with its own nature. 
It was said that looking into oneself effects the ascent from one stage to another. The 
perplexity of being, however, signals the impossibility of achieving complete transparen-
cy in this effort; in other words, the impossibility of making the intelligent self into a ful-
ly intelligible object. (Alternatively put, the soul is not a Form.) “Being” indirectly names 
the unattainable ideal of knowledge and self-knowledge. Let me explain. The friends of 
Forms proposed that knowledge is only possible if there were beings that are at rest, and 
the Stranger argued that they excluded their own being that was equally necessary for 
knowledge, which is essentially mobile and dynamic. They forgot that they themselves 
were part of the cosmos they strove to understand; in the pursuit of knowledge, they un-
derstood the cosmos as if they themselves were “above and outside” of it. The philoso-
pher’s prayer corrects this forgetfulness and proposes that Motion must be as well, i.e. 																																																								
40 Gill (2012), 227. 
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that one should look at oneself as an integral part of the world. But the present argument 
reveals that there is still something within ourselves unaccounted for in this way of look-
ing, that “third” something disclosed by the name “Being.” As (4) makes quite clear, to 
think about Motion and Rest is not just to have two thoughts, one about Motion and the 
other about Rest; it is instead to have one thought –– namely that of Being –– about both 
of them. So two becomes three; the logos of the soul increases itself. Solving the problem 
of being would then be identical to revealing that which yokes intelligibility and intelli-
gence together; the perplexity before “Being” is therefore in an important sense insepara-
ble from the perplexity before the being of the thinking soul. It is not surprising, then, if 
the perplexity of Being is not completely solved. 
The force of the perplexity perhaps partly lies in the fact that “Being is” must strike 
Theaetetus as a much more puzzling assertion than, for example, “Motion moves” or 
“Rest rests.” While all of them are tautologous in form, “Being is” stands out as particu-
larly devoid of content and demands an account, and yet no such account is available: any 
account seems to make it something other than what it is. It is difficult to say why this is 
the case. At any rate, the fact that nothing can be said of being reminds one that earlier, 
nothing could be said of nonbeing either. “Nonbeing” is similarly a name so devoid of 
reference or content that even uttering its name is already giving it too much content. And 
“nonbeing” was the name for what is utterly unthinkable, while “being” now emerges as 
what cannot but be thought in order for anything to be thinkable. The Stranger therefore 
tells Theaetetus that the two perplexities are somehow two aspects of the same question 
(250d7-e2). In applying nothing to “nonbeing” and everything to “being,” both nonbeing 
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and being lose any content and yet they are uttered as if they have content. Maybe it is 
wrong to think that nothing can be said of nonbeing and everything can be said of being. 
This is in some sense what will happen in the sequel. 
Perplexity advances an issue by returning to the beginning. The Stranger discovers 
the perplexity of being by going back to the beginning, namely the pluralists among the 
Presocratics who were criticized for failing to inquire into what being is before counting 
beings. In the rest of the digression the Stranger will make progress. But what kind of 
progress is it? Three assertions that occurred in the perplexity of being will now be exam-
ined anew: 
 
(O) Motion and Rest are opposites. 
(E) Motion and Rest are, and each is. 
(N) Being is a third, or has its own nature, apart from Motion and Rest. 
 
The Stranger’s doctrines that are about to follow will be built upon them. The nega-
tivity in ἀπορία will now be transformed into positive doctrines in the following way. 
The Stranger will examine whether all three of these can be consistently said, what com-
mitments or implications they carry. He therefore “goes in a circle” as if these statements 
form the center and he inspects them from different perspectives in logos.41 His logos 
therefore “rests” in the sense of not letting go of these three assertions and seeing them 
survive perspectival tests at each turn in his discussion. As Klein notes, the Stranger’s 																																																								
41 Moline (1981). Cf. Laws 898a-b: circular motion is “most akin and proper to the orbit of the mind.” 
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doctrines “…direct attention to varying aspects of that ever-same aporia whose very for-
mulation already indicates the solution in Plato’s mind.”42 
A couple of anticipatory remarks before I move on. First, the Stranger will not solve 
the perplexity by giving a logos (definition, account) stating the nature of Being. He nev-
er says what Being itself is. Instead, his strategy is to discover what one can say about it 
without an account of its nature.43 It is important to emphasize that in doing so, he is not 
completely blind, either. The hope is that, since Being and nonbeing are now understood 
to be two aspects of the same question, to be able to say something about one should 
bring out some clarity about the other; and in addition, that this attempt at speaking will 
induce or make visible what it is that they only vaguely see. Second, claim (O) will be 
tacitly suggested to be problematic. In other words, while the digression ostensibly pre-
sents a doctrine based on these three assertions, a careful reading indicates a problem 
with affirming all three of them together. 
4.3 The Ideal Logos of Being 
4.3.1 The Intelligibility Principle 
The Stranger proposes a new beginning — 
 
Str. Should we neither attach Being to Motion and Rest, nor attach anything to any 
other thing, but on the grounds (ὡς) that they are not mixable and that it is impossi-																																																								
42 Klein (1968), 86. Cf. Peck (1952), 44, who notices the presence of statement (E) throughout the rest of 
the digression; Gill (2012), 227. 
43 Cf. Prior (1980), 204 (also 207-8). Even Owen, who claims that Plato distinguished two senses of the 
verb “to be” in the dialogue (and this for him is almost equivalent to giving an “eidetic account” of εἶναι), 
understands that making this distinction is incidental to the main task of providing the account of falsehood 
necessary for defining the sophist. 
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ble for them to share in each other, we should set them as such in our speeches? Or 
should we gather everything into the same, on the grounds that they are capable of 
communing with each other? Or that some do, and others not? Which of these, The-
aetetus, will we say that they choose? (251d5-e1) 
 
“They” refers to the predecessors he reviewed and anyone who will investigate be-
ing. The Stranger has the ambition to answer on behalf of all philosophers (including fu-
ture ones!). The expected answer has something to do with the fact that all philosophers 
are concerned with the possibility of knowledge. Regardless of what they might other-
wise say, identifying the commitments of this common concern forms the core of the 
Stranger’s inquiry. 
The question assumes a difference between the order of logos and the order of being. 
“To attach,” “to posit,” “to set…in speeches,” and “to gather” suggest the former: actions 
that we do, what we say or think. “To mix” (μείγνυσθαι, συμμείγνυσθαι), “to take a share 
of” (μεταλαμβάνειν), “to commune” (κοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνεῖν, or κοινωνίας ἔχειν) and 
similar words, on the other hand, refer to the latter, events or relations independent of our 
actions. In other words: the Stranger consciously makes spoken images and “spoken 
originals.”44 (It is also here that the difficulty of distinguishing beings and thoughts about 
them sets in: see 0.4.) For the sake of clarity, below partaking (μετέχειν) will be the ge-
neric term referring to relations on the order of being. Its meaning will be made a bit 
clearer later; right now the following can be said. x partakes in Motion and x moves are 																																																								
44 Failure to attend to this fundamental distinction leads to views like Peck (1952), 39 and n.1, who argues 
that the language of partaking is wholly linguistic (cf. Ketchum (1978) 56-8). Peck, however, occasionally 
shows himself more alive to that distinction (for example in ibid., 59 n.1). Rosen (1983), 229 is right in 
stating that the Stranger “…never shifts (from 249 to 261) from the primacy of forms over language.” 
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interchangeable; to partake something means to instantiate it as an attribute. It also seems 
that x does not partake in Motion and x does not move are interchangeable as well.45 
The distinction between logos and being indicates that what we say is relatively in-
dependent of how things are, i.e. there is a certain degree of agency in speaking and 
thinking. There are options one can choose among. But while it is in a sense up to us to 
choose, in another sense, one does not speak in whatever way one likes. Therefore what 
one says should be responsible, that is, responsive to how things are: speaking and think-
ing ought to be oriented by beings and not words alone. This the Stranger indicates by the 
reason-giving ὡς that precedes the partaking verbs: beings are the grounds of εὖ λέγειν. 
The Stranger examines the first option that nothing partakes in anything else in some 
detail, but only one of those arguments is directly relevant to the perplexity of Being. If 
nothing partook in anything, then neither Rest nor Motion would partake in Being. And 
that, according to the rule just formulated, means that Rest and Motion are not, which 
contradicts (E) (251e7-252a4). Therefore the first option is rejected. What about the se-
cond option, namely that everything partakes in everything and all is reduced to the 
same? The argument against it is supplied by Theaetetus, who confidently says “even 
someone like me can solve this” (252d4). The argument is that “Motion itself would alto-
gether rest (or “stay still”) and Rest itself in turn move, if the two should supervene 
(ἐπιγιγνοίσθην) upon each other” (d6-8). In other words, total partaking between every-
thing contradicts (O). 
																																																								
45 Nehamas (1982), 357. Cf. also Cornford (1935), 256. 
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This leaves them with the third option, “some are willing to mix together, others not” 
(252e2). The entities that mix or do not mix are soon identified as εἴδη / γένη. The princi-
ple is so fundamental that it is repeated several times (254b7-8, 256b8-c3, 259e5-260b2, 
261d1-6). Some critical notions are involved here. First is the idea of determinacy, defi-
niteness, specificity. To be is to be such and such and therefore to not be such and such. It 
is the minimal condition for intelligibility, because to know something at the very least 
involves knowing that it is this (or this sort) and not that (or that sort). Moreover, there is 
also the idea of compatibility and incompatibility, which forbids beings from mixing to-
gether or makes them “unwilling (οὐκ ἐθέλειν)” to do so, to use the Stranger’s animistic 
language.46 To use an earlier example: being human is incompatible with omniscience. 
Compatibility and incompatibility have their roots in the notion of nature or essence. To 
be a nature is not to merely be determinate. It also requires the possession of certain fea-
tures, the loss of which would imply that the thing in question no longer is what it is. Na-
ture is thus a stronger notion than determinacy — a point that the Stranger will make in 
the discussion of the greatest Kinds. In short, the conditions that make questioning possi-
ble lie in the possibility of receiving definite, intelligible answers. From here on, the idea 
that “some mix and some don’t” will be called the principle of intelligibility. 
4.3.2 Dialectic 
The principle of intelligibility leads to the analogy of spelling, an analogy that intro-
duces three points: a clearer notion of partaking, the discovery of dialectic, and the notion 
																																																								
46 Cherniss (1944), 46. Lorenz & Mittelstrass (1966), 132 are wrong to restrict κοινωνία and συμπλοκή to 
only compatibility (or combinability) between Forms or Kinds. 
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of vowel-like Forms. This subsection discusses the first two; the next section discusses 
the third. 
1. Spelling first helps make the notion of partaking between Forms more concrete. 
The syllable SO, as a combination of S and O, while retaining the sounds of each indi-
vidual letter, puts them “together” in such a way that produces a new sound, which nei-
ther letter has by itself. It is not evident to everyone, then, that the sound SO is the com-
bination of S and O, but each letter is somehow “in” it. On the other hand, they are also 
not so fully “together” as to be indistinguishable. The syllable is then in principle separa-
ble into its constitutive elements. This illustrates, as Rosen notes, an important meaning 
of partaking, namely that in this relation, each is open to the influence of the other (like 
the sound S being inflected by the sound O) and yet retains its own identity and separabil-
ity from the other. Partaking as “being together with, and yet remaining itself” is brought 
to light by the spelling analogy.47 
2. The second point made by the spelling analogy is that the person who knows how 
to spell has expertise in letters (γραμματική). He knows which letters “harmonize” with 
which. The Stranger seems to have in mind rules of spelling. For example, no word ends 
with the letter γ, or ζ cannot be followed by ξ, or that σ can be followed by τ. He knows 
which letters “are willing to mix” and which are not. So the person who discerns how the 
Forms combine with each other or not must also have knowledge, and this is called dia-
lectic. It is the greatest knowledge and that which befits the free person, because it is 																																																								
47 Cornford (1935), 251; Gadamer (1980), 148; Rosen (1983), 249-250. Ryle (1960) seems right to think 
that letters and syllables in Plato never lose the meaning of sounded, utterred letters and syllables, even 
though they sometimes include the meaning of written, visible characters. 
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studied for its own sake — it is the knowledge of the philosopher (253c5-7).48 Philosophy 
is mentioned for the second time. What is the knowledge of dialectic, and what sort of 
logos does the dialectician have? 
(i) The expert in spelling does not simply memorize how to spell the words he comes 
across. He also knows the rules that help him spell words he encounters for the first time. 
In other words, what he knows guides him in the encounter with what he does not yet 
know. The dialectician would then also have knowledge of a similar kind, where the rules 
of harmony between Forms would help him discern what is possible or not possible in 
newly encountered beings. His knowledge seems to be a sort of skill that is backed up by 
theory.49 
(ii) The dialectician is the ideal of the philosopher. Only the person who “philoso-
phizes purely and justly (καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως)” deserves to be called “dialectician” 
(253e4-6). This remark implies that there are impure or (perhaps unintentionally) unfair 
philosophers. As the ideal, the dialectician is infallible: he “never considers the same 
εἶδος another or another the same” (253d1-3). 
(iii) The letter analogy suggests that the dialectician “gets to the bottom of things.” 
He knows the ultimate, elemental, and simple constituents of intelligibility, namely, the 
letter-like Forms that cannot be broken down into simpler components. Let us consider 
the difference between dialectic and diaeresis once more now.50 Diaeresis seems to as-
sume that a visible look or a shape can be ultimately analyzed into a structure of Forms. 																																																								
48 The meaning of freedom cannot be discussed in detail here. Good places to start include Rosen (1980), 
158; (1983), 246, 259; Heidegger (1997), 364. 
49 Rosen (1983), 256; Gill (2012), 9. 
50 I will not repeat all what I said in 1.1. 
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Diaeresis would then be the art of spelling. If diaeresis breaks down “words” into letters, 
then it by its own nature does not and cannot divide “letters,” or what Rosen calls the “ei-
detic alphabet,” since letters are not further analyzable. These letters would then be pre-
supposed by diaeresis and investigated by dialectic.51 
The dialectician seems capable of moving freely between elemental Forms and the 
composite “words.” If the spelling analogy is intended to illuminate this point, it could be 
that the two one-many relationships that the dialectician is said to discern (253d5-e2) — 
one of the most obscure passages in Plato — are something like the following.52 The dia-
lectician can see how one word is composed of many letters — this would be the part of 
his knowledge attained through the practice of diaeresis. But he can also attempt to see 
how one letter occurs in the many words that he encounters. Let this stand as my ex-
tremely tentative suggestion as to how that passage might be understood; whether it is 
right or not does not affect the main points below. 
(iv) In Stage Two the Stranger had said that it was impossible for a human to know 
everything, and that allowed them to catch the sophist in his seeming wisdom. The argu-
ment by implication questions the philosopher as well, because he is also interested in 
knowing everything. Here, an alternative to “knowing everything” is implied by the 
spelling analogy. The impossibility of knowing everything was established in Stage Two 																																																								
51 Rosen (1983), 258-9 says that “the Stranger never identifies” dialectic with diaeresis. There are good 
reasons to think that he is right. On the other hand, the Stranger also describes dialectic as “division in ac-
cordance with kinds” (253d1, e1-2); he later characterizes diaeresis as “division of kinds in accordance 
with forms” (267d5-6). To say that they are completely different, then, might be a bit of a stretch. 
52 There is no consensus on how exactly that passage is to be read. A sample of the wildly different inter-
pretations: Stenzel (1940), 96-106; Gómez-Lobo (1977); Klein (1977), 52; Rosen (1983), 259-262; 
Benardete (1984), II. 145-6; Dorter (1994), 152-4; Gill (2012), 211-227. Rosen’s remark that he “sees no 
secure basis for a detailed positive account of what is here meant by ‘dialectic’ ” is important to keep in 
mind when the interpreter attempts to go beyond the text.  
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as if “everything” meant every single “word.” That is not possible for humans. But the 
alphabet, however, that consists in a finite amount of elements that almost everyone is 
capable of learning. The thought is, then, that even if it is impossible to know all the 
words, it might be possible to know the basic characters of each letter and the principles 
of their harmony and disharmony with one another.53 It then becomes possible to know 
everything by knowing the elemental constituents of intelligibility, of what there is to be 
known in general. The hope, then, is that the unlimited variety of things has a unifying, 
intelligible, simple, and clear basis; and grasping that basis would allow one to compre-
hend the former better as well. 
(v) Since one can accidentally utter statements that are combinations of Forms, the 
dialectician’s logos must be of a different quality. The Stranger suggests that the dialecti-
cian διαισθάνεσθαι, “thoroughly perceives” Forms and their relations (253d7). The root 
αἰσθάνεσθαι denotes an immediate access to beings, while the δια- prefix suggests clarity 
and transparency of his vision. One might say that the dialectician’s logos is perfect; it 
makes the relations between Forms visible as he articulates them. His logos and 
διαισθάνεσθαι are thus no longer “separate” acts or states in his soul. It is much more ap-
propriate to say that the dialectician “perceives discursively” or “discourses perceptive-
ly.” There is no “gap” between what he sees and says; nor is there a gap between what he 
discerns and how things are. What he sees and says blend into a “one” that at the same 
time mirrors accurately how things are. 
																																																								
53 Cf. Rosen (1980), 157. 
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This means, in other words, the dialectician’s logos is not daemonic. Daemonic 
means that one cannot help but say more than what one means; it is the gap between the 
two that opens room for inquiry. The dialectician closes that gap: he is the genuine end 
that all our efforts to speak and think gesture towards. Moreover, the dialectician “tells it 
like it is”: the intelligibility of the object is fully comprehended by him and thus he is at 
one with the world or at home in it. This is part of the meaning of the Stranger’s claim 
that the philosopher always “clings to the Idea of Being (τῇ τοῦ ὄντος…ἰδέα) in his rea-
sonings” (254a8-9). This extremely difficult phrase at the very least means that the phi-
losopher strives to know all that there is to know, since only that which is knowable truly 
is. He affirms all that is knowable as beautiful and becomes a beautiful part of it –– that 
is, if he succeeds and becomes a dialectician. 
Dialectic is obviously extremely difficult, if not impossible. The intelligibility prin-
ciple, coupled with the spelling analogy, intimates the dream of perfectly mirroring the 
world in logos. As soon as the Stranger offers a glimpse into the philosopher’s ideal, 
however, he seems to undercut the possibility of achieving it. 
4.4 The Greatest Kinds 
The spelling analogy makes a third point, leading to the discussion of “the greatest 
Kinds”: 
 
Str. The voiced letters stands out from the rest, like a bond that has made way 
through all, such that without any of them it is impossible for any of the rest to join 
(ἁρμόττειν) another. (253a4-6) 
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Letters of the alphabet can be divided into two groups: vowels or “voiced” letters 
without which there would be no syllables, and consonants (the “voiceless” ones) that 
require the vowels to join together. The Stranger suggests that there are two groups of 
letter-like Forms (Kinds) as well, one are vowel-like and the other consonant-like. The 
vowel Forms are necessary conditions of the intelligibility principle. In other words, they 
are what all Forms must partake in in order to enter other partaking relations. The inquiry 
into vowel Forms therefore has a double significance. It is, on the one hand, an investiga-
tion of the universal features that all Forms share. In this sense, understanding vowel 
Forms is an inquiry into what Forms as such are. There is, on the other hand, also reflex-
ivity built into the inquiry. By calling the vowel Forms “Forms,” the Stranger implies that 
the vowel Forms share the same features as the consonant Forms insofar as both are 
Forms. In other words, the task of articulating what Forms as such are must itself be 
“Formal,” that is, conducted through Forms alone. The articulation of what grounds the 
principle of intelligibility must itself be intelligible. 
If successful, the investigation of vowel Forms would be foundational: it would pro-
vide the theoretical underpinning for diaeresis. As foundational, vowel Forms are not and 
cannot become the object of diaeresis. The divisions revealed in diaeresis are consonant 
Forms. Since vowel Forms are what all Forms partake in, it is impossible to make a divi-
sion using a vowel Form as a criterion. One cannot, for example, distinguish hunting 
from selling by saying that one partakes in Being and the other does not partake in Being, 
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because all εἴδη partake in Being.54 Instead, it is because they partake in it that they can 
combine and still be separable from one another in logos. 
The Stranger now takes up a discussion of “the so-called greatest Kinds” (254c3-4). 
“Greatest” seems to mean both that they are general, universal features that beings exhib-
it, and that they are important precisely because of their universal significance.55 “The 
greatest Kinds,” however, does not seem to be just a synonym for vowel Forms; they 
phrase could include very extensive consonant Forms. The Stranger limits the discussion 
to Motion, Rest, Being, Sameness, and Otherness. The last three are explicitly said to be 
vowel Forms later.56 What about Rest and Motion? 4.4.2 will discuss Rest; but Motion, I 
will suggest, cannot be a vowel. It is perhaps one of the greatest because all moving 
things are its members, and thus it is an extensive class.57 
The Stranger also remarks that “the way of the present inquiry” (c8) has limitations 
without explaining why.58 What are the limitations? At least four should be mentioned. 
To begin with, he does not investigate all vowel Forms; for example Oneness (or Unity), 
an obvious candidate, is not discussed. There is also the limitation of purpose: all they 
need is to say something about being and nonbeing (c5-d2) for the sake of catching the 
																																																								
54 Franklin (2011), 18 n.14, speaking of the vowel Forms, says something similar: “because they are coex-
tensive, [they] do not submit to taxonomic distinction.” 
55 There is no reason, then, to assume that only one of these two meanings are intended as Trevaskis (1966), 
101 n.4 seems to do. 
56 Being: 256e3, 257a4, 259a5; Sameness: 256a7-8; Otherness: 255e3-4, 256d12-e1, 258e1, 259a5. In the 
literature, θάτερον is often translated as “Difference.” 
57 Lentz (1997); Gill (2012), 227-236; and Buckles (2015) all argue that all five Kinds are vowel Forms, or 
what Gill calls “structural” as opposed to “categorial” Forms. Gill perhaps offers the strongest case among 
them in trying to develop an important sense in which attributing Cambridge change to Forms is not trivial 
(see reference to Keyt in n. 160). In the end, however, I remain unconvinced. 
58 Discussions of the limitations the Stranger could be alluding to can be found in Klein (1977), 56-7; 
Rosen (1983), 266; Mouroutsou (2010), 126. 
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sophist. That purpose might not require their logos be as exact or comprehensive as the 
dialectician’s. Thirdly, even if their logos were exact and comprehensive, the Stranger 
explicitly ranks logos the second best compared to actually seeing being and nonbeing 
clearly. The Stranger thus marks the difference between his account and the dialectician’s 
as one of sight. Finally, the procedure itself seems limited too. The Stranger proposes a 
two-step discussion. First, what sort each of the greatest Kinds is (ποῖα ἕκαστα ἔστι, c4); 
second, the power of partaking or communion (κοινωνία) each has with one another 
(c5).59 The Stranger does not ask the τί ἐστιν; question, which should precede ποῖα ἔστι.60 
Why does he pass over that question? Is it because, being letter-like Forms, they are ele-
mental and simple, and so it is impossible to give a logos for what each of them is? Or is 
it because he is talking to Theaetetus and deliberately adjusts the level of discussion? 
4.4.1 Nature 
The arguments in step one should not be read as independent from one another as 
they usually are. Instead, each argument is related to the next in the sense that something 
said before becomes the object of reflection later. In other words, logos does not lose its 
daemonic character; it is what carries on the conversation: 
																																																								
59 The text here, and in several places later, uses the expression “the δύναμις of communion” each Kind has 
with one another. This is one of the reasons that some scholars think a “being as power” doctrine is at work 
in a latent way in the dialogue. I have two reservations. First, there are only few hints in the text that the 
Stranger wants us to analyze, for example, “Motion partakes in Sameness” in terms of Motion being affect-
ed by (πάσχειν) Sameness, and that Sameness affects (ποιεῖν) Motion. Basing the claim on occurrences of 
δύναμις alone seems slim. Second, it is not at all clear what the payoff is in switching from κοινωνία to the 
power of κοινωνία. (Leigh (2010), 79-81 argues that it provides an analysis of partaking in terms of causali-
ty, but one wonders if that is a clear advantage.) As Moline (1981), 84-8 and Phaedr. 270c-d show, howev-
er, the difference between εἶδος and δύναμις might be smaller than one would think. 
60 Rep. 354b-c, Symp. 195a with 198c-e, Men. 71b. 
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Initially, (O), (E), and (N) are restated.61 Rest and Motion don’t “mix,” Being “mix-
es” with both (since both are), and they are three (254d7-13). The Stranger infers that 
“each is other than the two but the same as itself” (d14-5). Something new appears: what 
do “other” and “same” mean? Do they stand for two Kinds that “always necessarily” mix 
with the other three, and there are a total of five? Or, have the Stranger and Theaetetus 
really meant “same” or “other” as any of the other three without noticing it (254e2-
255a2)? Theaetetus suspects that the latter might be the case. He might be thinking that 
“same” is another way of referring to Rest. In the review of the friends of Forms, they 
were closely related (249b12-c1); similarly, if the character of Motion is to be otherwise 
every other time (248a12-13), perhaps Motion is the Form doing the work of “other-ing.” 
For this reason, the Stranger first proves that Motion (or Rest) is neither same nor 
other. The language is obscure but the thought is tolerably clear.62 The Stranger is draw-
ing Theaetetus’ attention to the structure of the argument in the perplexity of being. That 
arguments showed how Being was a third followed from two premises: Motion and Rest 
are opposites, but “Being” is something both partake in. To generalize, then, whenever 
opposites both partake in something, that something must be a third besides that pair. 
Since both “same” and “other” are said of Motion and Rest, neither can be Motion or 
Rest. 																																																								
61 They are not repeated with the exact same words, but nothing that occurred in the conversation so far 
would suggest that they have different meanings. For an attempt to argue that they do have different mean-
ings, however, see Mouroutsou (2010), 74 ff. 
62 For helpful discussions, see Berger (1965) (which correctly emphasizes the importance of premise (O)); 
Malcolm (1967), 140-2. Crivelli (2012), 119-136 gives a detailed treatment of the textual issues involved, 
together with his proposed solution. It seems to me, however, that the difficulty is exaggerated. As he him-
self notices, the key is to grasping the argument is that the structure of the argument parallels steps (3)-(5) 
in the aporia of being, a parallelism the Stranger himself notes to set up the argument. 
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In the very course of this argument, Theaetetus and the Stranger have uttered εἶναι as 
meaning “…is the same as…” (255a4-5, a8, and b5-6). In other words, their argument 
tacitly identified “is…” with “same.”63 The Stranger perhaps is the first to become aware 
of this, and so he now proposes to examine whether “we must think of Being and ‘the 
same’ as one thing (ἕν τι)” (b8-10: notice especially the ἆρα at b8). Note the change of 
language. Instead of saying “But is Being ‘the same’?” which would be using the word 
“is” as an identity claim, the Stranger now avoids using εἶναι in the sense of ταὐτόν and 
resorts to circumlocution (“to think…as one thing”).64 So, if there were no significant dif-
ference (διάφορον σημαίνετον) between the two, then “Rest and Motion both are 
(κίνησιν…καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι)” can by replacement become “They [are] the same 
(αὐτὰ ταὐτόν)”65 But then Rest and Motion would be one, which contradicts the assump-
tion that they are two. So, since “same” is neither Motion nor Rest nor Being, it is a 
fourth Form (εἶδος) (c5-6) — let me call it Sameness from now on.66 
																																																								
63 Cf. Dorter (1994), 157-8. 
64 Note that the Stranger’s formulation of question, as it stands in the text, could have very easily led into a 
new question. Since he was forced to use “one” in asking it, he could have asked, Is “one” a Form different 
from the five examined here? 
65 Many scholars have criticized the argument because of an apparent ambiguity (see Eck (2000), 66-69 for 
a review and critique of the criticism). “Rest and Motion are the same” can mean one of two things. Either 
“Rest and Motion are each the same as itself,” which is true, or “Rest and Motion are the same as each oth-
er,” which is false and the way the Stranger intends Theaetetus to take it. In other words, the expression is 
incomplete and can be filled in different ways. But, as Trevaskis (1966), 103 and Bostock (1984), 94 saw 
quite clearly (despite the criticism of the argument by the latter), the proof assumes that, if Being and 
Sameness are one and the same Kind, and if “to be” can be a complete expression when attached to a sub-
ject (i.e. if expressions such as “Motion is” require no complement to be meaningful), then “the same” must 
also be complete when attached to a subject. This is what justifies the Stranger’s argument; and “Rest and 
Motion [are] the same” is a complete expression, and it means that the two are identical with each other. 
66 The proof shows quite clearly that Plato grasped the ambiguity between the meaning of “to be” as identi-
ty claims (usually, when followed by a noun) and “to be” as predication claims (usually followed by an 
adjective). (255c12-d8 and 256a10-b5 are two other places that scholars appeal to in making this claim, but 
they do not demonstrate this point.) Bostock (1984), claiming that there is no basis in the text for claiming 
that Plato noticed the ambiguity, is therefore mistaken (see esp. p. 90-91 and 111). 
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Consider the arguments so far. Sameness is said to be a Form because it is distinct 
from the other three. But is being distinct a good reason to count something as a Form? 
Otherwise put, the arguments seem to presuppose that “other” might just be another name 
for Being, or that being different is sufficient for being a Form. This is why, I suggest, 
Theaetetus hesitates once more when the Stranger asks whether they should speak of 
“other” as a fifth, or think of it and Being as two names for one Kind (c8-11: he responds 
τάχ’ ἄν). The Stranger’s argument is that some beings are spoken of themselves by them-
selves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά), others are always spoken of in relation to others (πρὸς ἄλλα). 
But any instance of an “other” is “always a one spoken of in relation to an other” (ἕτερον 
ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον). If “other” partook in both these kinds of beings, there would be at least 
one instance of an “other” not spoken in relation to an other. Therefore “other” is not Be-
ing either — Otherness is a fifth kind.67 
What the distinction αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα consists in has been an im-
mensely controversial topic. Crivelli (2012), 142-145 classifies five interpretations, four 
of which have found wide support in the past. (1) The distinction is between the meaning 
of εἶναι as existence (καθ’ αὑτά, for example “Zeus is”) and predication (πρὸς ἄλλα, for 
example “Zeus is powerful”). (2) The distinction is between the identity (“He is Socra-
tes,” and in cases like this, usually the verb “to be” is followed by a noun) and predicative 																																																								
67 The proof that Being and Otherness are two Kinds is deeply relevant to the theme of the dialogue, the 
sophist. Proving the twoness of Being and Otherness is the ontological equivalent of answering whether 
philosopher and sophist are two. The Stranger has just said that the philosopher is to the sophist as Being is 
to nonbeing (254a4-b1). And since nonbeing will turn out to be in some sense Otherness, grasping the sig-
nificance of the proof here is crucial for understanding the ontological foundations for the difference be-
tween the philosopher and the sophist. The Stranger’s language here, which speaks of applying names to 
kinds, also reminds one of Socrates’ explanation of his question to Theodorus in the opening of the dia-
logue (cf. 255b9-10 ὡς δύ’ ἄττα ὀνόματα ἐφ’ ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ with 217a7-8 καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα 
τρία, τρία καὶ τὰ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθ’ ἓν ὄνομα ἑκάστῳ προσῆπτον). 
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(“He is tall,” often followed by an adjective) use of εἶναι. (3) The distinction does not 
concern the meaning of the word εἶναι, but is distinguishing between two kinds of beings. 
αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά refers to “beings on their own,” for example, dogs, men; and πρὸς ἄλλα 
refers to beings that always are relative to something, for example, large things are large 
relative to some standard. (4) Like the previous interpretation, this one also interprets the 
argument as distinguishing between two kinds of beings. αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά refers to Forms 
or Kinds, and πρὸς ἄλλα refers to particulars, which are only intelligible through the 
Forms, and thus only “are” πρὸς ἄλλα, that is, by reference to the Forms they instantiate. 
Is one of these correct, or are they all wrong? 
I think (4) is correct. (1) and (2) cannot be right, because the “predicate” sense εἶναι, 
in the Stranger’s presentation, belongs to the work of partaking, and partaking is not a 
Form but a relation between Forms.68 A relation cannot be one of the relata, otherwise a 
regress problem would occur. The αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά / πρὸς ἄλλα distinction, however, 
concerns the Form Being, not relations between Forms. So πρὸς ἄλλα cannot refer to 
predication. This leaves options (3) and (4). One reason for supporting (4) is that the 
Stranger says the following immediately after proving that Being and Otherness are two 
Kinds or Forms: 
 
																																																								
68 Trevaskis (1966), 114; Malcolm (1967), 139-140; Ferg (1976), 336; Prior (1980), 206; Silverman (2002), 
147; Leigh (2008), 120. I put the word “predicate” in scare quotes because, as Prior notes, μετέχειν does 
more than attribute a property to the referent to the subject term, and as such is not strictly identical to pred-
ication. 
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We will say that [the nature of the Other] has gone through all of them. For each is 
other than the rest not on account of its own nature, but on account of partaking 
(μετέχειν) in the look (ἰδέα) of the Other. (255e3-6) 
 
“All of them” refers to all Forms, and not just the five greatest Kinds.69 This is a re-
vealing statement. First, he indicates that Otherness is a vowel responsible for distinct-
ness or separation between Forms. At the same time, however, the Stranger warns against 
confusing being distinct with being a nature.70 As Frede saw, the Stranger’s principle 
stated here is a general formulation of the example “Simmias is taller than Socrates, not 
in virtue of his own nature, but in virtue of sharing in tallness with respect to Socrates” 
(Phaedo 102b-c).71 The principle of Otherness, like the attribute “tall” or Tallness, ought 
to be distinguished from the nature of something. The difference between the nature of 
something and its distinctness from others reflects the notion of nature as having an in-
tegrity of its own. A thing being definite or distinct does not guarantee that it has a nature, 
even though having a nature implies being definite and thus distinct.  
Another way to put this is to say that one must distinguish What a Form is from 
What a Form is not, and the difference between the two is rooted in the twoness of Being 
and Otherness. The answer to the former is grounded in the Form’s nature. The answer to 
																																																								
69 Campbell (1867), 152, 154 restricts πάντων to only the five kinds discussed. This cannot be right in light 
of 256e5 ff., where the Stranger makes it clear that the intention is to talk about Forms in general, and not 
just these five greatest Kinds alone. Eck (2000), 62 n. 16, while agreeing with Campbell’s reading, never-
theless sees it as obvious that what is said here and later is applicable to all forms. 
70 Nehamas (1982), 353. For the possible objection that Otherness itself seems to be a Form that is an ex-
ception to this assertion, see the response in Crivelli (2012), 148. 
71 Peck (1952), 49 and Ambuel (2007), 150 give the exact opposite interpretation of the one offered here. 
Ambuel goes a step further and argues that the Stranger is a nominalist. However, as Frede (1967), 35, 67 
shows, like the passage in Phaedo, this statement has nothing to do with nominalism. 
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the latter, however, is grounded in the relation between that Form and the nature of Oth-
erness.72 Only natures can be spoken of αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, that is, they can be articulated in 
and through themselves because they have that sort of integrity. And the Stranger implies 
that Forms and only Forms are such natures. This in turn means that Forms must be the 
class of beings that are spoken of αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, and thus supports (4).73 
So the twoness of Being and Otherness is an implication of the insight that “negative 
definitions” of Forms are not genuine definitions. What a Form is not, to repeat, does not 
say What a Form is. They might be necessary, even sufficient as well, for isolating what 
is investigated; but all this should not mislead one to think that a negative definition ar-
ticulates the nature of something. Nature or essence, then, is primitive in the sense that it 
cannot be further reduced to definiteness, distinctness, or determinacy. 
To say that the Stranger insists on not confusing what x is with what x is not does not 
mean that diaeresis is a mistaken procedure, or that it has nothing to do with revealing 
nature and it offers only negative definitions. To be sure, diaeresis reveals both what 
something is and what something is not. The sophist is an acquisitor and not a producer, a 
hunter and not a merchant, and so on. However, in each summary, whenever the divisions 
are put together into a logos, the Stranger, as a rule, never mentions the excluded divi-
sions.74 He thereby implies that they were only auxiliary in guiding their search; the goal 
is to reveal what something is and not what it is not. The Stranger’s claim here reveals his 
																																																								
72 Fraassen (1969), 492, 495; Ketchum (1978), 48, 52; Eck (2000), 63 n. 18. I am getting ahead by the tacit 
identification of “is not” and Otherness here. But it does not affect my point. 
73 Silverman (2002), 176-180 proposes virtually the same reading of αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά. Buckles (2015), 325, 
from another direction, also argues for the equivalence of φύσις and καθ’ αὑτο. 
74 Campbell (1867), xi. 
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awareness of a certain danger in the procedure of diaeresis; it does not invalidate the 
methodos itself altogether. 
But while his claim does not invalidate diaeresis, it does seem to make one question 
the proofs he just went through. He has only proven that Motion, Rest, Being, Sameness, 
and Otherness are distinct from each other. Earlier, he also spoke of the “nature of Be-
ing” after demonstrating that it was distinct from Motion and Rest (250c3-7. Note also 
Theaetetus’ tentative response to that inference at c8: σχεδόν). In other words he regular-
ly infers from the distinctness of something that it is a nature, and therefore a Form. But 
if distinctness does not guarantee Formhood or nature, it is actually not proven definitive-
ly that the five greatest Kinds are Forms. But he calls these Kinds εἴδη. Are they Forms in 
the sense of being natures? 
The Stranger had acted against the principle of value neutrality he himself recom-
mended to show the inadequacy of that principle. Perhaps he is aware of what he is doing 
here as well. I suggest the following. The intelligibility principle requires that there are 
distinct natures, and letters in the alphabet were meant to illustrate this distinctness.75 
These natures are named “Forms” or “Kinds,” and they exist καθ’ αὑτά; each is the same 
as itself and other than the rest of the Forms. The Stranger, however, by drawing attention 
to the fact that his proofs fall short of showing that the five greatest Kinds are Forms, in-
dicates a weakness in logos. The Stranger had proceeded on the assumption that he sees 
the five Kinds only vaguely. This means that while he cannot articulate the natures of 
each, he still grasps them to the extent that he is able to see their combinations. He “sees” 																																																								
75 Sayre (2005), 228. 
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the elements only as clearly as he sees their articulations in sentences as true or false. 
This allows him to see the distinctness between the five greatest Kinds without seeing the 
natures of each. The move from “each of the five Kinds is distinct from one another” to 
“each of them has or is its own nature” is therefore not completely based on logos.76 His 
inference, otherwise put, is not deductively valid. This does not mean that it is a bad in-
ference. There are two possible justifications for it. Either conducting these proofs has 
generated a logos-transcending insight into these vowel-like Forms, or the Stranger is 
suggesting that being Forms is the best explanation for the distinctness of these Kinds.77 
In other words, either he expressed an insight without argument, and what he said there-
fore can only be understood by the listener who attains the same insight, or he drew a 
plausible conjecture that is not absolutely free from doubt. The Stranger’s logoi concern-
ing the greatest Kinds, to repeat, remain heuristic. It either induces insight or encourages 
certain conjectures over others; it does not sanction indisputable, necessary inferences. 
This weakness of logos is not explicitly stated; one sees the point by carefully consider-
ing what the Stranger says and what he does. 
4.4.2 Precision 
The Stranger moves to step two, where the partaking relations of Motion with the 
other four are discussed. Four pairs are analyzed — 
 
(r1) Motion is not Rest, because it is altogether other than Rest (255e11-15) 
																																																								
76 This disparity between the Stranger’s utterance of a principle and his failure to follow it is noticed by 
Mitchell Miller (1992), 109-110. 
77 Cf. Schipper (1965), 76. 
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(r2) Motion is, because it partakes in Being (256a1) 
(s1) Motion is not the Same, because it is other than Sameness (256a3-5)78 
(s2) Motion is the Same, because all partake in Sameness (256a7-9) 
(o1) Motion is not Other, because it is other than Otherness 
(o2) Motion is Other, because it is other than Otherness (256c5-10) 
(b1) Motion is not Being, because it is other than Being 
(b2) Motion is a being (ἔστι ὄν), because it partakes in Being (256d5-10) 
((b2) and (r2) are treated as identical in meaning.) 
 
In all the last three pairs, a Motion is X statement is matched with a Motion is not X 
statement. All assertions restate what was already established in step one. The “is not” 
statements repeat the distinctness of the five kinds. The “is” statements were also men-
tioned or implied early on. So in one sense, there is nothing new: the Stranger is still ex-
amining the consequences of the perplexity of being. But the same things are now ob-
served from the perspective of partaking relations. The “is” and “is not” statements are 
related to “partaking” statements as spoken images to originals. A glance at these anal-
yses show that all Motion is not X sentences are understood to reflect the original “Mo-
tion is other than X,” or that “Motion partakes in Otherness with respect to X;”79 and all 
Motion is X sentences reflect “Motion partakes in X.” Note here that the spoken images 
which contain “to be” as the verb are not all analyzed as relating to the Form Being.80 The 
																																																								
78 What are translated as “Same” and “Sameness” (and “Other” and “Otherness”) here are both ταὐτόν (and 
ἕτερον) in the text. 
79 See Kostman (1973), 200. 
80 Rosen (1983), 275 (cf. also 281) comments that “κοινωνία, μέθεξις are not synonyms for [the Form] be-
ing.” See also Moravcsik (1973a), 176 and Crivelli (2008), 218-9. 
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Stranger does not, as mentioned in the Introduction, assume that a treatment of Being is 
identical to distinguishing the meanings of εἶναι. 
The first two statements remind one of the philosopher’s prayer: Motion is not Rest, 
but Motion is (that is, if knowledge is to be possible). In the analysis of the next two 
statements, the status of Sameness as a vowel Form is confirmed during the discussion of 
(s2) (“all,” that is, all Forms, partake in Sameness). No less important than this is the dis-
covery of apparent contradictions. The Stranger explains that “Motion is not the Same” 
and “Motion is the Same” do not contradict each other because they are not meant in the 
same way (οὐ ὁμοίως). He means something like the following. If “[to be] the same” is 
an image for “to partake in Sameness,” and “[to be] not the same” an image for “to not 
partake in Sameness,” then they would be meant ὁμοίως, because a contradiction would 
follow. “Motion does not partake in Sameness” and “Motion partakes in Sameness” can-
not both be true at the same time. But “[to be] not the same” here does not mean an ab-
sence of a partaking relation but the presence of a partaking of Otherness. Otherwise put, 
they are not two contradicting images of the same original, but each an image of a differ-
ent original. 
This is a significant moment, since the Stranger is illustrating how a weakness in 
logos can be overcome through logos. He gives an example of how a spoken image can 
be accurate or inaccurate depending on the original with which it is matched. He clarifies 
this by creating image-original relations within logos. An apparent contradiction now 
comes to light as merely apparent. In other words, the partaking statements now seem to 
have the status of accurate images of being which can serve as originals. They can be 
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stand-ins for originals in logos, and the less precise statements are measured against 
them.81 It looks like here, the Stranger has provided a logos that is appropriate to the dia-
lectician, namely, partaking statements that articulate relations between Forms as they 
are. 
As the previous step suggested, the combination of elements seems clearer or more 
evident to the Stranger and Theaetetus than the nature of each element. Accordingly they 
seem to be more successful here in articulating the partaking relations between the great-
est Kinds. The arguments in step one were only plausible, while the conclusions reached 
in step two seem more certain. But once more, the Stranger seems to undercut or qualify 
the degree to which they succeeded. After all, he also began with asking how many and 
what sort of Kinds there are, and this is not unlike the “precise speech makers” criticized 
for counting beings before asking what being meant. A curious exchange happens right 
after he discovered apparent contradictions —  
 
Str. So, if in some sense (πῃ) Motion itself partook in Rest, it would also be nothing 
out of place to address it as resting? 
Tht. Most correct, if indeed we agree that some are willing to mix with each other, 
and others not. (256b6-9) 
 
																																																								
81 Rosen (1983), 278 argues in a different direction. He asks exactly on what grounds do we know that the 
spoken image is precise or genuine and thus can serve as the original - are there “grounds other than the 
discursive analysis” (italics in the original) available? I think the Stranger is aware of the issue, because he 
keeps on undermining the εἰκών (as accurate, exact) status of his discourse. 
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The Stranger suddenly entertains the possibility that Motion in some sense might 
partake in Rest. Admittedly, he expresses the thought in a counterfactual conditional, 
which seems to imply that he does not accept that Motion partakes in Rest in any way.82 
But even in stating the thought, the possibility is entertained.83 It would seem, then, that 
the Stranger is hinting that Motion must partake in Rest in some sense for knowledge to 
be possible, namely that (O) might not be simply true. But why is the Stranger asking this 
question only here and now? What led him to entertain this possibility at this point? 
I suggest the following. The Stranger just analyzed “Motion is the Same,” and under-
stood that Motion partakes in Sameness. Motion is the same as itself. But doesn’t that 
mean that insofar as it remains the same, it is at rest, and since it is at rest, it partakes in 
Rest?84 Isn’t it the case that “whatever is in the same ways in the same manner about the 
same thing always cannot be so apart from rest” (249b12-c1)? In other words, the 
Stranger is suggesting that one cannot state that “Motion partakes in Sameness” without 
committing oneself to the thought that Motion partakes in Rest as well. The Stranger is 
then drawing Theaetetus’ attention to a problem. But he certainly does not draw his atten-
tion to it in a way that would force him to review all that they have said. And so The-
aeteus thinks that the Stranger is merely reminding him indirectly of the intelligibility 
principle, which, we recall, was partly established by (O). 
In short, “Motion partakes in Sameness” and “Motion resting is impossible” cannot 
both be true. So either the radical opposition between Motion and Rest is problematic, or 																																																								
82 Vlastos (1981), 283-6. 
83 According to Gill (2012), 227, this is meant to “rigorously preserve[s] the appearance” of the opposition 
between the two. Cf. also Crivelli (2012), 162-5. 
84 Cf. Rosen (1983), 279. 
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Motion does not partake in Sameness and is not actually a Form. Sameness and Rest are 
two, and yet not completely separate. This suggests that Rest is a vowel Form: insofar as 
all Forms partake in Sameness, they partake in Rest as well. If Motion and Rest are not 
radically incompatible, then three previous passages where this assumption was used to 
advance the conversation are problematic. Let us take a brief glance at them. (i) In the 
perplexity of Being, it means that “to be” might very well mean “to rest,” since there 
would now be no contradiction in saying that “Motion is” means “Motion rests.” (See 
Step (3) in 4.2.2. This would mean that the friends of Forms could be right after all, who 
identified being with rest: “true being” refers to the resting, unchanging Forms.) (ii) The-
aetetus’ refutation of “everything partakes in everything else” is flawed. It is not a hope-
less mistake, however: as long as there is a pair of opposite consonant Forms, one can 
construct an argument refuting it. (iii) The proof that both Sameness and Otherness are 
distinct from Motion and from Rest also does not go through as presented in the text 
since, as noted, that proof had the same structure as the perplexity of Being, which also 
relied on the truth of the radical opposition between Motion and Rest. This suggests that 
counting the five Kinds as five could be a mistake, that the Stranger might have separated 
in speech what are not so easily separable.85 
So overall, while the intelligibility principle certainly does not collapse because of 
the flaws in these passages, they do indicate the difficulty of affirming Motion as a Form. 
And if it is true that Motion in some sense rests but in another sense does not, this means 
																																																								
85 Eck (2000), 77-8 also saw that claim (O) is wrong, but he thought it was a mere “marginal slip” that 
could be easily corrected. He omits mentioning, however, that it is also operative in the perplexity of Being 
and the correction makes the position of the friends of Forms a reasonable choice once more. 
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that the partaking statements are only relatively more accurate than their imagistic “is” 
and “is not” statements. They are not precise or exact in the sense of mirroring the For-
mal relations as they are: the Stranger still has to distinguish between different ways or 
modes of partaking (as the adverb πῃ suggests), a distinction not offered in the dia-
logue.86 His logos that claims to replace originals once more falls short of them. 
At any rate, the discovery of apparent contradictions is an advancement of some sort. 
The Stranger indirectly instructs Theaetetus how to respond to the sophist’s 
ἀντιλογικόν.87 By analyzing the relation of Motion to Sameness and Otherness, he habit-
uates Theaetetus to affirming apparent contradictions. He now encourages the young man 
to follow along in affirming the last pair yet to be analyzed, (b1) and (b2). And this gives 
them what they need: Motion is-not and is Being. They now have a Form (a genuine be-
ing) exhibiting the look of being something else, i.e. the look of other-than-Being. So the 
Stranger seems to have discovered the ways in which being is not: 
 
Any Form other than Being is a nonbeing, a μή ὄν. (256d11-e2) 
A Form is many other Forms, and is not countless other Forms. (256e5-6)88 
The Form Being is not other Forms. (257a4-6) 
 
The first one generalizes from (b1). The first half of the second statement generalizes 
from all statements numbered 2: every Form partakes in a number of other Forms. Its se-																																																								
86 Gadamer (1980), 110 connects the impossibility of articulating relations between Forms with the impos-
sibility of articulating the natures of each by itself. 
87 Trevaskis (1966), 103. 
88 In those lines, τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν should not be understood as the Form Being (or Nonbeing). They are 
generic expressions referring to all statements that have the form “…is…” and “…is not…” respectively. 
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cond half generalizes from all statements labeled number 1: every Form is different from 
all other Forms (whether it partakes in them or not). The third one seems to be an infer-
ence from (b1). It suggests that if any Form is other than Being, then Being is other than 
it as well. All these three statements can be summed up as saying that any one Form, 
which belongs to the realm of true being, insofar as it partakes in Otherness with respect 
to any other Form, is-not that other Form. The Stranger concludes by repeating that one 
must not feel distressed at these apparently paradoxical affirmations, because “the nature 
of kinds has communion with one another” (257a8-9). 
4.5 Parts of Otherness 
The Stranger broaches a new topic, parts of Otherness. This new topic does not rely 
on the assertions made in the perplexity of being, nor was it part of the two-step plan for 
the investigation of vowel Forms. But he seems to be turning towards demonstrating in 
what way nonbeing is.89 In the previous section, by contrast, he showed in what way (or 
ways) being is not: each Form could exhibit the look of being-not (namely when com-
pared with other Forms). Now he seems to be asking whether there are actual “nonbe-
ings” that exhibit the look of being. He discovers them to be parts of Otherness. 
1. He first sees a difference between ἐναντίον and ἕτερον and explains it to The-
aetetus. The point is that not (οὐ, μή) does not mean opposite to but other than. One ex-
ample is given — whenever one addresses something as “not big,” the small is no more 
meant than the middling. So he generalizes and says that whenever “not” or “non” is at-
																																																								
89 According to the suggestion of Cornford (1935), 289. 
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tached to a word, then the whole phrase refers to something else other than what that 
word refers to. 
It is likely that the discussion of the greatest Kinds led the Stranger to see this point. 
Since Motion is not opposite to Sameness, Otherness, and Being, and nevertheless one 
can still say that it is not each of them in virtue of being other than each of them, he real-
izes that οὐ, μή does not mean ἐναντίον.90 
Second, there is a strong temptation to generalize the Stranger’s example as fol-
lows.91 To be not big means to be of some other size than being big. To be not green, sim-
ilarly, means to be of some other color than being green. This is often known as the in-
compatibility range interpretation: to be not-q means to possess or have some feature 
which is in the intelligible range (e.g. size, color) of q and incompatible with q.92 This 
seems to be a good theory. It is continuous with the usage of “not” in ordinary discourse 
and at the same time made more precise. But an account’s being good is no justification 
for thinking that the Stranger (or Plato) proposed it. The temptation should be resisted for 
four reasons. First, the notion of incompatibility is in this dialogue regularly expressed by 
ἐναντίον. When the Stranger says that Motion and Rest are ἐναντίον, he means or implies 
that they do not partake in one another. But here he explicitly distinguishes this and 
ἕτερον.93 Second, conversely, ἕτερον never means incompatible or incompatible within a 
																																																								
90 Despite the fact that in ordinary discourse, “not big” in many pragmatic contexts just means “small,” and 
therefore οὐ and ἐναντίον are thus used confusingly. 
91 See the review in Crivelli (2012), 184-6, 188-192, who calls this the “quasi-incompatibility” interpreta-
tion. 
92 See e.g. Wiggins (1971), 301; Gadamer (1980), 148; Sayre (2005), 232-4 (his formulation in (1976) is 
more helpful); Pelletier (1990); Brown (2008), 452-62; Gill (2012), 159-161, 168. 
93 Keyt (1973), 299-300; Dorter (1994), 159-160. 
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certain range. It almost always means “other than” or “different from.”94 It would become 
difficult to explain why, all of a sudden, it is used in a very different meaning if one 
chooses this interpretation, especially at a place in the text where ἕτερον and ἐναντίον are 
actually distinguished and not confused. Thirdly, when the Stranger generalizes from the 
example, he does not take the fact that small, middling, and big all belong to the same 
intelligibility range of sizes as relevant for his point.95 Instead he merely says that to be 
“not something” just means to be something else, to possess an attribute or feature that is 
other than that something. Nor does he later specify the meaning of “not beautiful” and 
“not just” in a specific way that unambiguously supports the incompatibility range inter-
pretation (258b8-c5). Finally, this interpretation requires one to analyze the account of 
falsehood, soon to be presented by the Stranger, also in terms of incompatibility, insofar 
as the principle of charity requires that the Stranger’s doctrine is internally consistent. But 
there is no unambiguous textual support that his doctrine of falsehood is to be explained 
in terms of incompatibility either (see 5.1 for discussion).96 
One should not therefore generalize from the example of “not big” in such a way as 
to yield the incompatibility range interpretation. So does the Stranger actually have an 
analysis of what it means to be not big? Does he give one at all? The answer is, I think, 
both yes and no. He does give one below, but it is difficult to say whether it is satisfying. 
																																																								
94 Silverman (2002), 192; Crivelli (2012), 190-2; Eck (2014), 279-280. 
95 As Owen (1971), 232 n. 19 notes. There is room for disagreement: see, for example, Brown (2008). 
96 Even Pelletier (1990), a book-length attempt to defend the incompatibility range reading, concedes that 
the text does not require this interpretation; at best one can argue that it is not ruled out by the text. And 
even that concession is perhaps mistaken. 
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2. θάτερον is clearly at work in “not-q,” and the Stranger is about to explain what it 
does. “The nature of Otherness appears to me,” he says, to be chopped up into pieces just 
like knowledge. Knowledge is one, but whenever a part of it gets ranged over something 
(ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον), it gets its own name, and this is why we have many knowledges and 
arts (257c10-d2). The analogy of knowledge draws attention to three points. First, the 
Stranger himself has been dividing knowledges.97 He has been chopping knowledge into 
pieces. Second, a part of knowledge becomes partitioned through being ranged over 
something. There are two aspects in a partition. One is “ranging over,” which relates a 
part to something else; the other aspect is isolation, the coming-to-be-apart from the rest 
of knowledge. So, a part of knowledge comes to be isolated as music by being ranged 
over notes. And that over which a part of knowledge is ranged gives that part its name. 
The part of knowledge related to numbers (ἀριθμός), for example, is arithmetic 
(ἀριθμητική). That the parts of knowledge get their names from their respective objects is 
not insignificant. It implies that the parts of knowledge are dependent upon the division 
of things or beings into kinds. Numbers as a kind exist before arithmetic did; they were 
not produced or “constructed” by arithmetic. To divide knowledge κατ’ εἴδη would then 
require the dialectician’s knowledge of Forms, i.e. of the divisions among beings. (If this 
is right, and the Stranger has given no indication of being a dialectician, the divisions of-
fered in the text are perhaps images of the dialectician’s division. Cf. 1.1.) Finally, this 
																																																								
97 See Rosen (1983), 119 n.2. 
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isolation or separation does not cause a part of knowledge to lose its character as 
knowledge. It retains its character in common with other knowledges and arts.98 
How is this applied to Otherness? “Get ranged over” is here replaced by “being set 
against,” ἀντιτίθημαι or ἀντίθεσις. So — Otherness is one, but whenever a part of it is set 
against something, it gets its own name, and that is why there are many “others” (i.e. 
parts of Otherness). Each part retains its character as an example of being-other, just like 
a part of knowledge retains its character as knowledge. And similarly, the partition is de-
termined by “something else,” i.e. Otherness alone does not determine how it is parti-
tioned. It is a “whole” whose partition is not explained by that whole.99 The Stranger il-
lustrates this with the following example: that part of Otherness set against “the nature of 
the beautiful,” that is, the Form Beauty. What is the appropriate name (ἐπωνυμία) of this 
part? Theaetetus’ answer is neither “the ugly” nor “the opposite of the beautiful,” but the 
“non-beautiful,” μὴ καλόν. The intelligibility of a part of knowledge required a prior 
grasp of something else: the person who does not understand what numbers are would not 
know what arithmetic is. Neither is the intelligibility of a part of Otherness understood 
without that against which that part is set. The proper names of these parts highlight this 
fact. The character of “the non-beautiful,” that which makes it non-beautiful, lies precise-
ly in this ἀντίθεσις against the beautiful. The non-beautiful is essentially related to the 
beautiful. The converse, however, is not true. The beautiful is not essentially the 
ἀντίθεσις against the non-beautiful. It can be grasped by itself, just as there is a pre-
arithmetic grasp of what numbers are before arithmetic was isolated as a part of 																																																								
98 Cf. Crivelli (2012), 207. 
99 Interestingly enough, Otherness is never called a “whole.” 
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knowledge. The non-beautiful is so fundamentally relational that the Stranger twice refers 
to it not as a class in ἀντίθεσις against the class of the beautiful, but as the antithesis itself 
(cf. 257e2-4 with e6-7), as if the relatum and the relation were the same. 
This suggests that parts of Otherness lack their own natures, and thus are not Forms. 
This is because, to repeat, what a Form is and what it is not are different questions. But 
the answer to “what is the non-beautiful?” is precisely what it is not — namely the beau-
tiful. While each Form is other than any other Form in virtue of Otherness and not of its 
own nature, the non-beautiful is other than the beautiful in virtue of its own “nature,” that 
is, nature with scare quotes, since strictly speaking, it has no nature of its own.100 The 
non-beautiful is not a Form. The Stranger, however, seems to suggest that parts of Other-
ness are Forms. He refers to them as οὐσία, and says that the non-beautiful has no less 
being than the beautiful, and likewise for the non-big and the big, the non-just and the 
just. 
To be sure, there is indirect evidence suggesting that parts of Otherness need not be 
construed as Forms. For example, the Stranger mostly refers to parts of Otherness as 
parts; he refrains from naming each part as εἶδος or φύσις; he does not use the intensive 
pronoun “the x itself” when speaking of these parts, a device usually reserved for refer-
ence to Forms. And later, in the Statesman, he shows himself as being aware of the dif-
ference between a part and a Form (Plt. 262a8-b2). But despite all this, the status of parts 
of Otherness in the Sophist is obscure enough to make one think that the Stranger has 																																																								
100 Silverman (2002), 195. I thus disagree with the view that Plato endorses “negative kinds” in the Sophist 
(e.g. Eck (1995), 22; Crivelli (2012)). See Wiggins (1971), 300 n. 16 for some philosophical and technical 
worries that follow from this endorsement. 
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failed to distinguish them from Forms proper. The Stranger confuses phantom Forms 
with Forms.101 
Theaetetus misidentified the refuter as a sophist, but that did not prevent us from 
learning something about the refuter. The Stranger confuses parts of Otherness with 
Forms, but this does not prevent us from learning something as well. There are four 
points I wish to raise. 
(i) Does the Stranger end up specifying the content of “not-q”? He does: it is funda-
mentally that part of Otherness set against q. To be “not-beautiful” is to possess some at-
tribute other than being beautiful. Is this attribute ugly or ordinary? Is it big or small? The 
Stranger is silent about this, and understandably various proposals have been made in or-
der to specify the content, the incompatibility range interpretation being one of them. But 
the effort to specify what he means might be misguided. The main lesson could be actual-
ly that θάτερον is the source of an ineradicable indeterminacy. “Not-beautiful” is deter-
minate to the extent that the beautiful is excluded; it remains indeterminate in the sense of 
not saying anything more than that. This is why the Stranger’s answer is not completely 
satisfactory, since one would prefer that the function of “not” be made more specific. 
There is perhaps no context- or perspective-independent meaning of “not.” 
(ii) Otherness itself is called a Form or by expressions that clearly suggest so: “the 
nature of Otherness” or “the look (ἰδέα) of Otherness” is used several times. While the 																																																								
101 The understanding that parts of Otherness are not Forms is from Silverman (2002), 193-5, even though 
he does not discuss whether the Stranger committed a mistake. Rosen (1983), 288-9, suggests an alternative 
solution, namely to treat the occurrences of εἴδος in this passage as “non-technical,” i.e. not Forms in the 
strict, Platonic sense. But it seems unnatural to read the Stranger as suddenly switching to a less strict sense 
of Forms in a passage so loaded as this. Peck (1962), 64 went a step further and argues that even τὸ καλόν 
in this passage is not a Form. 
		
180 
parts of Otherness lack their own nature, it does not follow that Otherness itself lacks its 
own nature. Otherness remains a stable look that is operative on other Forms, and it is 
responsible for separating one Form from another. It is remarkable, still, that the cause of 
spurious or phantom Forms is understood to be the work of genuine Forms: a part of Oth-
erness set against a Form produces a phantom Form. Spuriousness is parasitical on genu-
ineness. The sophist was said to dwell in the darkness of nonbeing (254a), and nonbeing 
is about to be revealed as Otherness (see next point). The sophist looks like the human 
embodiment of Otherness: both of them are capable of deceiving.102 Otherness looks like 
the source of deception and the sophist taps that source. 
Otherness does not just make the sophist possible, however. It also makes philoso-
phizing possible. Since it is not the natures of each Form, but Otherness that separates 
Forms from one another, articulation of the structure of Forms is only possible because of 
it. In other words, Otherness makes Formal structure accessible to logos, and thus 
knowledge through logos becomes possible. Otherness, in other words, is the common 
source of both true and false logos. 
(iii) So what is the “Form of nonbeing” (258d6) the Stranger ends up claiming to 
have discovered? The text is inconsistent. At one point, the Stranger says that it is that 
part of Otherness set against the Form Being.103 Later, however, when he sums up his re-
sults, he seems to suggest that “nonbeing” is a generic name for each and every part of 
																																																								
102 Heidegger (1997), 368; Mouroutsou (2010), 121. 
103 258a11-b1: nonbeing is “that antithesis of a part of the nature of Otherness and the nature of Being 
against one another.” Since Campbell, commentators have often added “a part of” before “the nature of 
Being” to make it fit the passage quoted in the next note. As Eck (2002), 77-8 notes, however, this is too 
forced to be acceptable at all. 
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Otherness.104 The first answer, however, makes “nonbeing” include everything that does 
not have the character of being –– but that is precisely what the perplexity of nonbeing 
forbids one from thinking.105 The second answer, then, seems more plausible, which 
means that “nonbeing” is the phantasmic name for Otherness. It is phantasmic because τὸ 
μὴ ὄν is only puzzling when treated as a complete expression. Once its genuine meaning 
θάτερον is restored and the original uncovered, it can be seen that, since to be other is al-
ways to be other than something, μὴ ὄν in and of itself is “incomplete” and requires one 
to specify what it is set against in order to become definite. There is no “nonbeing” as 
such, but only being not-beautiful, being not-big, and so on. The Form of nonbeing just is 
Otherness.106 
This does not mean, the Stranger reminds Theaetetus, that the perplexity of nonbeing 
is solved. Their solution is that when τὸ μὴ ὄν is a disguised expression for being a part 
of Otherness and thus definite, the perplexity is not applicable to it since this sense of 
nonbeing is a sort of being. But τὸ μὴ ὄν in the sense of opposite to being, of being com-
pletely devoid of any attribute including being, still must be and cannot be prohibited; 
and the Stranger “says farewell” to that perplexity (258e8-259a1). That which is devoid 
																																																								
104 258e2-3: “we dared to say of a part of it which is set against each being that it itself is really nonbeing.” 
105 Cf. Eck (1995), 35. As Silverman (2002), 191 puts it, it seems that to be an antithesis to Being is nothing 
else than “to not partake in the Form Being,” which is nothingness and prohibited by Parmenidean logic. 
He is perhaps correct to say that “the form of nonbeing” is basically “parts of the Different taken collective-
ly” (ibid., 196-7, italics in the original). 
106 This is how most commentators take it as well. A recent attempt by Eck (2002) to make this portion of 
the text internally consistent while yielding the same orthodox interpretation still comes at the price of ac-
knowledging a systematic inconsistency on Plato’s part: Eck is compelled to explain away the transition 
from τοῦ ὄντος at 258b1 to αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος at b2 (on his reading, the former means “instances of being” 
while the latter means “the Form Being”) as a harmless carelessness on the Stranger’s part (82-3). It is best, 
I think, to admit the difficulty of the text instead of forcing a solution. 
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of any character, or nothingness, remains a paradox in being thinkable and unthinkable at 
the same time. 
(iv) Otherness is revealed as the source of mistakes through the Stranger himself 
committing a mistake due to it. I do not think this is a slip on Plato’s part, but almost a 
“performative demonstration” (through the Stranger) of the power of Otherness to mis-
lead or deceive. And the point is the same as before: the weakness of logos. Genuine 
Forms and spurious, phantom ones have the same “discursive look.” The only way to dis-
tinguish between them is to “see” beyond what is said in order to understand how the 
non-beautiful specifies a class without a common character being present and is only de-
fined externally through their common lack of a character. This difference, to be sure, can 
be communicated through speech (I am doing that right now); but that speech is not com-
prehensible to the listener if he or she does not try to look at what the speech is indicat-
ing, that is, to look beyond logos. The Stranger’s mistake illustrates the dangers of listen-
ing and responding in the element of logos “with eyes closed.” He is no elenchic god but 
rather the human refuter.107 
4.6 Interim Conclusions 
After this very long chapter, let me offer a brief review before turning to the final 
chapter and conclusion. 
Stage Three, just like the previous stages, consists in partly advancement and partly 
mistakes and inadequacies. What are the conditions for questioning? To question is to 
embark on a quest for understanding and knowing. To question while already deciding 																																																								
107 Cf. Blondell (2002), 357. 
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that no answer is available is to behave like a madman; the quest for knowledge thus re-
quires the thoughtful inquirer to uphold the conditions that make knowledge possible. 
The basic condition is the intelligibility principle. Part of the articulation of that principle 
is presented in the communion of Kinds. Each Form must be a stable, definite, and dis-
tinct nature which forms definite relations (κοινωνία, μέθεξις) with one another. Other-
ness emerges as both the necessary condition for distinguishing Forms in logos and the 
source of the possibility of mistakes in logos. The person who defends and preserves the-
se commitments for the sake of preserving the possibility of questioning is the philoso-
pher; the philosopher who actualizes the possibility of knowledge and the logos appropri-
ate to it in the highest sense is the dialectician. His logos would be εἰκών in the sense of 
accurate image. 
The Stranger’s own logos is an imperfect response to the prayer. The soul is in a 
state of knowledge when its motions are “stable” in the sense of holding to the same 
thought that survives the examination from various perspectives. But the Stranger’s doc-
trines, discovered in this fashion, fall short of the dialectician’s knowledge. The Stranger 
does not aim for the perfect clarity of the dialectician, but only consistency and coher-
ence. And he does not even achieve that: he fails to clearly insist on the difference be-
tween nature and definiteness. Even if he corrected that mistake, his doctrines were not 
accurate, since, as mentioned, “Motion and Rest are most opposed” is not true without 
qualification. And even if that simplified assumption were corrected, he would still be far 
from the dialectician’s state, since it is suggested that logos cannot definitively settle 
what Forms there actually are or even articulate their natures clearly. In short, there 
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seems to be no methodos in logos that would bring one from thinking to the dialectician’s 
insight. (But this does not mean that logos is completely powerless to bring this about; it 
just means that there is no “method” apart from repeated examination.) The presentation 
of knowledge as “judgment with logos” remains εἰκών in the sense of plausible image. 
Socrates’ initial suspicion that the Stranger is an elenchic god is thus not mistaken; it 
is an exaggeration with some truth to it. The Stranger practices elenchus just like Socrates 
does. But it is more powerful in two ways. First, he applies it in a much more comprehen-
sive and ambitious fashion than Socrates. If Socrates focuses on what others think only to 
the extent that his interlocutor thinks the same things, the Stranger’s review of the prede-
cessors and his claim that his results apply to future thinkers make his results less re-
stricted in scope. Second, he states the positive aspects of an aporetic result much more 
readily. For example, if being cannot be only Motion, nor can it be just Rest, then it must 
be both. Moreover, it is important to remember that the Stranger’s doctrines were built 
upon the perplexity of being. If the refuter remains in the knowledge of ignorance and 
stays healthy and moderate, the Stranger beautifies his knowledge of ignorance concern-
ing his perplexity before being. He comes close to behaving like a sophist, who is said to 
present images as originals. 
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CHAPTER FIVE FALSE LOGOS AND THE TRUE SOPHIST 	
At the end of Stage Two, there were three perplexities: the prohibition against non-
being implied the impossibility of image and falsehood. The discovery of nonbeing as 
Otherness seems to suggest now that consistent accounts of image and falsehood are 
availble. But are they? 
The Stranger does not revisit the perplexity of images.1 But does he implicitly sug-
gest a solution anywhere? Recall that images are something else than their original, re-
semble the latter, and can be measured by taking the original as a standard. This sound 
account of images yielded the seeming impossibility of “the interweaving of being and 
nonbeing.” Now, after clarifying the difference between “opposite” and “other,” a non-
contradictory logos stating the interweaving of being and nonbeing would seem to be 
available. It is fine to affirm that an image is not (i.e. other than) the original and that it 
still is. But the solution cannot properly articulate the difference between images and 
originals. Because now both an image and its original have the structure of an interweav-
ing of being and nonbeing. The original, no less than the image, both is not the image and 
yet still is.2 Otherwise put, Otherness alone does not explain why the original is a stand-
ard and the image is what conforms to or deviates from the standard. So, the needed con-
dition that the original is a standard is not articulated in the Stranger’s doctrine. Given the 
																																																								
1 Cornford (1935), 215, 322-3; Rosen (1983), 31 (also 191-3). Cherniss (1957), 264f. seems wrong in say-
ing that the task of the Sophist does not require Plato to address the perplexity of image. This defense, even 
if right, only raises the further question why Plato made the Stranger mention that perplexity in the first 
place. 
2 Rosen (1980), 170. 
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understanding of Otherness, one can be an image of the other. An orthologia of image, 
therefore, is not available in the Sophist. 
While there is no adequate account of what images are, the Stranger does try to show 
that there are images — at least those of the verbal kind. Recall that accurate and inaccu-
rate images were analogues for true and false logos, and accuracy and inaccuracy were 
exclusively features of images, not of originals. Establishing the possibility of truth and 
falsehood in logos would therefore secure the status of logos as image-being. This is why 
the Stranger says that if there is falsehood, then all are full of images and likenesses and 
appearances (260c8-9; 264c12-d5).3 
5.1 The Soul as Logos 
The Stranger reminds Theaetetus that they rejected “nothing mixes with anything 
else” (259d9-e2; 260b1-2). That position means the separation of everything from every-
thing in speech, which is unmusical and unphilosophical (259e2). The complete separa-
tion of all from all entails the “wiping away (ἀφάνισις) of logos,” and “logos comes to be 
for us (ἡμῖν) through the interweaving of εἴδη” (e4-6). And “logos must be one of the 
kinds of beings for us, since without it we would be deprived of the greatest thing, phi-
losophy” (260a5-7, emphasis added). 
Philosophy is here mentioned for the third and last time. ἀφάνισις, in turn, echoes 
249c7, where philosophy was mentioned for the first time: the philosopher was said to 
reject any view that wipes away (ἀφανίζων) knowledge. Knowledge was said to require 
both stable objects and mobile subjects. The middle term connecting the two, the 																																																								
3 Cf. Owen (1971), 250; McDowell (1982), 116. 
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Stranger suggests, is logos. So far he has dealt with the relation between logos and ob-
jects of knowledge, and that resulted in the intelligibility principle (“the interweaving of 
Forms”). The investigation was hypothetical and incomplete. It argues that if knowledge 
is possible through logos, then Forms must interweave with one another as stable, distinct 
natures. The Stranger is about to turn to the relation between logos and the subject of 
knowledge, that is, the soul as the speaking, thinking being. It is meant to show that 
knowledge is possible through logos, because the cognitive capacities of the soul share 
the structure of logos. And in demonstrating that logos can be true and false, he establish-
es the possibility of fallibility of the soul. 
As they did at the end of Stage One, the Stranger and Theaetetus understand their 
present situation differently. The Stranger intends the following discussion to justify the 
philosopher’s enterprise, indeed, to justify his own way of inquiry that has carried on the 
conversation so far; Theaetetus, however, does not get this point.4 In order to motivate 
him, the Stranger therefore entertains another objection from the sophist. The sophist will 
now accept that nonbeing is, that it is the work of Otherness; but this new discovery, the 
sophist argues, does not necessarily mean that the perplexity of falsehood is solved. They 
have still not demonstrated that falsehood is intelligible once Otherness replaces nonbe-
ing in the formula of false logos. They need to now make that explicit. 
The section on logos and falsehood is often read as a part of the Stranger’s digres-
sion. This is correct, but there is also a break of sorts between this section and the rest of 																																																								
4 The Stranger, in stressing the importance of the question of logos, mentions only its significance for phi-
losophy in 260a. It is Theaetetus’ response (260b3-4) that compels the Stranger to return to their initial 
theme, the sophist, so that Theaetetus may “understand most easily” why the discussion of logos is now 
necessary (b5). 
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the digression preceding it.5 There are signs that a descent is under way. A difference in 
the level of confidence can be discerned between the Stranger’s tone in the discussion of 
Forms and how he speaks in the discussion of logos. In the digression, it is the difficulty 
of seeing with clarity and the second-best character of their discussion that are empha-
sized. While he concludes the discovery of the εἶδος of nonbeing triumphantly, he re-
mains tentative and claims to be open to future revisions and objections (251a1-3, 254c8-
d3, 257a11-3, 259b9-c1). This sort of caution is absent in the discussion of logos. The 
Stranger no longer says that someone could persuade them otherwise later. He is rather 
confident that he has the basics of the solution articulated, and even speaks of “seeing” 
(κατιδεῖν) the participation of logos in nonbeing (261a1). This indicates that they are 
“opening their eyes.” As the painting analogy had earlier suggested, logos, after all, is 
more familiar to us than the Forms towards which it opens us. 
The smallest “unit” of a logos is the combination of two different kinds of words. 
The shortest logos interweaves a name (ὄνομα) with a verb (ῥῆμα). Verbs are indicators 
(δήλωμα) of actions (πρᾶξις), and names set signs in voice for “those that do the actions” 
(262a6). Names and verbs are thus related as agents and actions.6 That at least one name 
and one verb are needed to constitute a logos is proven by showing what would happen 
when this condition is not satisfied. The Stranger utters “lion deer horse,” a series of 
names alone, and “walks runs sleeps,” which is composed of only verbs (262b-c). Both 																																																								
5 Cf. Brown (2008), 452. 
6 As some commentators note (e.g. Lorenz & Mittelstrass (1966), 140 n.78; Crivelli (2012), 223-4), it is 
quite clear that the name-verb distinction is not purely grammatical, that is, they are not simply classifica-
tions of words. This is no sloppiness on the Stranger’s (or Plato’s) part. As the intermediary between soul 
and being, logos is neither purely “linguistic” nor “ontological.” But the more precise determination of this 
intermediate state of logos is beyond the confines of this study. 
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weave words together, but neither says anything. Even though the Stranger calls both 
kinds of words δήλωμα, neither can perform the function of δηλοῦν by itself. In order to 
δηλοῦν an action or inaction, or the being or nonbeing of something, one must blend a 
verb with a name, for example, “a human learns.” The claim that a name and a verb form 
the minimal requirement of logos allows the Stranger to distinguish between ὀνομάζειν 
and λέγειν, a distinction similar to the one between reference and meaning.7 Both verbs 
and names by themselves only ὀνομάζειν, that is, they refer to or name actions or actors. 
Only together do they λέγειν τι, say something, which is alternatively expressed as 
δηλοῦν or σημαίνειν, to indicate or to signify. The most telling expression for λέγειν, 
however, is τι περαίνειν, which Cornford nicely renders in his translation as “getting (us) 
somewhere.” “Lion deer horse” doesn’t get us anywhere; “a human learns” or “a sophist 
purifies” does. It is telling because περαίνειν, “to reach the boundary or end,” connotes 
both motion and a stop to motion. It also fits the characterization of the inquiry of the 
sophist as a journey (πορεία, πορεύω) that carries the intention to stop somewhere be-
cause the journey has a goal.8 Logos in this sense of name-verb conjunction means state-
ment or sentence. 
A statement is a whole more than the sum of its parts. It is only in the togetherness of 
name and verb that δηλοῦν, λέγειν, or περαίνειν happens. As a whole, logos has qualities 
that its elements do not have. A statement, unlike its parts, can be “true” or “false.” What 
makes a statement susceptible to truth and falsehood? The Stranger discusses this in three 																																																								
7 Moravscik (1973); Fine (1977), 291-293, 300. Fine’s claim that in the Sophist the conditions of truth and 
falsehood (meaningfulness) and correct naming (reference) are “sharply separated” must be resisted. Re-
mark (ii) below in this section gives the reason why. 
8 As Ryle (1960), 444 puts it, “A sentence expresses the termination of an inquiry” (my emphasis). 
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steps. First, a statement is always a statement of or about something (λόγος τίνος or περί 
τινος). The aboutness condition provides an “anchor point” by which the statement could 
exhibit the quality of truth or falsehood.9 
The Stranger then illustrates the necessity of the aboutness condition for truth and 
falsehood with two examples. The first one is “Theaetetus sits,” and the second, the 
Stranger says, is “ ‘Theaetetus,’ with whom I am conversing, ‘flies.’ ” What are the 
statements about? Both are about Theaetetus. But one is true, and the other false. (I note 
in passing that Theaetetus can only discern the truth and falsehood of each sentence by 
being aware of his body: another indication that they are opening their eyes now.) In oth-
er words, logos is not simple but complex. It says of something that it is so-and-so; in 
combining name and verb, it makes each of them serve a different role in a complex 
whole. Final step: “Theaetetus sits” is true since “it says that what are about you are 
about you (λέγει…τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ).”10 “Theaetetus flies” is false because it 
says — 
 
(a) something else than the ones about Theaetetus (ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων, 263b7, b11); 
or 
(b) that those-which-are-not-[about-him] are [about him] (τὰ μὴ ὄντ’ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα, 
b9). 
 																																																								
9 Owen (1971), 264. 
10 According to Keyt (1973) ὡς should be translated “that.” Lorenz & Mittelstrass (1966), 137 n. 70, how-
ever, argue that it makes little difference if one alternatively translates it as “how” or “as.” Regardless of 
which one is chosen, the key idea of ὡς is that the clause following it represents a state of affairs independ-
ent of the activity of speaking. See also Dixsaut (1992), 58-9. 
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Is falsehood now explained by the discovery that “nonbeing” is Otherness? Now, the 
Stranger clearly intends us to think that his doctrine is at work here by using (a) and (b) 
interchangeably. The obvious suggestion is that once μὴ ὄντα is replaced by ἕτερα, and 
the replacement still articulates the falsehood of the sentence, then the solution works. 
Let’s see whether this is actually the case. Falsehood exists, if logos partakes in nonbeing 
(260e1-2). ἕτερα or θάτερα refer to instances of Otherness. But we learned before that 
ἕτερα are always other than something. Other than what? τὰ ὄντα περὶ τίνος. But this 
requires clarification. 
The idea behind the account is roughly clear. There are a number of actions that 
Theaetetus does, or attributes that he has. When one combines one of the verbs that name 
those actions with the name “Theaetetus,” one utters a true statement. When one com-
bines any other (ἕτερον) verb with “Theaetetus,” one utters a false statement. So false-
hood is articulated as dependent on truth: it is a relation between “that which is not about 
Theaetetus” and “that which is about him,” and this relation is mediated by Otherness in 
some way. Is it possible to specify in what way? As Keyt (1973) has argued convincing-
ly, the text is too underdetermined to justify an answer one way or the other. And one’s 
answer depends on the interpretation of the parts of Otherness passage, which, as already 
suggested, is no less indeterminate than the present one (and perhaps not accidentally so). 
Once the incompatibility range interpretation is ruled out, two interpretations remain. 
They are (1) Flying is other than all the actions that Theaetetus is engaged in; or (2) The-
aetetus is other than any agent that is flying. 
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There is a deeper problem involved. Regardless of which option is correct, the 
Stranger’s account in a way does not explain but rather conceals the puzzle of falsehood. 
He claims that since the agent named by the name is a being, and the actions named by 
verbs also are, names and verbs indicate beings. In this sense, then, no problem of nonbe-
ing arises at all. To be sure, his claim addresses the perplexity insofar as it clarifies the 
ambiguity of λέγειν τι as saying something meaningful, which is now distinguished from 
saying the truth.11 By showing that the structure of speaking is actually the more compli-
cated λέγειν τι περὶ τίνος, he now secures the possibility of saying something without 
saying something true. His account explains why it is wrong to think of a false statement 
as simply saying nothing.12 In another sense, however, the Parmenidean problem of non-
being still lurks in the background. While nonbeing disappears on the level of elements, it 
does not disappear on the level of the combination of elements. “To fly” is false about 
Theaetetus either because flying is other than the actions that are about him, or because 
Theaetetus is other than anything that is flying. But it is precisely the absence of combi-
nation that makes “Theaetetus flies” false. The question remains: how can someone state 
what is not? The Stranger’s answer: by wrongly combining the things that are. But this is 
not an explanation of falsehood; it is a paraphrase that avoids the Parmenidean puzzle. 
The nonbeing of the combination of Theaetetus and flying is precisely the “nonbeing” 
																																																								
11 Wiggins (1971), 275-7; Frede (1992), 399, 413-4, 417. That Plato means to clarify this confusion is sug-
gested by Theaetetus, who is confused about the two. He fails to follow what the Stranger means in saying 
“some words combine and others do not” (261d7, e3-4, 262a12-b2), and seems to have thought of non-
combinable words (meaningless statements) as identical with false statements. See the remarks in 
Benardete (1984), II. 156 and Brown (2008), 452. 
12 As Bondeson (1972), 4-5 explains, the original perplexities were generated by the participants accepting 
an analogy between λέγειν and sight: to speak is to take a direct object. The solution implies that that anal-
ogy was not sound. 
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which is banished by Parmenides and to which the Stranger just said farewell.13 And 
since logos is false precisely because it is mixed with the “nonbeing” of combination, the 
Stranger does not solve the problem of falsehood. 
The Stranger’s analysis of falsehood in terms of Forms (mainly Otherness) cannot 
then be said to be adequate. It solves one problem while avoiding another. On the other 
hand, the account looks better if it is read as a psychological explanation. Falsehood is 
something we do or suffer from. The Stranger indicates this by relying on only himself, 
Theaetetus, and the effort to utter two statements, to illustrate that falsehood exists. The 
aboutness condition, then, means that the act of speaking, λέγειν, intrinsically sets a goal 
to hit. λέγειν is a motion with a direction and aim. “Theaetetus….” aims or intends to say 
something about Theaetetus. To the extent that Theaetetus has definite, determinate fea-
tures, not everything said about him will be true (263b11-12). It is possible, of course, to 
“miss the mark of truth,” i.e. to hit something else. The possibility of falsehood, in other 
words, depends on a prior truth-oriented motion. One is free of mistakes if one does not 
even try to aim at truth. 
That falsehoods depend on the truth-oriented motion of the soul and thus has a psy-
chological basis is confirmed by the conclusion of this section. The Stranger says that 
there are many falsehoods and truths in thinking, judgment, and φαντασία — that is, in 
the cognitive faculties of the soul. All three of them have the structure of logos. This 
means that, insofar as logos can be true or false, they are all fallible because they intrinsi-																																																								
13 Wiggins (1971), 285; McDowell (1982), 133-4; cf. Eck (1995), 41. Peck (1952), 35 n.1 argues that the 
Stranger means that the aporia of nonbeing was unworthy of being dealt with, because it was a sophism and 
not a serious philosophical problem. It could be seen here that that cannot be the case. 
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cally aim at truth.14 The Stranger thus affirms that, since they themselves have been acti-
vating φαντασία, judgment, and thinking to understand the sophist, the possibility of 
making mistakes was present at every step of the way.15 Dramatically understood, the 
threat of the sophist goes hand in hand with the effort to learn. Thinking is the same as 
statement, because it is a dialogue (διάλογος) within the soul without voice, while the 
sounds that flow through the mouth from thinking is λόγος (here, λόγος must mean ver-
balized statement) (263e3-5). The identification of thinking with logos suggests that 
statements never come individually. If thinking is a dialogue, and a dialogue requires at 
least two sentences, then logos is already plural. When an affirmation or denial of a 
statement comes to be quietly in the soul in accordance with thinking (κατὰ διάνοιαν), 
that is judgment (264a1-2). This definition identifies judgment as what one truly judges 
and believes in instead of what one claims to believe in. Whenever judgment is present in 
someone (παρῇ τινι) through (διά) perception, it is φαντασία , or the structure of 
φαίνεσθαι (a4-b3). The claim that all these three powers share the structure of statement 
means that logos is the unifying structure of the soul’s intellectual powers; it is that which 
makes the knower into a “one,” that is, a unified whole. φάντασμα, which was accepted 
as simply true in Stage One, and simply false in Stage Two, now turns out to be, as the 
object of φαντασία, either true or false. Three remarks: 
(i) The soul is understood to be discursive or “logical” in its very movement from ig-
norance towards knowledge. It is already “speaking,” “thinking,” and “believing” before 																																																								
14 Cf. Wiggins (1971), 281: “…the first intention significance of saying that p is to be taken as speaking the 
truth…” (italics in the original). 
15 Cf. Gill (2012), 169. 
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words are spoken. This means that, since statements are true or false because they are 
wholes and not just sums, the soul, in being truth-oriented, aims at wholes. It does not 
only wish to know each part and add them up, but wishes to fit them into the big picture, 
i.e. it always weaves together what it divides or cuts. It does not always succeed because 
the whole is not immediately available to it. It is familiar with wholes that are parts of the 
whole. It tries to discern the parts that it is unfamiliar with on the basis of what it dis-
cerns. In doing so, it inevitably produces an image of the world, which, as image, can go 
wrong or be right. Logos is the desire of the soul to picture the world in itself; the urge to 
discourse is the sign that the soul strives towards truth. 
(ii) The Stranger, in uttering his example of false statement, added a relative clause: 
“Theaetetus, with whom I am conversing, flies.” This is arguably meant to avoid the 
counterclaim that there might be something else named “Theaetetus” that is flying. It 
draws attention to the fact that there must be some kind of “truth” even in a false state-
ment, i.e. Theaetetus must be first correctly identified. This in turn suggests that the truth 
and falsehood of a statement cannot be determined unless the aboutness condition is sat-
isfied without ambiguity. If the Stranger had said, for example, “Theaetetus, who is the 
old man listening to our conversation, sits,” it could be neither true nor false because it is 
unclear what the statement is about. 
This is relevant to the Sophist in the following way. The Stranger has given five def-
initions of the sophist in Stage One, and one of them, we know, is false: it defined the 
philosopher instead of the sophist. The what is question posed in the rest of the dialogue 
can be understood to be asking for the identity of the sophist that would ensure the false-
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hood of that definition. In other words, the genuine definition would make the following 
sentence true once inserted in the blank space: “the sophist, who ___, does not practice 
elenchus.” Diaeretic definition, then, aims to identify the sophist in such a way that the 
other statements about him can be grasped in their truth and falsehood. The question of 
how the Stranger’s definitions of the sophist relate to one another will be discussed near 
the end of 5.3. 
 (iii) While both thinking and judgment are purely λογικῶς in structure, φαντασία is 
not: it is a blending of logos with perception. A couple of examples might illustrate the 
workings of φαντασία. If I see a tree in front of me as I walk on the street, I naturally 
avoid walking into it. Despite not uttering anything, my action indicates a belief (δόξα) 
induced by my perception that there is a tree, and/or that walking straight ahead will get 
myself hurt. When I watch a film at a theatre, even though on one level I am quite aware 
that the violence depicted on screen is fake, on another level I cannot help but turn my 
head away and feel fear or uneasiness when that happens. My turning away betrays my 
φαντασία. The former example is a true one, and the latter false. 
To suggest that φαντασία also has the structure of logos, however, indicates a ques-
tion. We learned from the friends of Forms that “we partake in becoming through percep-
tion in the body.” In other words, if the project of knowledge is the coming to be one 
through logos, this “one” is perhaps not simply the soul by itself apart from the body. At 
least, the Stranger’s definition of φαντασία suggests so. To the extent that φαντασία is 
not without perception, and thus not without the body, the project of becoming a knower 
cannot simply be “learning how to die” in the sense propounded in the Phaedo, that is, to 
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be apart from the body completely. The “eye-opening” discussion of logos, the Stranger’s 
examples of true and false statement, and φαντασία –– all three of them raise a new ques-
tion now: what is the relation of the soul to the body in the pursuit of knowledge through 
logos? What is the subject, who are we, that wish to become knowers? In order to see 
how the Sophist was unclear about this question and is compelled to raise it, let us turn to 
the rest of the dialogue. 
5.2. Return to Diaeresis 
After his very, very long digression, the Stranger resumes the definition of the soph-
ist: 
 
Str. Let us therefore try again, separating in twos the kind put before us, traveling 
both down and towards the part that is always on the right after being cut, and hold-
ing on to the community of the sophist (ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας), until 
we strip away all that is common (τὰ κοινά) to him, and, having laid bare his proper 
nature (τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν), let us exhibit it, most of all to ourselves, and then to 
those most naturally close in kind to this sort of method. (264d10-265a2)16 
 
This passage should be compared with what was previously said about diaeresis. The 
language of similarity and dissimilarity, which structures appearances and visible looks, 
is no longer mentioned. This is because the digression has required that εἶδος be investi-
gated by itself through logos first. To say that Sameness, Otherness, and Being structure 																																																								
16 Sayre (2006), 70 focuses on two features in this description, “keeping to the right” and dichotomous divi-
sion. He argues that they are common features of all the diaereses carried out in the dialogue. While this is 
correct, appearances can deceive. The real point of this passage is less the common features that all diaere-
ses share than how the final definition differs from previous diaereses, a point anticipated by the remarks 
on “community” and “nature.” 
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all εἴδη meant that each of them is identical with itself, different from others, and is a na-
ture.17 To belong to a kind is then not simply to resemble other members of that kind in 
looks, but to exhibit that self-same feature in common: thus now the language of similari-
ty and dissimilarity is replaced by κοινωνία and τὰ κοινά. It indicates a newly found clar-
ity about the object of their division. What determines kinds is now the self-same charac-
ter that also differentiates itself from the spurious looks. 
The notion of nature is necessary. Some one or several features are determinative of 
making something the kind that it is. It is that feature without which it cannot be that 
thing. In addition, nature would explain the other features that it also has. The Stranger 
had implied that the disclosure of the nature of something would successfully answer the 
“what is?” question about that thing. We now see that diaeresis, at its final stage, is used 
for the sake of answering the question of something’s nature, to isolate the whatness of 
the sophist so that he can be seen by himself, in his own light. 
In the first two stages, the question of nature, its relation to the focal feature, and the 
purpose of diaeresis were raised but not adequately answered. One might now say that 
the focal feature is the nature of the sophist. His nature is therefore the concern with 
seeming wisdom. The passage just quoted indicates that diaeresis is supposed to isolate 
this nature from other beings, to locate it among the larger families to which it belongs. 
But the final divisions suggest something more. Nature is also now the principle of each 
division. To anticipate, the Stranger will consistently divide between two classes that 
share the same visible look, but the one class is worse and yet pretends to be the other, 																																																								
17 Philips (1961), 463 notes that in both ordinary Greek and many places in Plato, ὅμοιος and ταὐτόν are 
used interchangeably. It is arguable that the Sophist distinguishes the two as the dialogue proceeds. 
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better class. The bifurcations, in making one the phantom double of the other, thus exhib-
its the pretension to be wise in each and every division of the final diaeresis.18 In this se-
cond sense, nature also “runs through” (cf. 253d9) the divisions articulating him. If this is 
correct, then the nature of something both is isolated for what it is and determines what 
diaeresis discovers along the way. 
5.3 The Final Definition 
The first two divisions locate the sophist within the totality of the visible world. 
Since to make an image is to make it look like some original, one should know what the 
original is that the image-maker looks to. The sophist pretends to be the wise person. The 
problem is that the Stranger needs to articulates the fact that the sophist doesn’t really 
know, and yet he makes images as if he does know. So he needs to qualify the sophist’s 
image-making in several ways. First he only imitates the opinions about the original; se-
cond he imitates them ironically (or insincerely); and finally, as part of his irony, he by 
and large shuns public speaking (despite letting students partake in politics). So the first 
two divisions specify the sophist’s family (as belonging to image-makers); the next two 
divisions determine the character of the image and the original in his imitating activity; 
and the final three divisions specify the manner of his image-making. See the Diagram 6 
below for the last five bifurcations of the final diaeresis. 
																																																								
18 This reading of the final definition shares some similarities with Dixsaut (1992), 46, esp. 75. She argues 
that each division shows the sophist, being the other (on the right hand branch), pretends to be the same (as 
the left hand branch) and therefore threatens to collapse the divisions at every turn. The present interpreta-
tion, in contrast to hers, emphasizes that (1) the divisions are grounded in distinctions of better from worse, 
and (2) it is not the sameness-otherness, but the being-seeming problematic that is the key to understanding 
the last definition (as even Dixsaut admits, the sameness-otherness problematic is actually given short shrift 
in the Sophist). Cf. the passing remark in Ackrill (1997) [1970], 106. 
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In talking about the philosopher and the sophist, both of whom relate to the totality 
of beings in their own way, the Stranger and Theaetetus have gained a broader perspec-
tive on things. So they now begin with looking at the totality of visible things. 	
 Human Phantastics 
 
 Other  Self (μιμητικόν) 
 
  Investigative  Opinion-Imitative 
  (ἱστορική)  (δοξομιμητική) 
 
    Simple (εὐηθής) Ironic (εἰρωνική) 
 
        Public:   Private: 
             Demagogue   Sophist 
 
Diagram 6. The True Sophist 
 
1. Production: divine and human. This division is strange. The earliest examples of 
production suggested that productive arts arose out of human need. No wonder, then, that 
Theaetetus asks what divine production is. The question concerns whether the generation 
(γένεσις) of animals, plants, and inanimate bodies can be modeled on the making 
(γένεσις) of buildings and tools. “The δόγμα of the many” knows only two possibilities. 
Either it cannot be modeled on human production, and nature begets them from a sponta-
neous cause without thinking, or it can, and god made them in accordance with logos and 
divine knowledge. Theaetetus chooses the second option because he supposes that that is 
what the Stranger wants him to choose. The Stranger denies this, saying that Theaetetus’ 
own nature led to this choice (265d6-e2). This division is therefore tentative. 
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“Nature without thought” and “god with knowledge” are not the only two options 
available.19 “Spontaneity that happens in accordance with thought,” for example, can be a 
third option. Regardless of whether natural things are generated by god or not, two things 
can be said. First, nonbeing was discovered to be a disguised name for being something 
else, a ἕτερον. The Stranger draws attention to the element of nonbeing in the initial defi-
nition of production by repeating that definition now: “to bring something that was not 
into being” (219b4-5, 265b9-10). Production, in other words, is making something into 
something else. According to the Stranger, human products are to be understood as as-
sembled or synthesized from “divine products,” the raw material of human production 
(265e4-6). Human production is therefore dependent on something that was not produced 
by humans. In the context of the dialogue, this indicates that the creation of speeches de-
pends on their initial discernment of the visible looks of things. In this sense speeches are 
also dependent upon the natural world (and in the next division, the human world as 
well). This dependency of human logos on nature is now brought out. It is also a division 
of better from worse since the divine is higher than the human. 
Second, human production is already “imitating” divine production in two ways — 
namely the two ways of the sophist and the philosopher. On the side of divine production, 
god’s knowledge and logos produce things. On the side of human production, the soph-
ist’s logos pretends to be god’s. His is the folly of transforming one’s partial knowledge 
into wisdom of the whole. There is also the philosopher’s logos, exemplified by an 
awareness of the distance between his and the divine logos and knowledge and the striv-																																																								
19 Benardete (1984), II.162. 
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ing for it. Theodorus’ characterization of the philosopher as “divine” in the opening 
(much like his judgment that the Stranger is a philosopher, and Theaetetus’ judgment that 
the sophist has an art) now comes to light as correct in the wrong way. The Stranger is 
divine to him, and therefore a philosopher, because he appears close to godlike 
knowledge. But actually the philosopher might be divine in the sense of guarding the 
boundaries between god and humans — which would make Socrates divine but unno-
ticed by Theodorus. A clear difference between the philosopher’s and the sophist’s com-
portment thus comes to light and yet is blurred by the Stranger’s presence. The philoso-
pher and the sophist both wish to be as godlike as possible, even when one of them does 
it in a perverse way. This means, of course, that the philosopher and the sophist belong to 
the same class here and are not yet distinguished. 
The fact that human production and divine production are divided and yet one wishes 
or pretends to be the other reminds one of the division between eikastics and phantastics. 
The Stranger, in other words, seems to have the problematic of being and appearing in 
mind and divides by keeping an eye on the sophist’s nature of seeming wise. 
2. Production: things themselves and their images. This division, like the two bad-
nesses of soul and body, is applied to both divine and human production. Since no correct 
account of image is available, the Stranger is relying on the ordinary, everyday under-
standing of image and original in making this division. Divine images are appearances in 
dreams, shadows, mirror-like reflections, and human images are paintings of a house. The 
Stranger gives the impression that divine images only have divine things as their origi-
nals, and likewise human images are of human things, and that is how Theaetetus draws 
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the distinction himself (266d6-7). But surely one can have dreams of human products, or 
paint images of natural things.20 More relevantly, the logoi of both the philosopher and 
the sophist count as an art of image-making that makes images of everything and weaves 
them into a whole. The Stranger himself has just made a spoken image of divine produc-
tion of originals and images. Whatever this might mean, the division has the same struc-
ture as the previous one. One kind (images) is inferior to and depends on the other (things 
themselves), and yet at the same time pretends to be the other. 
The sophist and the philosopher still do not differ in kind at this point. The sophist 
either puts together beautiful speeches and presents an image as the whole, or tears any 
speech apart with his contradicting art and looks like he knows. The philosopher puts 
spoken images together so that he may discover the whole, or he contradicts all partial 
speeches that pretend to be the whole. The Stranger said that the first division is a 
“lengthwise” cut while the present one is “widthwise” (266a1-2). This reminds one that 
earlier, εἰκών is an image that preserves the proportions of the original in length, width, 
and depth. Does this suggest that the philosopher is the same as the sophist “on the sur-
face,” that is, when observed two-dimensionally? Does it mean that only when one con-
structs a three-dimensional likeness for each of them and also make “depth-wise” divi-
sions can their difference be disclosed? Is the Stranger hinting that the rest of the divi-
sions are “depth-wise” ones? Is a three-dimensional likeness possible in logos? What 
would that mean? 
																																																								
20 Howland (1998), 217. 
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3. Eikastics and phantastics. The Stranger finally arrives at where he left off since 
the digression. But now it must be said that the Stranger and Socrates no less occupy the 
branch of phantastics than the sophist does. This is because elenchus is the reverse opera-
tion of phantastics. Phantastics presents false beliefs as true ones; elenchus restores the 
seemingly true beliefs back to their original falsehood and thus reveals them for what 
they really are. Elenchus “reverse engineers” a phantasm into a “mere appearance.” But 
as the reverse operation of phantastics, both seem to be one and the same art. The person 
who can explain a magician’s sleight of hand seems to have the same knowledge as the 
magician does. The difference is solely that the Stranger and Socrates practice phantastics 
for the sake of truth or making likenesses, while the sophist practices phantastics as if 
there is no such art and everything is eikastic. So all three of them occupy the phantastics 
branch. As in the previous two divisions, the philosopher and the sophist belong to the 
same kind while relating to the other kind in their own ways. 
4. Nameless phantastics and phantastic impersonation (τὸ μιμητικόν). The instru-
ments (ὄργανα) employed to make a phantasm can be either oneself or others. The soph-
ist uses himself as an instrument and this is called μιμητικόν. A μίμησις τῆς φανταστικῆς 
is “someone using his own body and producing similarities of your external behavior 
(σχῆμα) or voice” (267a6-7). μίμησις and μιμητικόν now have the narrower meaning of 
impersonation.21 Since it is not obvious that an impersonator is worse than the imitation 
using tools other than oneself, one cannot say that this division exemplifies the principle 																																																								
21 Benardete (1984), II. 165-6, (1993), 779; Notomi (1999), 280-2. The double meaning of μίμησις as either 
representation or impersonation concerns an important question of mimesis I cannot go into here. Philips 
(1961) contains a helpful overview of how this double meaning of μίμησις develops throughout Plato’s 
works. 
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where the worse pretends to be the better. But there is still a clear sense in which one 
branch is pretending to be the other, namely, the sophist only pretends to be wise by say-
ing apparent truths. In other words, his speeches appear to “imitate” the world as it is, but 
he is only using it to mimic the behavior of the wise. Since the opening of Stage Two, the 
focus has been mostly on what the sophist says, that is, what he does; but now, the 
Stranger finally goes back to the question of what he is (231c2).22 
Here one can address an issue important for understanding the Sophist. Dorter notes 
that it would be absurd to differentiate the sophist from the philosopher in terms of seem-
ingly true and true logos.23 The sophist does not always say false things, nor is the phi-
losopher free of error. The crucial difference, as he correctly emphasizes, is one of pur-
pose or intention. So it makes no sense to define the sophist in terms of phantastics, 
which makes him the master of false speeches. 
Dorter is right that the sophist and the philosopher cannot be distinguished by saying 
that the sophist says false things and the philosopher true ones; and 0.1 already argued 
that truth and falsehood in logos is the condition for the difference between the philoso-
pher and the sophist, not the difference itself. And here, this division makes clear that the 
Stranger does not ultimately understand the sophist to be simply a maker of false speech-
es. Not the sophist’s speeches, but he himself is phantasmic. In the final definition, there-
fore, the production of phantasmic logoi ends up being an accidental or apparent part of 
the sophist’s production of his own phantasmic being.24 																																																								
22 I borrow this doing/being distinction from Notomi, ibid. 
23 Dorter (1990), 42 and (1994), 167-8. 
24 Brown (2010), 166 f. makes a similar point. 
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It is true that the Stranger speaks as if the sophist only offered falsehoods. But his as-
sertions are often surrounded by qualifications. When he said that the sophist says noth-
ing healthy, it was under the condition that the sophist is contradicting someone who 
knows. He also calls the sophist a charlatan and impostor, but that does not imply that he 
always says false things. On the other hand, he certainly does not mean that his predeces-
sors are sophists because of their errors.25 The Stranger does not call them sophists but 
implied that they were philosophers since they were all concerned with knowledge and 
especially knowledge of what being is.  
More importantly, his exaggeration is actually grounded in the respective intentions 
of the philosopher and the sophist, not due to a neglect of them. The philosopher wishes 
to know the truth: the Stranger presents him with his wish fulfilled. No great harm is 
done as long as one remembers that this simplification needs to be corrected. Conversely, 
the Stranger also had good reasons for saying that the sophist offered falsehoods. The 
sophist is, essentially speaking, indifferent to truth and falsehood. So while theoretically 
speaking, the sophist might make true speeches, he is much more likely to make false 
ones, because the majority of his audience is unwise. The sophist either has to bow to 
their level of understanding and package their opinions into something that appears pro-
found and attractive, or present speeches challenging their opinions to make them think 
he knows something. In being unconcerned with the truth of their opinions, he will say 
false things more often than not. 
																																																								
25 Despite the suggestion made by Rosen (1983), 140. 
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This shift to μίμησις as impersonation marks an interest in the sophist’s exterior. If 
the sophist is not wise and yet can pass off as wise, he must at least be skillful in imitat-
ing in a superficial way. The word σχῆμα, referring to external shape, figure, or bodily 
motion, therefore recurs in the next two divisions as well. The sophist is implied by the 
Stranger to be all surface and no substance. 
5. Investigative (ἱστορική) and opinion-imitative (δοξομιμητική) impersonation. The 
Stranger says that there is no division greater (μείζω: 267b8) than that between knowing 
(γνῶσις) and ignorance (ἀγνωσία). This reminds one of noble sophistry, where the dif-
ference between folly and all the other sorts of ignorance was said to be a “big” one. It is 
also a better from worse division. 
How is the difference drawn? Someone who impersonates Theaetetus’ mannerisms 
does so knowingly (γιγνώσκων, εἰδότων). But it looks like one cannot speak of imper-
sonation with ignorance. Since, if impersonation is by definition to be acquainted and 
familiar with the surface and the surface alone, with the mannerisms of the person, igno-
rant impersonation is impossible: one cannot possibly imitate Theaetetus if one has never 
even observed him. This suggests that one simply cannot say the sophist is ignorant in the 
sense of not knowing the σχῆμα. 
ἀγνωσία and ἀμαθία, being linguistically privative, suggest a lack. But since τὰ μὴ 
ὄντα are never simply lacking, ignorance is not solely characterized by the simple ab-
sence of knowledge either. In the case of the exterior or figure (σχῆμα) of justice, or vir-
tue generally, for example, “many people are not ignorant, but somehow have opinions 
(οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες, δοξάζοντες δέ πῃ), and they try very hard to be eager to produce the 
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appearance (φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν) that what they judge to be virtue is in them, imitating as 
much as possible in actions and words” (267c3-6). But despite being in no way just 
(δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες), they do not miss the target of seeming to be just. They hit the 
target that they misidentify as justice itself. This description makes one think of the false 
opinion Theaetetus had, who misidentified a refuter as a sophist but more or less hit the 
target of what it is to be a refuter. As suggested in Chapter Three, the sophist manages to 
make phantasms without knowing the original because he replaces knowledge of things 
with knowledge of his clients’ opinion about them. The sophist “deceives” by reinforcing 
the collective self-deception that was already there.26 This is then δοξομιμητική, opinion-
imitative impersonation. Folly remains the “biggest” kind of ignorance that needs purifi-
ers but encourages sophists. 
If the sophist and his audience are not simply ignorant, what about the knowing im-
personation?27 In calling this impersonation ἱστορική, the Stranger is suggesting that the 
philosopher himself also does not know the original, but is investigating in order to know. 
“Investigative phantasmic impersonation” reminds one of certain Socratic speeches. The 
day before, Socrates had “acted out” the opinion in Theaetetus that knowledge is percep-
tion. He did it so convincingly that the young man can no longer tell whether Socrates 
really believes in it, and Theaetetus should feel gratified that his opinion is shared by a 
reputedly wise man, or whether Socrates is merely pretending to believe in it in order to 
put Theaetetus to the test (157c4-6). In other words, Theaetetus didn’t know whether 
																																																								
26 Cf. Rep. 492a-493d. 
27 Philips (1961), 462 also notes that by this point, impersonation of the phantastic sort is no longer 
“…necessarily bad.” See also Gill (2012), 243. 
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Socrates’ phantasmic impersonation was opinionative-imitative or investigative. The-
aetetus’ uncertainty reflects the indeterminacy of the philosopher’s exterior. The sophist’s 
δοξομιμητική resembles it and is the worse of the two. 
What about the Stranger? While the description of the class reminds one of Socrates’ 
way, the Stranger seems to put himself under this class as well. He first claims credit for 
coining its name, and then explains that this name did not exist because “in ancient times 
there was laziness…concerning the division of kinds in accordance with forms (εἴδη)” 
(267d5-6). This seems to refer to diaeresis; if so, it tacitly acknowledges that diaeresis 
also makes phantasms for the sake of investigation. We saw this in Stage One already. 
This raises the question of the status of the previous definitions (more on that in a mo-
ment). At any rate, this division actually suggests four classes, and the Stranger only di-
vides the two in the middle (see diagram 7). 
The first one, knowledgeable phantastics, would be the dialectician presenting per-
spectival adjustments of knowledge to others. The second one, ἱστορική, would be occu-
pied by the Stranger and Socrates, which sophistry looks like. The fourth one, ignorance, 
is a class without members. The philosopher and the sophist are now distinguished for the 
first time in the final division. But they become confused once more in the next one. 	
   Phantastics		
Knowledge Inquiry Sophistry     Ignorance 
 
Diagram 7. Four (Three) Kinds of Phantastics 
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6. Being naïve, simple (εὐηθής, ἁπλοῦν), or duplicitous, insincere (διπλοῦν, 
εἰρωνική, “ironic”).28 The simple person thinks he knows what he opines to know. The 
sophist is not simple but by his very name “sophisticated.” He shows a different behavior 
(σχῆμα) because of his experience (κυλίνδησιν) in speeches.29 This is so because he se-
cretly suspects that he is ignorant of the things he gives the air of (ἐσχημάτισται: cognate 
with σχῆμα) knowing in front of others.30 The sophist’s claim to knowledge or wisdom 
conceals his fear; he is insincere. 
This is a funny division. εὐηθής does not look like an art but the lack of art. Even to 
be simple in an artful way is already to be cunning or ironic. Many scholars have re-
marked that not only is Socrates (and not sophists) (in)famous for irony, but the behavior 
of the professional sophists in Plato’s works also seems more suitably characterized as 
simple than ironic. They are often depicted as pompous or foolish, giving no indication 
that they harbor any awareness of their lack of knowledge.31 So if we look at those pro-
fessional sophists, it seems more appropriate to classify them along with foolish ones. 
																																																								
28 There are two famous Platonic places where the confusion between irony and naïveté is very lively por-
trayed, namely Thrasymachus’ and Callicles’s accusations of Socrates. The former, for example, first ac-
cuses Socrates of being ironic because Socrates knows more than he lets off (Rep. 337a4); but then he ac-
cuses him of being naïve because he fails to see the reality of the goodness of injustice (343d2). What 
Thrasymachus fails to see is that there is a tension between those two judgments of Socrates. See the in-
sightful discussion in Burger, R. (1985), “Socratic Eirōneia,” Interpretation 13.2: 143-9. 
29 The noun κυλίνδησις literally would mean that the sophist has “rolled himself hither and thither” in 
speeches for quite some time. It suggests a sort of know-how experience and resembles the expression 
“I’ve been around” in English. Cf. Tht. 172c9 κυλινδούμενοι, which describes those experienced in matters 
of the law court. 
30 Dorter (1994), 168-9 misses this aspect of the sophist’s appearing to know, but only focuses on his fear. 
He thus draws a radically different conclusion than the one presented here. 
31 Protagoras, and to some extent Gorgias as well, are depicted by Plato as wiser than other sophists, if ul-
timately less so than Socrates. But the view that the sophists generally behave with the conceit of wisdom is 
not invalidated by these exceptions. 
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Has the Stranger committed a mistake? Or were the sophists so successfully ironic that 
their fear completely eluded everyone except the Stranger? 
I would argue that Notomi is right to defend this division as sound. To put his argu-
ment in my own words: the Stranger’s view of the sophist logically requires it. The ar-
gument can be stated as a reductio. If the sophist did know that he knows, he would be 
simply wise, while also appearing to be so. If he did not know that he does not know, he 
would just be like anyone who has not yet undergone the test of elenchus. If he knew that 
he did not know, he would be a Socrates. The double assertion that the sophist does not 
know and yet is capable of deceiving compels the Stranger to articulate the state of his 
soul in such a way that he is somewhere in between completely lacking awareness and 
having clarity about his own ignorance. This is why the sophist must somehow intimate 
his ignorance, however vaguely. This suggests that on the Stranger’s estimation, the 
sophist comes very close to understanding himself and breaking the spell of folly, but he 
somehow cannot bring himself to face it.32 
But despite the fact that one can justify this division, its surface effect cannot be ig-
nored, namely that it brings Socrates closer to the sophist in appearance. Generally speak-
ing, the simple person says what he thinks, and the ironic does not. Seen this way, it be-
comes possible to say why the sophist here bears the epithet “ironic” instead of Socrates. 
The sophist is ironic while Socrates only appears so. The sophist claims to know and 
conceals his ignorance so successfully that no one spots his irony; Socrates claims to not 																																																								
32 See also Dixsaut (1992), 71 for a similar argument. As Notomi (1999), 291 sees,  “Indeed, the sophist 
disbelieves arguments (logoi) in an ultimate sense; for his inner self refuses to allow what the argument 
shows and to admit his own ignorance.” 
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know and reveals himself so nakedly that everyone suspects him of hiding something. 
Socrates, then, is simple while the sophist appears so.33 The philosopher and the sophist 
have their looks reversed and one’s σχῆμα reveals only the being of the other. 
What about the Stranger? He occsaionally seems ironic in the sense that he believes 
in something while saying something else. He defines the refuter only to ultimately deny 
that he is a sophist. He claims to be value-neutral but violates the principle. He distin-
guishes nature from distinctness and then speaks as if parts of Otherness are examples of 
Forms. But is he also like Socrates, who is εὐηθής but appears εἰρωνική? On the other 
hand, he “gives the air” of knowing something no less than the sophist. He appears to be 
teaching in the ordinary sense, namely communicating something he knows. One won-
ders if he is not even closer to the sophist than Socrates is. But he sometimes appears sin-
cere as well. He confesses helplessness in front of the perplexity of nonbeing; he makes it 
clear that his doctrine of the greatest Kinds is tentative; he frankly admits of uncertainty 
concerning which branch the sophist belongs; and he presents the account of falsehood 
with confidence. Can he be secretly worrying that he is saying what he does not really 
know? He would then be putting himself together with the sophist while leaving Socrates 
in the other class. The Stranger shifts appearances no less often than the sophist. It looks 
like both the sophist and the philosopher visit humans in multiple guises, and it remains 
difficult to determine the Stranger’s identity. 
7. Being insincere in public or private. The Stranger sees “one who is capable of iro-
nizing publicly with long speeches, to a crowd, the other, privately with short speeches, 																																																								
33 Benardete (1984), II. 167; Notomi (1999), 292. 
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compels the person who is alone (αὐτόν) conversing with him to contradict himself” 
(268b1-5). The former is called the politician or the demagogue (δημολογικόν), in con-
trast to the statesman; the latter is the sophist, in contrast to the wise. This division articu-
lates the earlier view that the sophist needs to advertise his skill as politically powerful in 
order to attract the young, ambitious clients. In other words, he himself is private and 
lives the life of the teacher, but appears to be political and concerned with the city. (It is 
arguable that Socrates is almost the reverse. He shuns politics but is deeply concerned 
with the good of his city and her future leaders.) The look of seeming wisdom is now 
identified, isolated, and trapped by the web of diaeretic speeches. The Stranger suggests 
that they weave the sophist’s name together “from the end to the beginning” (268c5-6), 
and a summary of the seven steps just discussed concludes the dialogue. The definition 
claims to have disclosed the sophist’s nature in an accurate or plausible image. But is it a 
good definition? One might answer this by raising two other questions.34 How should one 
understand the first four definitions of the sophist in relation to the final one? Do they 
play a role in the dialogue’s message about the sophist? Second, does the final definition 
succeed in distinguishing ignoble from “noble sophists”? 
Right before the final definition began, the Stranger remarked that initially, the soph-
ist “appeared (ἐφαντάζετο)” under hunting, contest, and exporting, i.e. the branches under 
acquisition. He spoke as if the definition of elenchus did not take place (265a4-9).35 As 
we have seen, however, he did not forget elenchus at all but alluded to it repeatedly in his 
																																																								
34 The Stranger concludes that whoever says that this is (εἶναι) the real (ὄντως) sophist will speak “most 
truly, it seems (τἀληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν)” (268d3-4). 
35 Notomi (1999), 274. 
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concluding diaeresis. As Rosen observes, ἐφαντάζετο strongly suggests that not only 
were the Stranger and Theaetetus wrong in thinking that the sophist was a hunter or mer-
chant, but also that their mistakes were actually due to the sophist’s art.36 Those defini-
tions are therefore false. They are failures because the sophist is not a hunter, nor a mer-
chant, nor an athlete. They captured only his ἐφαντάζετο, his appearances.37 The sophist 
is a producer pretending to be an acquisitor. 
To say that the definitions are false as definitions, does not mean that they are simply 
false. Nothing in the final definition implied that the sophist doesn’t really associate with 
young men, or that he is only pretending to travel, or pretending to sell learnings - even 
though the quality of those learnings is clearly brought into question. In other words, 
some of the features discovered concerning the sophist remain true as statements about 
him.38 They describe the sophist correctly. Moreover, the earlier definitions have an ob-
vious advantage over the final one — they show the sophist in his familiar looks, whereas 
the final one does not give a recognizable “picture” of the sophist. One can see sophists 
around us through the first four definitions. 
As suggested at the beginning of Stage Two, nature should serve an explanatory 
function. If the final definition is superior to the initial definitions, it should explain why 
the sophist appears as he does. In the final definition, wealth, young men, and travel are 
no longer mentioned; the Stranger therefore implies that they are not part of the sophist’s 
nature. The reasoning would be something like the following. To say that the sophist’s 																																																								
36 Rosen (1983), 311. 
37 Notomi (1999), 277-8; Sayre (2006), 64; Rickless (2010), 295. 
38 This distinction sometimes seems to elude commentators, see e.g. Dixsaut (1992), 46. 
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concern is with seeming wise means that he is concerned with fame; to the extent that he 
is concerned with fame, he is concerned with honor, and calling him an athlete is more 
appropriate (if still wrong) than calling him a merchant. The sophist is concerned with 
wealth only to the extent that it is a visible sign of recognition from others of his wisdom. 
He therefore does not pursue wealth for wealth’s sake, but he desires wealth to be the re-
sult of his teaching, of the supposed superiority of his intellect. Wealth is therefore ex-
cluded from the final definition because a person is no less a sophist even if he is uncon-
cerned with it. The association with young men also turns out to be non-essential: the 
sophist’s interest is in people who are liable to be deceived but look up to the wisdom of 
speaking in public. Those are the people that would honor him, and one can find many of 
them among young men. What about traveling? The Stranger seems to mean traveling per 
se cannot count as what makes a person a sophist — otherwise he and Theodorus would 
become suspicious. Only if one travels for the sake of achieving fame for wisdom does 
one become a sophist. The sophist either wishes to exploit the unequal distribution of 
knowledge across cities, or simply wants to ensure his fame across political boundaries. 
Insofar as the initial definitions fail to make the sophist’s intention clear, and the final one 
explains why he appears the way he does, the final definition is sound. 
However, once wealth, young men, and travel disappear from the definition, the 
sophist looks even more like the refuter, who talks to anyone suffering from folly, and 
appears indifferent to being rich or travel. The final definition seems to bring the sophist 
and the refuter closer to each other, and the difference between Socrates and a sophist is 
actually obscured by those omissions. And some of the divisions in the final definition — 
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for example, irony and privacy — even seem to deliberately allude to Socrates. We thus 
enter the second question: does the dialogue ultimately present only ignoble sophists as 
sophists? It looks as if the Stranger did not correct Theaetetus’ mistake at all. But as sug-
gested above, what happens is that the final definition actually identifies the appearance 
of the philosopher with the being of the sophist. The philosopher appears as an ironic 
impersonator of opinions in private; the sophist is an ironic impersonator of opinions in 
private. The εἰκών of the sophist is a φάντασμα of the philosopher, and it cannot but be 
so, because that is what a sophist really is.39 The final definition functions as the middle 
term between the first four definitions and the fifth one. The relationship between the def-
initions is therefore something like the following: 	
Hunter, Merchant, Athlete  True Sophist  Refuter (Noble “Sophist”) 
 
 Appearing       Being 
 
                         
Sophist 
     Appearing  Being 
 
 
   Philosopher 
 
Diagram 8. The Relation Betweeen The Six (Seven) Definitions 	
The final definition is therefore correct, since the relation between the sophist and 
the philosopher is now made exact. This is not a common opinion.40 But it both articu-																																																								
39 Nehamas (1999a), 118 claims that this is Plato’s view of the sophist, but his evidence is not the final def-
inition here, but the Republic instead. 
40 Cornford (1935); Moravcsik (1973); Notomi (1999), Ch. 8; Lott (2012); Sayre (2006), 70-2 defend this 
view. Gill (2012), 170-1 leans towards this view but wishes to say that it is ultimately flawed. Dorter 
(1994) and Brown (2010) are notable scholars who argue that the final definition fails to define the sophist, 
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lates the sophist’s skill at seeming wise through logos, and explains why he must be con-
fused with the philosopher. As one can see from the diagram, it also links the first four 
definitions of the sophist with the definition of elenchus by the distinction between being 
and appearing. 
Let me return to the plot of the Sophist again. If the Stranger’s refutation is just, then 
Socrates has made himself needlessly confused with the sophists. The emphasis is on 
“needlessly,” which implies that there is an alternative to distinguish the philosopher 
from sophists; otherwise Socrates would be blameless. The fact that Theodorus calls the 
Stranger a philosopher initially makes one hopeful that the Stranger can show Socrates 
how this is to be done. 
But the Stranger ends up vindicating Socrates, precisely because he appears to 
charge him of being a sophist. To repeat: after the discussion of noble sophistry, the 
Stranger was compelled to save Socrates from looking like a sophist too, because he him-
self needs the Socratic art. But now, the Stranger in fact admits that philosophers and 
sophists are not just confused because of the ignorance of the many, but they really are 
confused, that is, even for someone who is not ignorant. What the final definition articu-
lates is the indeterminate character of logos. Like the abstract discussion of the commun-
ion of Kinds, the final definition can also be understood as an image of extremely differ-
ent originals. It is reasonable to suppose that Theaetetus is not at all in a position to un-
derstand the definition properly. It would appear accurate to him as a spoken image of 																																																																																																																																																																					
but for different reasons.  Rosen (1983) argues that the final definition is meant to accuse Socrates of being 
a sophist all along. The ending of the passage on elenchus, however, seems to speak against this view. Is 
there a reason why the Stranger changed his mind during the conversation? 
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both the sophist and the philosopher. The crucial task was not just to clarify the differ-
ence between the philosopher and the sophist, but to do this to a non-philosopher of The-
aetetus’ nature. And that task is a failure. The Stranger’s “theoretical” victory is a “prac-
tical” failure. The philosopher’s pursuit of knowledge through logos does not protect him 
from being misunderstood. Socrates is perhaps quite satisfied, I suppose, that the defini-
tion is a true or ironic one, because it states what he said in the beginning all along. The 
Stranger proves Socrates’ innocence by catching him in the end: there is no way for a 
philosopher to avoid looking like a sophist in front of non-philosophers. 
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
1. The Stranger’s complaint is unjust not because his doctrines are false, inconsistent, 
or hypothetical, but because his education of Theaetetus cannot satisfy Socrates’ initial 
request. No more than Socrates could he avoid appropriating what he himself understood 
to be sophistry in the inquiry into the sophist. “Seeing images as originals” is integral to 
the process of striving towards “seeing images for what they are.” 
There is another way of expressing the same point. The Stranger’s failure is not due 
to attempting a “technical” solution to the problem of the sophist, where the sophist ad-
mits of no technical solution, whatever that might mean.1 Nor is it because he tries to de-
fine value-neutrally what can only be grasped in a value-laden way.2 The present inter-
pretation shows that his final definition no longer follows the principle of value-
neutrality. Nor does he fail because the only refutation of the sophist is ethical or practi-
cal and cannot possibly be theoretical or ontological.3 This might as well be true, but I 
wonder if the Sophist really meant to convey this: so much of the text seems redundant or 
unnecessary if that was all it meant to say. On the reading offered here, the Stranger’s 
failure is due to the limits of logos and the sort of knowledge achievable by it. 
I come back to the difference between me, who read internet articles on mathematics, 
and the mathematician. Is the difference between us one in terms of logos? The answer 																																																								
1 This is occasionally the view put forward by Rosen (1983), 8, 22, 308. 
2 Dorter (1994), 14-6. 
3 According to Rosen, ibid., 23-4, this is the real difference between Socrates and the Stranger: the great 
Athenian philosopher attempts only a practical refutation (but one wonders if that is correct, given that part 
of Socrates’ thesis in the Gorgias is that sophistry is not an art, i.e. it is an assertion about the sophist’s ep-
istemic state). Cf. Howland (1998), 170. 
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suggested by the Sophist is not a simple yes or no. At first glance, the answer is no, since 
it is obviously possible that we can utter the same sentences that prove a theorem, so the 
difference must be sought otherwise. One might say that the mathematician understands 
the proofs more deeply. However, what does understanding more deeply mean? One 
thing it does mean is that he is more capable than I am in responding to questions and 
confusions. If someone does not understand one or several steps in the proof, he is capa-
ble of explaining to this person what is going on; if someone says something wrong he 
can detect it. So there really is a difference in our logoi. While we say the same thing, the 
mathematician’s logos is nevertheless superior to mine, since it is rooted in the capacity 
of his soul to respond to questions, to teach and communicate, and to relate what he said 
to other things. What he says is coherent with whatever he has not uttered and in this 
sense, his logos is actually more extensive and comprehensive than what he has uttered. 
(Genuine logos was eventually said to be διάνοια in the soul. The utterance, the verbali-
zation of thinking is secondary, derivative, partial, and sometimes even misleading.) The 
mathematician’s thoughts are more connected and coherent with one another, and thus 
his state is more of a robust “one” with respect to mathematics than mine. 
Not only does the logos in his soul contain more connections, but it also possesses 
the right kinds of connections. I might associate and connect what I read about mathemat-
ics with other things I understand or know, but much of it will be “fluff,” superficial, or 
mistaken. But what makes the mathematician’s connections “right” or true and mine false 
or unsound? Some of them might be a matter of consistency and coherence. In other 
words, the connections I make are wrong because they lead to contradictory results. So 
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part of what determines the correctness of the connections is still a matter of logos, a 
“logical” affair. But there are connections that do not suffer from contradictions or incon-
sistencies and yet are nevertheless wrong. Ultimately this leads to the idea that the math-
ematician has a kind of intuition that is irreducible to logos and rather informs why he 
makes the connections he does. The difference between me and the mathematician there-
fore both is and is not a matter of the qualities of our respective logoi. 
By the end of the Sophist, an analogous situation is presented. The Stranger would 
corrrespond to the mathematician. He gives a display of what he claims to have heard and 
memorized, but his logos, as recorded in the Sophist, is clearly a reflection, or even a re-
vision, of what he heard. In addition, he adjusted his own examined thoughts to the level 
of Theaetetus. There is therefore indirect evidence that he, like the mathematician, has an 
overall better grasp of what he says. Theaetetus would be like me, who listens to the 
speech and makes some effort to follow and understand. By the end of the Sophist, he and 
the Stranger have shared a logos, but they are still in different epistemic states with re-
spect to the sophist. This shared logos, the dialogue in front of us, is but the tip of the ice-
berg of the resourceful logos in the Stranger’s soul. By contrast, it is all that Theaetetus 
has. 
Theaetetus’ knowledge of the sophist is not at a satisfactory level. If he can articulate 
the difference between the sophist and the philosopher, but is still unable to recognize a 
sophist (or a philosopher) when he sees one, his state seems to be somewhat unsatisfying 
as “knowledge” of the sophist. Theaetetus seems to lack what would allow him to “con-
nect” the final definition correctly to its original. Otherwise put, at the end of the conver-
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sation, he is like someone who has never seen a bird in his life, but has read plenty of 
books on ornithology that contained no pictures. As explained, he could very well see 
Socrates in the definition. The Sophist begins and ends with logos; its beginning and end-
ing are not identical to the beginning and ending of inquiry.4 
Theaetetus learned from the conversation what was learnable through conversation. 
The Stranger gave him what he could through relying on the element of logos alone, 
namely the ambivalent character of appearances. The possibility that things are not nec-
essarily how they seem to him is clarified to him. He has learned how to look and observe 
more cautiously and carefully. He learns of the future need to activate his own power to 
reason, his logos, so that what appears unproblematic can be problematized and exam-
ined. 
The need to see, therefore, cannot be replaced by the Stranger’s instruction. The-
aetetus needs to put together what he sees with what he heard together into a harmonious 
whole. A better determination of what Theaetetus lacks is παθήματα, the experience of 
things that only comes with time.5 Theaetetus needs it in order to sharpen his discernment 
of individual sophists and philosophers in the future. He will, like everyone, make mis-
takes and might even associate with sophists, thinking that they are philosophers or noble 
ones. In other words, he will suffer (πάθος). The Stranger’s logos attenuates but does not 
eliminate Theaetetus’ need to “learn through suffering.” 
																																																								
4 Theaetetus’ state with respect to the sophist is not unlike the reader’s state concerning the Stranger. Plato 
gives us the Stranger’s logos, but he does not say how to understand them correctly. At best we can plausi-
bly judge the being of his soul, whether it is a philosopher or a sophist. (See the insightful comment in 
Howland (1998), 176) 
5 Cf. Blondell (2002), 342-3. 
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We can further specify of what Theaetetus lacks experience. If I counted correctly, 
he utters the phrase “I don’t understand (οὐκ ἔμαθον)” for a total of five times (227c7, 
222d9, 260b4, 262a12, 265b7). None of these occurs in the digression on Forms, where 
Theaetetus rarely confesses difficulty and even made a couple of contributions to the 
conversation.6 It appears that as a mathematician, Theaetetus is a bit out of touch with the 
everyday. Given that μαθηματικά derives from μανθάνω, Theaetetus’ “I don’t under-
stand” seems to have the undertone of “I can’t mathematicize it!” A glance at the context 
of those five times when he utters this response shows that the first four occur when the 
theme is about the soul. And as mentioned before, in the discussion of the refuter, which 
is about psychic or intellectual purification, Theaetetus had a lot of trouble “seeing” any-
thing before the Stranger makes the divisions (223e4, 226c12, e3-4). The defect of The-
aetetus is then “psychology.” In other words, he lacks a logos of what is least likely to be 
mathematicizable.7 Since the difference between the philosopher and the sophist ulti-
mately concerns the respective states of their souls, it looks like experience of humans is 
what Theaetetus lacks. 
With Socrates’ trial in the background, the Stranger’s failure takes on special signifi-
cance. The philosopher champions logos, but the logos appropriate to knowledge he is 
after cannot defend his cause in front of others. Neither Socrates’ logos nor the Stranger’s 																																																								
6 Of course, not voicing his perplexity does not mean that he is following the conversation well, it might 
mean that he is actually suffering from folly. But it does indicate that he does not sense his own confusion 
as much as in those places where he makes it explicit. In the digression, he says he does not understand 
once (in the perplexity on Being), and the verb is συνίημι. And given my interpretation of that passage, 
namely that the perplexity before Being is deeply involved in the perplexity before the thinking activity of 
the soul, it reinforces the point being made here. 
7 As Rosen (1980), 163 observes, for Theaetetus mathematics replaces experience, and the latter is unavail-
able to him precisely because of his young age. 
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can do this. Otherwise put, the project of comprehending the intelligible aspects of the 
world within logos –– the philosopher’s aspiration to be a dialectician –– cannot justify 
itself in front of others. One reason why this is so is because non-philosophers challenge 
and doubt the worth of philosophy. The Platonic dialogues are in this sense serious re-
sponses to Socrates’ trial. But even in a society where philosophers are relatively safer 
thanks to Plato, philosophy still requires defending, because it understands itself to be the 
most reasonable choice of life. It is not simply compelled by non-philosophers to defend 
itself; it desires to defend itself. This desire is experienced as an inner need arising from 
the very choice of the philosophic life. 
In this respect, then, the Sophist can be read as a critique of a certain intrinsic urge in 
philosophizing. The dialogue reveals the philosopher incompletely: it describes him as 
the otherworldly stargazer, the absent-minded Thales who forgot what was at his feet. 
Accordingly the ideal of knowledge it offers is that retreat into logos, and accordingly it 
presents the soul voluntarily wishing to hit truth and to become what it is by itself. But 
this ends up in a life and knowledge that cannot defend its own activity on its own 
grounds in front of others. It is in this sense not philosophical enough. And so the ideal of 
knowledge suggested by the dialogue must be subjected to a new examination. This inti-
mated new, yet unclear ideal would supposedly incorporate elements of perception, expe-
rience, and psychology into a view of knowledge that can defend itself on its own 
grounds. It would be capable of defending Socrates. These elements all point to the body, 
i.e. what the giants stood for and what the friends despised. The Stranger’s failed recon-
ciliation between the two must therefore be taken up again. Perhaps the knower that is to 
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become one in the pursuit of knowledge is not the soul alone, but the embodied soul or 
ensouled body. And the ability to deal with particulars, the understanding of souls, and 
the need to remember the body –– all these point to a notion of knowledge typically pos-
sessed by someone whom the Greeks called πολιτικός, “statesman,” the philosopher’s 
other double. The investigation of what knowledge is and accordingly what the philoso-
pher is must therefore go to its sequel, the Statesman, for the next transformative reflec-
tion. 
2. It does not follow, however, that dialectic as it is conceived in the Sophist is 
judged to be a worthless project because of its improbability and inadequacy. Instead, 
Plato means to say is that dialectic is a very significant part of the philosopher’s deep de-
sire, but it is not the whole; and that its defects are no reason to give up pursuing it, but 
only a reason to pursue it with caution, moderation, and with a clear awareness that it 
does not encompass the totality of what the philosopher longs for. The lesson is that we 
should be sober about the power of logos, not that we should reject it altogether. 
The philosopher does not appeal to the impossibility of perfect knowledge as an ex-
cuse to be lazy, but as a warning against unfounded optimism and hasty assertions; while 
he understands the importance and value of taking risks in his pursuit of knowledge, he 
also understands that not all risks are equally worth taking and logos can evaluate be-
tween options. In blending adventurousness with a concern for safety, the Platonic phi-
losopher exemplifies the difficult union of intellectual moderation and courage.8 It fol-
																																																								
8 Mouroutsou (2010), 57-62 emphasizes daring (Wagnis) in the Platonic conception of philosophy, and she 
uses the Sophist to support her view with a survey of τολμή, κίνδυνος and cognate words. A sound choice, 
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lows from this that the way of Socrates and the way of the Stranger are only rivals in the 
beginning; they end up complementing each other. Socrates encourages Theaetetus to 
overcome the fear of voicing and testing his views in the open, but makes him more 
moderate in the estimation of those views. The Stranger induces moderateness by reduc-
ing Theaetetus back to the attentive, absorbing, listening student and adopting a more di-
dactic stance than Socrates, but he also emboldens Theaetetus by showing how important 
and difficult questions can be dealt with in a constructive manner. In short, Socrates 
blends courage and moderation in a manner that emphasizes the latter, while the Stranger 
stresses the former. Does this difference have something to do with the fact that Socrates 
is the citizen-philosopher par excellence and the Stranger is a wandering, nameless think-
er? This question once more points to the Statesman. What can be said here is that the 
“either-or” between the two of them has, on closer consideration, transformed into the 
more safely woven “both-and” represented by Plato. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
because the Sophist is a venturesome and, one might even say, “masculine” dialogue. It opens with The-
odorus calling the Stranger a “very philosophical man.” 
It must be added, however, that the notion of safety (ἀσφαλής) is no less important: the turning to 
logos and the hypothesis of Forms, as Socrates explains in the Phaedo, was rooted in a concern for “the 
safe” way to philosophize (see e.g. 100d8, e1, 101d2, 105b7, c1). The Stranger at one point says that the 
Empedocleans and the Heracliteans, faced with the monist-pluralist debate, thought it “the safest” to weave 
together both, that is, to affirm that being is both one and many (242e1). He himself does the same thing 
with respect to the battle between giants and gods: he weaves together motion and rest, and ultimately be-
ing and nonbeing. Cf. ἀσφαλής in 231a7 (quoted at the beginning of 2.3), which implies that classifying the 
refuter as a sophist is a mistake that only an incautious person would make; cf. also 229c6. 
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